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Abstract
Co-operation between civil society actors and military personnel is increasingly 
common in humanitarian missions since the early 1990s. However the interaction has 
led to varying degrees o f friction between both groups, at times lessening the co­
ordination and efficiency o f the civil-military relationship. Existing theories o f  civil- 
military relations are largely based upon the relationship between the military and their 
civilian government, and have not been tested within the relationships experienced at 
the ground level during peace enforcement type missions. This study tests the theories 
o f Samuel Huntington within the context o f the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) led mission in Kosovo (KFOR) between 1999 and 2001. This period o f time 
encompasses the NATO bombing campaign, including their interaction with civilian 
agencies during the refugee crisis, and the subsequent deployment o f KFOR into 
Kosovo. The study examines KFOR’s interaction with various civilian entities 
including NGO’s, police forces, civilian administration, political and paramilitary 
figures. The methodological framework o f the study uses hypotheses generated from 
the work o f Huntington, and then tests the hypotheses with reference to KFOR’s actions 
and interactions with civilian entities. The thesis concludes that Huntington’s theory, 
with some qualifications, can successfully account for interaction in such an 
environment.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
The aim of this thesis is to explore the character o f civil-military relations during a 
peacekeeping or peace support operation, and in doing so to discover whether there are 
underlying trends within military culture that significantly influence the outcome of 
civil-military co-operation. This approach is somewhat different to those commonly 
undertaken within the study of civil-military relations, as it treats the multi-national 
military force as a singular group. Generally those examining civil-military relations 
tend to focus on more coherent defence entities, insofar as the subject matter may be the 
national army, the chief o f staff, or a security committee or council (for example see 
Perlmutter 1968:606-643, Weigley 1993:27-58, Lepingwell 1992:539-572). Scholars 
then in turn examine the interface with a civilian counterpart or institution, such as the 
department o f defence, civilian government, greater political elite and so on.
What these studies have in common is that they involve unitary actors, or can be 
separated into unitary actors, such as the army, air force and navy within the armed 
forces. Multi-national forces in theatre, by comparison, are not strong unitary actors. 
The national contingent’s first duty is towards the parent state, not the operational 
command under which the contingent has been placed. United Nations (UN) operations 
have been the scene of many incidents where one country’s military has acted, or 
refused to act, in disregard of the multinational force commander’s orders, or where the 
actions o f national forces have clashed with the operations o f the multinational force in 
question (for example United States [US] forces in Somalia in 1993, Belgian troops in 
Rwanda in 1994, see Shawcross 2000, as well as French KFOR [Kosovo Force] in 
Kosovo in 2000). Therefore the multinational force has much less consistency and 
unity of purpose than a national army, even if  it may be structured along the same lines. 
The bodies that the multinational force interfaces with are also far less coherent than 
those within the state. A crisis zone will attract many different civilian organisations, 
be they national, interstate or charitable groups, in addition to the indigenous groups of 
the region. According to Richard H. Solomon and Colonel George F. Oliver III (in All, 
Miltenberger and Weiss 2000),
Peacemaking and humanitarian relief operations are usually as complex and 
multifaceted as the problems they address. It’s rare to find an operation that 
involves only military personnel, or relies wholly on intergovernmental
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organizations (IGOs), or calls only for the expertise o f nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs). It’s much more typical for members o f two or all three 
of these communities to be in the field. And when they are together, it’s 
important for the success o f the operation that they work well together (p.ix, All, 
Miltenberger and Weiss 2000).
The obvious question to ask then is why one would examine a multi-national force as a 
coherent body when it is not much more than a loose collection o f contributions from 
national armies? The simple answer lies in the difficulty o f the alternatives. 
Conclusions drawn from the interaction o f one nation’s armed forces with that nation’s 
government may not be necessarily extrapolated to the next. Therefore, trying to 
understand the functioning of a multi-national force through workings of each national 
contingent would soon leave the researcher bogged down in a multiplicity o f differing 
national structures and cultures. Studying KFOR in this fashion, for example, would 
necessitate the study o f civil-military relations and systems in 30 separate countries.
However, the military profession itself can be used as a starting point. Although there 
will be undeniable national differences, there is also common values and attitudes that 
will be present in almost all military forces, and therefore should provide lowest 
common denominators. The military is, after all, a highly rigid organisation bound to 
the use of violent force for political reasons. The creation o f a standing officer corps 
and general staff, happening from the 1800’s onward, made the military a distinct group 
in society whose profession was the science and application of war and whose intellects 
were bent on finding the most expeditious way of achieving military objectives. The 
most famous protagonist of this military intellectualism, Carl Von Clausewitz (1993 
edition), whilst advocating the complete dominance of political objectives over military 
processes, did not recognise any dilution of the later. ‘The conduct o f war, in its great 
outlines, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place o f the pen, but does 
not on that account cease to think according to its own laws.’ (1993:737)
This increased specialisation o f the military, while it served to make the profession far 
less comprehensible to the civilian, did not negatively influence its inherent 
competitiveness. Traditionally, both militaries and governments have sought parity 
with their neighbours in the area of defence, making regional minimum standards in 
training, concepts and resources even more likely. An advanced military alliance has a
further homogenising effect, even for those states that remain outside o f such an entity 
(for example much of neutral Ireland’s military equipment and training is North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] standard). In short, it is possible for us to find 
generalisations that can be applied to the military profession across different nations, 
and even more so when those nations are grouped within a particular region.
This thesis identifies such military characteristics and then attempts to assess the impact 
of these characteristics on civil-military relations at the ground level, as opposed to 
those at the executive level. Civil-military relations at the executive level can be 
expected to differ hugely from relations and co-operation at the ground level. Whereas 
national governments may desire results from their armed forces in security and defence 
endeavours, they may not pay close attention to how such results are obtained. In the 
Clauswitzian fashion, the military will be the blunt tool o f the state and its politics. At 
the ground level however, civil-society actors may be more concerned with the way in 
which this blunt tool is being applied. They may feel that the military’s actions may 
negatively impact the ability o f civilian organisations in theatre to operate successfully, 
they may feel that the military is overbearing, and they may feel sidelined or 
disenfranchised by the presence of such an intimidating group. The study examines 
how military decisions in theatre practically impact upon the work o f civilian 
organisations.
Civil-military relations theory will be applied to assist in the isolation o f those aspects 
of military culture that influence co-operation. The dissertation will bring a conceptual 
approach, drawn from the existing civil-military relations literature, to a modem 
military operation where a multi-national force was deployed. By doing so it will 
demonstrate how military culture influences the military’s co-operation with its civilian 
partners, and how this in turn impacts upon joint peacemaking and humanitarian efforts 
within theatre. The study achieves an understanding o f civil-military relations that will 
have a great practical use in today’s military operations, particularly those o f the lower- 
and mid-range o f the Petersberg tasks in which Irish military personnel are most likely 
to be involved. With a greater understanding o f preferences o f the military organisation 
we can better decide what tasks their expertise is suited to, and just as importantly, what 
scenarios in which their involvement would be best curtailed. The adaptability o f the 
military is then better understood and can consequently be better utilised.
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For western governments, specifically those of the European Union (EU), the most 
important military commitments are in the Balkans, if  only because that area holds the 
key to future regional stability for a consolidated and expanded Union. Of the 
operations currently ongoing, NATO-led KFOR is by far the largest, with almost 50,000 
troops present, o f which one transport company has been contributed by Ireland. 
KFOR’s significance goes beyond simple size and location, it also has an important 
policy contribution. The dimensions o f the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force are closely 
related to KFOR in size (the Rapid Reaction Force is to comprise o f 60,000 soldiers) 
and the aim of current EU efforts to equip the force logistically spring from a desire to 
improve on KFOR’s lengthy build up period.
As an example o f civil-military co-operation, the experience in Kosovo is ideal. 
Military forces had to work in conjunction with civilian groups from the very first in 
diplomatic, humanitarian and security efforts. A close investigation o f how these 
interactions contributed, or otherwise, to positive outcomes would certainly aid in the 
development o f a civil-military interface. If soldiers and civilians do not understand 
how to work with one another the gains o f inserting them quickly to a crisis zone will be 
lessened as tensions between each will hinder any potential synergy. The identification 
of recurrent trends o f behaviour within civil-military co-operation, especially those 
reminiscent o f experiences within other areas o f civil-military relations (see for example 
techniques o f manipulation identified by Janowitz 1959:493, Kirkland 2000:547-560 
and Gourlay 2000:33-50), would help to resolve an increasingly important challenge to 
crisis-management. The seminal work o f Samuel Huntington has been chosen to 
provide the framework of the research question, and his conservative realist concepts 
have shaped into two hypotheses. Do soldiers act independently o f civilians in the field, 
and can their freedom be restricted by a multiplicity of civilian entities?
The first chapter o f the thesis investigates the recent development o f the civil-military 
relations literature and examines the contemporary standing o f the field, as well as the 
theoretical perspectives that may be applied to ground level civil-military relations. It 
finishes by refining Huntington’s theory into the working hypotheses for the study. 
Chapter Two details the methodological approach assumed in the research and lists the 
various sources used and defines any biases associated with each. Chapter Three 
examines the military’s involvement with humanitarian and infrastructure tasks. The 
first half o f this chapter looks at the combined civil-military efforts to deal with the
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Kosovo refugee crisis and its spill over into Macedonia and Albania. The second half 
of the chapter looks at the arrival o f KFOR into the stricken province and the military’s 
interactions with civilian personnel and organisations in humanitarian and civil projects. 
Chapter Four looks at KFOR’s co-operation with civilians in the areas o f policing and 
justice, and examines how the military improvised and devised their own policing 
service while the civil police force was built up. The military’s role in, and co­
operation with, Kosovo’s judicial system is also examined. Chapter Five assesses 
KFOR’s treatment o f the province’s paramilitary and radical groups and looks at the 
impact o f the military’s reactions to sectarian and ethnically motivated violence. The 
conclusion of the thesis argument then follows.
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No more is this the case. Since the 1990’s military and civilian organisations have been 
seeking to bridge the professional gaps between them in order to be able to better work 
together on common objectives. In theatre the division o f labour between military and 
non-military personnel is becoming more fluid as humanitarians and soldiers attempt to 
develop a more organic approach grounded in the respective capabilities of each. 
According to Carl Bildt, former High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
‘Whatever we call these operations, peace enforcement or peacekeeping, they will 
require a civilian component and a civilian-military interface’ (Phillips 1998:23). The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and more recently the European Union (EU), have 
each taken a direct interest in this area and are attempting to exploit the possible 
synergies in a layered civil-military operation (See for example Council o f the EU 2002, 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2000, NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
[EAPC] 1998). However despite the interest in the matter, and the subsequent 
incorporation o f civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) into actual doctrine, there is a 
strong difference o f opinion in the proper balance o f civilian and military input. For 
example one recent EU communication states that the focus o f CIMIC is to support the 
military mission, which in turn will support the achievement o f lasting solutions for the 
crisis (Council of the EU, 2002). The opposite has also been argued, stating that the 
military role in post-conflict situations should be transitional and limited as the overall 
aim is reaching self-sufficiency o f local people (Beasley 1998). There is logic in each 
position and it may be that different crises will require the respective influence of 
civilian and military parties to be varied according to the circumstances. In addition to 
this, despite the obvious attractiveness o f achieving synergy between soldiers and 
civilians, cultural and professional differences continue to raise significant barriers. 
Applying a theory that could untangle the reasons for friction between both soldiers and 
civilians in theatre would, therefore, make a significant contribution.
However, the existing literature on the civil military relations and co-operation in 
theatre is not widely developed, especially from a theoretical point of view. There are 
two reasons for this. Extensive co-operation between the military and civilian entities at 
the ground level is a relatively new phenomenon, and this is reflected in the relatively 
low amount o f research available by comparison to other subject areas within the field. 
Secondly, as previously mentioned, traditional research in the field o f civil-military 
relations has overwhelmingly tended to concentrate on military forces and their 
interface with various components of their encompassing society be it the political elite,
greater public or surrounding social and political institutions (for specific examples see 
Perlmutter 1968:606-643, Weigley 1993:27-58, Lepingwell 1992:539-572 and Segal 
and Segal 1983:151-170 for a broad discussion).
But while the soldier/state relationship is ultimately the pivotal point in democratic 
and/or civilian control over the armed forces, some argue that it is counterproductive to 
construe understandings o f civil-military relations entirely through that framework. 
Bland (1999:8) argues that
Generally, extant and new theories o f civil-military relations fail in two ways: 
they are too narrowly conceived and miss critical aspects o f the problem, and 
they are bound by the culture and national politics o f their proponents. Existing 
theories and studies tend to concentrate on solving or preventing the coup d’etat, 
something that is a dangerous but, arguably, occasional problem of civil-military 
relations in most states.
If, according to Bland, theories of civil-military relations can be undermined by over­
reliance on cultural and political aspects, how useful can they be for understanding co­
operation in theatre? The soldiers and civilians on today’s battlefield or theatre of 
operations are less likely to share a common nationality, let alone common norms or 
cultural outlook. They may not share allegiance to a common executive body and may 
have very different opinions on how to achieve the same objectives. Taking the overall 
stability of western civil-military relations into account, it seems likely that a crisis of 
civil-military relations may be more likely to happen outside of, or removed from, the 
full apparatus o f state control and inside the confines and pressures o f a multi-national 
deployment o f military and civilian forces. Norms and interests between various parties 
may conflict, yet fewer structures will be available to resolve or rectify them.
20th Century development of civil-military relations
Given these factors the necessity o f a theory designed for civil-military co-operation at 
ground level becomes apparent. Unfortunately the poverty o f existing civil-military 
relations theory has been commented on by Burk (2002:7) and Bland (1999:7). Burk 
states that we have only limited theories that examine only one aspect o f the matter, and
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only in the loosest sense do we have overarching theories o f civil-military relations. 
Bland (1999:7) goes so far as to say that the theoretical foundation that might help to 
answer how the military is controlled by civil authorities is weak or even entirely 
lacking. In addition to this, civil-military relations literature has a particularly broad 
interdisciplinary scope. Speaking from a sociological point o f view, Moskos wrote that
Sociologists o f the armed forces have long relied on the work of other students 
of the military in such established and allied disciplines as political science and 
history. Lately there has been an overlap with the fields o f peace studies and 
strategic or national security studies; beyond academia there is a larger group -  
variously, present and past members o f the military and defenders and critics of 
military organization -  who both give insights and serve as a corrective for 
professional sociologists of the military. Few substantive areas in sociology 
have such a diffuse constituency as does the study o f armed forces and society. 
(1976:55)
Although this range o f fields makes for a rich synergy it is not without its drawbacks. 
Reflecting some o f Bland’s concerns, Edinger (1963:392-405) pointed out that many of 
the studies produced by the 1960s ‘have been conspicuously ethnocentric in character, 
and have tended to deal with issues limited in time and space’ and he criticised them for 
having ‘little unity o f focus or method’ (1963: 392). According to Edinger any work 
which dealt with the military, regardless o f the field in which it originated, was being 
given a blanket classification o f civil-military relations, including the ‘bargain 
basement’ work (1963:392).
Due to the interdisciplinary nature o f civil-military relations research and the sparseness 
of theoretical works, it is therefore necessary to engage with a broad spectrum of 
literature. This approach has its advantages insofar as it yields a necessary 
understanding o f the development of western civil-military relations over the last five 
decades, and also allows the author to avail o f the key works in the field. The 
remaining difficulty is to pick a coherent path through the various works available, as it 
is difficult to bracket the research in a fashion that conveniently divides it without 
excluding certain schools of thought.
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Moskos (1976:55-77) conveniently separated the dominant categories of civil-military 
relations.1 The five heuristic categories of civil-military studies were the power elite 
soldier, the professional soldier, the common soldier, the citizen soldier, and the third 
world soldier. The specific works belonging within each category will be identified and 
discussed below, but for now a simple conceptual guide will be offered. The power 
elite soldier is the one most closely associated with the literature dealing with the 
military industrial complex, and posits that the military is a pressure group. The 
professional soldier and common soldier categories deal with two sides of the same 
coin, where the professional soldier deals with the career officer and the military culture 
of professional soldiers, while the common soldier deals with enlisted personnel. The 
citizen soldier by comparison represents a juxtaposition o f  the professional and common 
soldier. Moskos (1976:64) describes the ideal formulation o f the citizen soldier as one 
who could take up arms for his country, retain civilian values yet bring ingenuity to the 
military structure, and easily resume civilian pursuits on completion o f a tour of duty. 
The third world soldier is, as the title suggests, the study o f armed forces of the less 
economically developed countries.
Since the point o f this study is civil-military relations in theatre, we can see immediately 
that two of the categories are o f less relevance. The power elite soldier would 
concentrate mostly on the military’s intertwining with economic and political spheres. 
For example the work of Mills (1956) theorised that there was a small and unified ruling 
elite who controlled the means of resource allocation and power in American society. 
Included in this elite were ‘warlords’, or top military officers, whose interests were 
entwined with those of economic and political leaders. Mill’s thesis, although in line 
with the concept o f the military-industrial complex, was simplistic about the ambitions 
of the high-ranking military, and did not define any more enduring agenda for the 
military than for it to remain in a position of power relative to other elite groups. Such 
research would be little value to civil-military co-operation in theatre. Literature on the 
third world soldier tends to examine the relation of the military to direct political power 
and authority and the recurring problem of the coup d ’etat (see for example N ’Diaye 
2002:619-640, Hunter 1997:453-475 and Jenkins and Kposowa 1990:861-875).
1 S ocio log ists often prefer to use the definition ‘armed forces and so c ie ty ’ instead o f  ‘civil-m ilitary  
relations’, how ever the author uses them  here interchangeably and does not intend any significant 
difference in m eaning to b e inferred.
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This field is o f less benefit to this study as the subject matters are often militaries with a 
high degree o f politicisation and appetite for direct power over the state, a scenario that 
simply won’t arise from a clongomerate of separate national militaries within a foreign 
country.
By contrast literature within the professional, common and citizen soldier categories 
examines to a greater extent preferences, incentives and behaviours created by, or 
present within, military culture and the works that are discussed below are drawn 
collectively from each o f these categories. Although these values are often directly 
related to the soldier’s place within his or her respective society, they are easier to 
translate to a ground level scenario where civil and military efforts and organisations 
may be ad hoc and transitional. Within such a loosely regulated environment, where 
military personnel are on active duty and removed from their parent societies, personal 
attitudes and cultures are o f more importance than the military’s place within the 
national establishment.
Not only did Moskos (1976:70) categorise the literature, he also discerned three 
paradigms in the conceptual understanding o f US armed forces (and by extension other 
militaries o f the western world) and society from the 1950s to the 1970s. In the first 
phase, roughly before the 1950s, the military was viewed as a self-contained entity with 
sharp divergences from civilian values. Throughout most o f the 1950s and 1960s the 
armed forces were seen as reflecting master trends toward societal bureaucratisation 
with increasing overlap with civilian structures. By the 1970s the distinctiveness and 
peculiarity o f violent force was again rediscovered, but within the context o f variable 
civil-military forms. The three paradigms have applicability beyond the US as the 
historical events and technological advances o f each period are a major determinant to 
the evolution of civil-military relations not only in the US but also other western 
countries. Hereafter the author will refer to Moskos’ paradigmatic phases as a rough 
guide, but will also include works that follow the logic o f the paradigm in question yet 
fall outside o f the timeline.
Much o f the research that falls into Moskos’ first paradigm deals with military 
socialisation during war, such as Marshall (1947), Stouffer (1949), Shils and Janowitz 
(1948), du Picq (1958), Feld (1959:15-22) and Little (1964). Du Picq (1958), based on 
his observations prior to World War 1, discovered that a strictly rational analysis o f
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military organisation and military formations tended to be misleading as it neglected 
intangible factors such as morale, an important factor o f solidarity and cohesion. This 
view was reinforced by Marshall (1947) when he asserted the principle that morale, 
rooted in a feeling o f  unity, gave soldiers the courage to fight. Shils and Janowitz were 
to subsequently confirm this (1948:280-315) when they conducted research into why 
German soldiers had such a low rate of desertion and surrender during the war. They 
discovered that the main motivation of the soldier to resist was the ‘primary personality 
demands’ afforded by the socialisation of the army (1948:281) and its smaller units. 
Similarly Little (1964) identified a shift from the primary affective relations which held 
such cohesiveness for regular soldiers during the pre-1950’s period, to a ‘buddy’ 
system. He found that buddy relations were the basic element o f infantry social 
organisation in the Korean conflict, and predicted that it would be it would be an 
important component o f cohesiveness in future limited conflicts.
However these works examine the soldier’s internal relations with military organisation 
and subsequent effect upon the soldier’s ability to fight, and as such are of less 
relevance to the study of civil-military co-operation. Continuing on from Moskos’ logic 
of the military as a self-contained entity Huntington (1957) could be placed in this 
category as well. According to Huntington it was the rise of the professional officer 
corp that led to the modem problem of civil-military relations in Europe and North 
America. He writes that
The emergence o f the officer corps as an autonomous professional body cannot, 
of course, be given any precise dates. It was gradual and faltering. Two facts, 
however, stand out. Prior to 1800 there was no such thing as a professional 
officer corps. In 1900 such bodies existed in virtually all major countries. 
(1957:19)
The creation o f the officer corps and general staffs allowed the military elite to retain 
the essential expertise required for a cadre of military efficiency that could be bestowed 
upon a mass conscript army in times o f need, but in Huntington’s opinion also made the 
military an autonomous social institution. This extends the concept o f a self-contained 
entity not just to a short post war period, but to hundreds o f years prior.
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Huntington’s work, however, has a broader applicability. He advanced the argument 
that once the military became a true profession with enduring peculiar characteristics, 
beginning with the officer corps and general staff, it would be forever at odds with its 
civilian overseers for a number of reasons. According to him the military were 
independent of, yet subordinate to the government, had a conservative realist outlook 
that put it at odds with liberal democracy, and could be categorised according to their 
professionalism and political power.
Detractors o f Huntington’s argument pointed to its failure to account for civil-military 
relations under socialist systems. Albright (1980:553-576) based his criticism of 
Huntington on the experience of civil-military relations in 16 communist countries. He 
dismissed the concept o f tension borne out o f military professionalism and instead 
pointed to the interchangeability o f both military and political leaders during 
revolutionary periods (1980:558-559). However, as Huntington recognised the creation 
of a general staff as the fundamental component o f military professionalism, Albright’s 
guerrilla armies are perhaps not the best comparison. Although not discussing 
Huntington as such, two works on communist armies also revealed patterns that 
Huntington rejected. Kolkowicz (1982) came to the conclusion that the communist 
military did have distinct institutional and professional values, interests and objectives 
to advance within the system, and that the military and party were highly 
interdependent. Jones (1985) found that in the Red Army, a high degree of 
professionalism and political power was in evidence with an anti-military ideology, a 
combination that Huntington had dismissed. Most recently Herspring (1999:557-577) 
argued that Huntington’s paragdigm has a fatal flaw when it comes to understanding 
civil-military relations in communist polities. Based upon an analysis o f the Soviet and 
East German experiences Herspring argues that the antagonistic relationship Huntington 
posited between civilian and military authorities changed over time. Herspring found 
that Huntington’s paradigm, accurate for the 1920’s, became inaccurate as socialists, 
military and civilian, grew up accepting the structures that they found themselves in 
(1999:568).
Moskos’ second paradigm of civil-military relations coincided with the advent of the 
Cold War, and some o f the relevant characteristics o f this period that appeared in the 
literature may be summarised as follows. The realities o f nuclear war dictated, for those 
countries concerned, that a military confrontation might lead to the annihilation of the
entire society. Therefore military and political spheres were forced to develop a 
continuing dialogue to afford a constant joint appraisal o f  the security situation. This 
collaboration was increased by new technology as the military received civilian 
personnel during the implementation of technological innovations.
The emergence of this ongoing dialogue was identified and debated by Fox (1955:402- 
418, 1961:354-366), May (1955:161-180), Howard (1960:35-46), Lyons (1961:55-63) 
and Janowitz (1957:18), who questioned how best to achieve co-ordination between 
civilian and military agendas. Howard (1960:35-46), based on a study o f civil-military 
relations in Great Britain and the United States between 1945 and 1958, suggested that 
in wartime that it was desirable for ‘maximum power to be concentrated in the hands of 
one or two men’, and reverting to a more diluted model in peacetime. Fox believed in 
the necessity o f a new breed of civilian individuals who would be able to understand 
both military and political considerations, rather than reducing military participation at 
high-level decision-making (1955:418). May already saw such a nexus of political- 
military considerations in the new National Security Council, the product of ‘long and 
painful history’, and re-iterated its importance as an institution for political-military 
consultation and debate (1955:180). The effects of this enforced collaboration were 
noted by Lyons (1961:55-63) when he studied the influx o f contemporary values into 
both the military and civilian sides of decision-makers. He suggested that a 
‘civilianization’ o f the military and a ‘militarization’ o f civilians was in progress and 
that this was due to a new relationship between both that was based upon a more 
complex division of labour than had existed before (1961:63).
However, Janowitz (1957:18) felt that the way to ensure proper balance o f relations and 
parity o f esteem in civil-military relations was to appeal to the military’s 
professionalism, or the least civilian aspects o f their training. In an apparently limiting 
argument to Lyon’s concept o f dual ‘militarization’ and ‘civilianization’, Janowitz did 
not accept that the convergence o f military and civilian spheres was all encompassing. 
He identified subtle trends by which the military resisted a civilian influx, such as 
training military officers for technical roles rather than simply hiring already qualified 
civilians (1957:18). He later developed this argument by stating that military authority 
had responded to technological changes by transforming from an organisation based on 
authority to one employing more and more techniques o f manipulation (Janowitz, 
1959:493).
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Civil-military relations in limited conflicts
Although Moskos (1976:70) does not give a precise date, he states that by the 1970s the 
distinctiveness and peculiarity o f violent force was again rediscovered, but within the 
context o f variable civil-military forms. Thus the third paradigm overlaps on the second 
as it also began within the Cold War, but was not caused by it. The emergence of 
limited war, hostilities such as Vietnam and UN operations, that did not risk societal 
annihilation, rediscovered the distinct character o f violence inherent within military 
force and reasserted the essential gulf between the civilian and the military spheres. 
However because o f the more complex nature of peacekeeping operations, the 
respective influences o f civilian and military parties in the maintenance o f security 
could vary, with negotiation and political expertise being equal tools to the threat and 
use of force. Despite Moskos’ reference to the 1970’s, literature that fits within this 
paradigm appears earlier. Instead o f massive conventional war Janowitz (1964, p.417- 
440) conceptualised the idea o f ‘constabulary’ forces, where the military establishment 
was continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use o f force, and sought 
viable international relations rather than victory. This was a departure from the second 
paradigm, where civil and military spheres had initiated an intensive dialogue in order 
to avoid military engagement. Use o f military forces to achieve strategic ends was 
again deemed appropriate, but in a much more limited way. Seeking to verify 
Janowitz’s concept o f constabulary forces Moskos (1975:388-401) examined the 
relations within the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP). He discovered 
that the traditional military professionalism ‘contributed to, rather than handicapped, an 
adaptation to the constabulary model’ (1975:399).
Broadening out the constabulary concept further Janowitz and Little (1974) argued that 
it was not only inevitable, but also desirable that the military develop a degree of 
political know-how to allow them to deal more competently with the administrative and 
diplomatic tasks involved in limited warfare. According to Janowitz (1974:473-508) 
the application o f military force was now being applied with concurrent efforts at 
persuasion. Fighting and negotiation, where negotiation involved the political, 
diplomatic and economic, were constituents o f a new level o f complexity and fragility 
in international relations. To bridge the gap Janowitz (1983) suggested a civic 
education. Professional soldiers would be taught that their needs were not different 
from those o f wider society, they would understand the essential goals o f the norms and
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rules that underpinned the regulations of their service, and deepen their knowledge of 
the obligations o f their country within the broader world order. Wesbrook (1983) 
argued that such political education would be far more effective than simple 
indoctrination, as indoctrination was unlikely to contribute to the formation of long­
term bonds of commitment to the other members o f the state and its ideology.
Although many of the factors identified within the second paradigm continued to be 
relevant, such as the overall Cold War threat and the increasing influx of technology, 
delineation between the second and third paradigms can be discerned. In support of 
Moskos’ evaluation that violent force was rediscovered, Segal and Segal (1983:161) 
wrote that ‘common technologies, leading to common organizational forms, could not 
eliminate the fundamental difference between the military and civilian spheres’. This 
fundamental difference lay in the application o f lethal force. According to Gard 
(1973:3) it still supplied the nation with ‘a trained armed force, skilled in applying 
military resources in support o f national policy’. Powell (1971) went further and argued 
that the difference between the military and the civil power was that the purpose of 
military power was to kill, although this view might be contested for its absolute 
approach. Whereas the third paradigm did see increased and variable co-operation 
between military and civilians, this was within a multi-layered context rather than the 
seemingly merging effects o f ‘civilianization’ and ‘militarization’ posited in the second 
paradigm.
With the end o f the Cold War security operations became far more complex. Whereas 
interstate wars had significantly reduced, they had been replaced by a myriad of low 
intensity regional conflicts (Ganguly and Taras 1998). The international community 
reacted initiall with a clumsy and uncoordinated approach. Gow (1994) argued that 
international action was not effective in the Balkans because of poor timing, 
inconsistency, lack o f co-ordination and agreement, and an ever-present weakness 
regarding compliance and use o f force. It appeared that the variable civil-military efforts 
identified by the third paradigm would have to be radically broadened within the post 
Cold War context. Booth (1994) identified a number o f duties beyond military 
intervention which should be incorporated into peacemaking efforts, including the 
support o f self defence, promotion o f negotiations, the fulfilment of humanitarian 
obligations, and the recognition of the limits o f military force.
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Revising the original paradigmatic approach, Moskos, Williams and Segal (2000) 
identified a fourth new paradigm for the post-Cold War or ‘Postmodern’ era based upon 
the radical changes in military objectives, input o f non-military personnel into security, 
and dominant security concerns.
The Postmodern military is characterized by five major organizational changes. 
One is increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, both 
structurally and culturally. The second is the diminution of differences within 
the armed services based on branch o f service, rank and combat versus support 
roles. The third is the change in the military purpose from fighting wars to 
missions that would not be considered military in the traditional sense. The 
fourth change is that the military forces are used more in international missions 
authorized (or at least legitimated) by entities beyond the nation state. A final 
change is the internationalisation of military forces themselves. Here we have in 
mind the emergence of the Eurocorps and the multinational and binational 
divisions in NATO countries. (2000:2)
The shift between the third and fourth paradigms regarding ground level missions can 
be pinpointed to the early 1990s when UN military missions in Somalia, the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, each carried humanitarian objectives in their mandates 
(Laurence 1999). Military and civilian spheres were again being forced together 
towards a single organic effort, however this time at an operational level. Even direct 
civilian support to the military for field operations was examined (Condrill 1993).
In an examination o f one of most recent military operations within the Postmodern 
paradigm, the Kosovo crisis, Pugh (2000:229-242) asked whether the influx of 
humanitarianism into military culture was creating a new dialogue o f civil-military 
relations. He concluded that the institutionalisation of humanitarianism in military 
doctrine, mandates, discourse and structures ‘may be placing military establishments in 
a hegemonic position that determines the framework o f future-civil military relations’ 
(2000:238). However, Pugh also stated that a ‘counter-hegemonic’ process may also be 
at work, whereby the greater the involvement of military forces in human rights and 
relief work, the more ‘civilianised’ military establishments will become (2000:238).
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Not only does Pugh’s conclusion jar with much o f the previous research within the 
field, which has consistently described greater co-operation but within a more complex 
division o f labour, it also does not consider the fact that western armies are less 
civilianised today than ever before. The divergence o f the military from civilian society 
due to the widespread transition from conscript forces to professional armies over the 
last number o f decades has been widely commented on by Hackel (1970), Janowitz 
(1973), Harries-Jenkins (1973:16) and Segal (1983). Most recently Van der Meulen 
and Manigart (1997:315-332) pointed out the inconsistency o f conscript forces for tasks 
of the constabulary type.
With the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and o f the Soviet 
Union itself, the Western armies’ missions changed. They are no longer used to 
deter a known adversary, but to maintain or enforce peace in out-of-area regions 
where their interests are in jeopardy and/or where human rights are being 
abused. In the context o f new engagement scenarios, political and military logic 
calls for the quick reaction capability o f “constabulary forces” (another classic 
forecast o f military sociology). These kinds o f forces are smaller, but their 
soldiers need longer training (1997:316).
Pugh’s argument of greater civilianisation o f the military through an influx of 
humanitarianism may also be dependent on the context o f the humanitarian activities. 
Kirkland’s (2000:547-560) study o f civic action by the US army in the central highlands 
of Vietnam in the late 1960’s displayed a military subsuming humanitarian actions into 
a greater war effort by using aid as a bargaining chip. ‘The American programs were 
based on good intentions, but they sought primarily to manipulate a vulnerable people 
to achieve short-term objectives’ (2000:557).
Overall however, conceptual schools o f thought for the Postmodern paradigm have 
lagged behind. Much o f the literature that has been produced has focused on the 
operational elements of the relationship between military and civilian actors working in 
concert and has concentrated on improving co-ordination rather than resolving more 
fundamental differences. For example Roberts (1996) advocated that the military 
should be prepared to assist humanitarian operations, but he accepted the dangers of 
involving the military in insecure foreign regions, and noted the necessity for good co­
ordination. In the same vein Williams (1998) argued that while a cultural gap will
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always exist between the military and the civilians, increased co-operation is possible 
through better planning, enhanced joint training, clearer mandates, improved 
management o f field operations and active attempts by the military, civil and 
humanitarian communities to achieve greater mutual understanding. These texts (see 
additionally Seiple 1996, Minear, van Baarda and Sommers 1999, Aall, Miltenberger 
and Weiss 2000, Bonn and Baker 2000) have often produced a ‘how to’ set of 
conclusions aimed at improving co-operation between soldiers and civilians. These 
conclusions are reactive in their scope and rather than defining necessary cultural 
changes they describe how western military establishments have grappled with new 
problems. Whereas these conclusions are immensely valuable in their own regard they 
have not often touched upon the questions inherent to the paradigm. Have civil-military 
relations been fundamentally altered by the demands o f a new security environment, 
and if so what is the nature of the change? Previous paradigms identified the issues at 
hand, but also recommended changes in the direction o f the overall evolution of the 
military’s fundamental character. The Postmodern paradigm however, does not yet 
appear to have moved far beyond the identification o f the issues within civil-military 
co-operation. What is now required are conceptual approaches that identify barriers to 
military forces achieving the changes required by the Postmodern paradigm.
A theoretical framework for civil-military relations in contemporary operations
A recurring theme has been whether the military are becoming more or less 
‘civilianised’, a question posed by Lyons (1961:63) and more recently by Pugh 
(2000:238). However, the concepts o f civilianisation and militarisation appear to be too 
simplistic and poorly defined and have been used to denote an apparent influx of values 
from one sphere to the other. This terminology reduces the study o f civil military- 
relations to a zero-sum game approach, where each group is bound to one spectrum of 
values where civilianisation and militarisation represent polar opposites. The ongoing 
lesson appears to be that closer co-operation between military and civilians does not 
bridge the essential gulf created by the military’s violent role, despite the various new 
relationships that are forged. What appears to be more accurate is that the military 
assumes certain values from its parent society, incorporates them, and remains the 
group o f ultimate violence. A more useful conceptual approach to civil-military 
relations, therefore, would recommend what values are required based upon the
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strategic and security environment in which the military will be expected to operate 
within.
Notwithstanding, following from the arguments o f those within the professional, citizen 
and common soldier branches o f the literature, the conceptual approach would also 
recognise that the military is not a tabula rasa that will accept all and any values that 
the civilian society might wish it to incorporate. For example, despite a stronger than 
ever emphasis on multilateral civil-military co-operation at the ground level, recent 
studies do not display a corresponding appreciation for such low key operations among 
US officers. One study demonstrated how more than 90% of West Point graduates 
believed the military’s primary function ‘was the conduct o f combat operations’ (Franke 
1997:52). Cadets’ attitudes towards non-combat missions also grew more negative the 
longer they had been at Westpoint (Franke 1997:52). Another study noted how there 
was a strong feeling among respondents at US war colleges that ‘once a goal is set, 
military judgement should prevail in selecting the best way to accomplish it’ (Stiehm, 
2001: 290-291). In addition to this the same study noted that military complaints about 
restraints on the use o f force seemed to ignore the fact that civilian officials had to take 
into account factors which lay outside of the purely military context (Stiehm, 2001: 
291).
In seeking to contribute to the development o f the current paradigm, the author wishes 
to test one of the established conceptual approaches drawn from the professional, citizen 
and common soldier literature. By doing so, the author hopes to realise two objectives. 
Firstly, to test an established theory within a modern context and discover whether it 
retains validity. Secondly, by doing so, to discover whether this theory can be applied 
as, or modified to provide the basis of, a new conceptual approach to ground level civil- 
military relations within the context o f the current paradigm.
In choosing an appropriate approach it is clear that none o f the existing theories o f civil- 
military relations were designed to be applied to the interaction between soldiers and 
civilians at the ground level. Therefore it is not surprising that many of the existing 
works do not lend themselves easily to a transfer. Theories or perspectives aimed at 
national security policy making (Fox 1955:402-418, May 1955:161-180, Avant 1994) 
are concentrated on executive decision-making, or access to executive decision-making 
structures, and for this reason may be unsuitable for the ground level experience. In one
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example Avant (1994) discovered that the role o f institutions was an important factor in 
the development o f military doctrine. She found that civilian leaders in Britain, who 
had institutional incentives to act as a unit, had an easier time agreeing on both policy 
goals and oversight options to ensure that the army followed these goals. Under these 
conditions the British Army reacted more flexibly to changes in civilian leader’s 
objectives. Conversely, in the US where civilian leaders had incentives to act 
separately, they found it harder to agree on policy goals and often chose more complex 
oversight mechanisms, to which the US Army did not always respond easily. Applying 
the institutional approach to a modem military deployment may have some merit when 
considering the various structures that are employed to bridge the gap between civil and 
military spheres, for example the civil structure o f the UN on one side and the military 
force on the other. However such approaches may be unsuitable for the rapid evolution 
and change which can happen in a crisis-management environment, where political 
reasons may be as important as efficiency in dictating the structure o f administrative 
bodies.
Other approaches have emphasised the social aspects o f differing personnel systems. 
According to Gourlay (2000:36) training and force composition can make some 
militaries more conducive to civil-military collaboration than others, and she noted the 
significance o f the military’s general familiarity with civil-military interaction and its 
use of reservists or civilian units. Janowitz (1973) pointed out that with the advent of an 
all-volunteer system and the end o f conscription, the military would develop more clear- 
cut boundaries and dangers o f social isolation and political particularism. An all­
volunteer force in his opinion increased the potential for internal rigidity and created a 
sharper boundary between the military and the civilian sector. Harries-Jenkins 
(1973:16) was of an identical viewpoint, stating that the decline o f the mass army and 
the adoption of a volunteer army would leave a military force in a position o f  
considerable social isolation, if  it was raised by traditional methods to carry out 
traditional tasks. However, on a political level Hackel (1970:22-23) dismissed any 
notion that a voluntary army was any safer for a democracy than a conscript one, there 
being no historical evidence to suggest that one system had more democratic reliability 
than another. In addition to this the transition from conscript to volunteer forces also 
seemed to imply a shifting o f the burden o f war to those who needed the money, and 
raised questions about the commitment of soldiers to their duties. However Segal’s 
research (1983) suggested that those who joined the military had a particular gravitation
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to the career in addition to their economic desires. The difficulty o f these approaches is 
that they may be too dependent on national cultures or systems to allow for 
generalisation. The many different contingents that may be present within a multi­
national deployment will be representative o f a number of differing personnel systems, 
whereas a study o f modern deployment requires an approach that could represent 
factors common to many military forces.
Theories dealing with attitudinal or behavioural characteristics are by their nature 
transferable across fields, such as those by Moskos (1975:388-401, 1976), Franke 
(1997:33-57) and Stiehm (2001:290-291). Moskos’ (1975:388-401 and 1976) research 
on the compatibility o f constabularism and traditional military professionalism is a 
particularly good example. He attempted to ascertain whether the traditional military 
professionalism lent itself to such a pacific stance as required under a peacekeeping 
mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP), a mission with all o f the characteristics o f an extreme 
accentuation o f constabularism. He concluded that both were compatible and 
subsequently dismissed the notions o f an ‘inflexible military mind’, or that the ‘glory of 
war’ was an essential ingredient of military honour (1976:137). Instead he called for a 
more grounded understanding of the norms o f military professionalism (1976:137).
However, this dissertation does not employ this approach for two reasons. Firstly it was 
felt that such attitudinal studies might have a tendency to be dependent on the social 
culture o f the subjects unless properly balanced. Secondly such studies would work 
best within the context o f well-defined conceptual approach, which Moskos had in the 
notion of constabularism. As previously stated the challenge o f the current paradigm is 
the lack o f such conceptual approaches, and therefore an attitudinal or behavioural 
approach may be better to validate a defined concept rather than form the basis o f one.
One such conceptual approach was formulated by Huntington (1957), whose work 
concentrated on defining the characteristics peculiar to the professional soldier, in this 
case the officer corps. There are a number o f drawbacks to using this work due to its 
age and the significant amount o f criticism regarding its ideological thrust (See Albright 
1980:553-576 and Herspring 1999:557-577, also Kolkowicz’s 1982 and Jones 1985). 
However, these criticisms are not sufficient reason to avoid applying Huntington’s work 
to a new setting. Much o f the criticism regarding Huntington’s work is related to its 
failure to account for civil-military relations in communist states. Since the focus of
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this research is civil-military relations during deployment the political characteristics of 
the troop-contributing nation are of less significance. Furthermore, despite the relative 
age of the work, it is still highly regarded amongst scholars in the field, including its 
recent detractors (see Herspring 1999:557-577). However, whereas the ideology of 
Huntington’s work may not be an impediment, it is a further incentive to apply 
Huntington’s approach to a contemporary setting. A failure to transfer to a scenario 
typical of the current paradigm may show a work that is less relevant, and one that has 
increasingly less potential to be generalised.
Huntington’s theoretical context
According to Burk (2002:8-10) recent work within civil-military relations still reflects 
the influence o f the theory proposed by Huntington almost fifty years ago, while Cottey 
et al (2002:32) state that Huntington made ‘Perhaps the most influential contribution’ to 
the area of democracy and armed forces. Burk describes Huntington’s work as being 
underwritten by liberal theory, where the first priority o f  the democratic state is to 
protect the rights and liberties of individual citizens. Burk refers to Hobbes’s original 
account of liberal theory, where security could only be provided through a social 
contract that constituted the state as a sovereign power whose laws were obeyed in 
exchange for the protection of the lives o f its citizens. A key concern for liberal 
theorists is how to ensure that the power of the sovereign is not abused by overturning 
the rights and liberties o f the citizens. For civil-military relations the crux lies in two 
contradictory agendas. The military cannot be allowed to become a free agent as it will 
pursue the ‘objects o f its own passions’ and pose an internal threat to sovereign power, 
while the state cannot entirely control the military as the passions of the civilian 
majority may lead to military strength being sapped (Burk 2002:10). Huntington 
attempted to resolve this conflict by advocating objective civilian control, where 
civilians would dictate military policy, but allow the military to carry it out as they saw 
fit (1957:83-85). According to Huntington, ‘Objective civilian control achieves its end 
by militarizing the military, making them the tool o f the state’ (1957:83). More 
generally Huntington recognised a conflict between the liberal democratic state and the 
inherently conservative realist military (1957:94-97).
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However Burk writes that there are reasons to doubt that Huntington’s theory, 
developed in response to the new circumstances o f the Cold War, is well applied to the 
contemporary situation (2002:9). He states that there is a sense that its value is limited, 
despite being recognised as an exemplary account o f the subject, and that new 
frameworks are required to guide further research (Burk 2002:12). The major flaw in 
Huntington’s thesis, according to Burk, was that it presumes that there is a clearly 
delineated military sphere defined by war fighting that is independent o f the social and 
political sphere (2002:13). In addition to this Huntington argued as if democratic civil- 
military relations are confined to relations among soldiers and civilians within a 
sovereign nation state, a reasonable assumption in the mid-twentieth century and before, 
but less tenable now (2002:14). However, these criticisms may also be applied to the 
wider body o f civil-military relations literature as well. Cottey et al argue that
The debate on democracy and civil-military relations in central and eastern 
Europe - and more generally - has been distorted, narrowed, and sometimes 
confused by a conceptual focus on “democratic control” o f armed forces, which 
assumes that the primary problems are the threat o f praetorian military 
intervention in domestic politics and the resultant need to enforce civilian 
executive control of the military. (2002:31)
Therefore, while there is a consensus that the use o f Huntington as an ‘overarching’ 
theory o f civil-military relations is waning, it is also accepted that the primary focus of 
civil-military relations literature has lingered for too long on the issue o f democratic 
control. While criticisms o f Huntington’s approach to civil-military relations between 
the soldier and the state must be recognised, it is also recognised by Bland (1999:7-27), 
Burk (2002:7-29) and Cottey et al (2002:31-56) that the focus o f the various theories, 
by Huntington and others, have dwelled almost exclusively upon a single issue, that of 
the soldier and the state. Burk even points out that with the multiplicity o f new issues to 
be examined in contemporary civil-military relations, it is hard to imagine that an 
overarching theory could even be formulated (2002:22).
Therefore, while it is beyond argument that Huntington conceived his original approach 
during an era when security considerations were vastly different to those o f the 
contemporary period, it does not mean that many of his identified concepts may not be 
successfully tested within specific and contemporary issues. Support for his approach
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continues to be found. With reference to the development o f civil-military relations in 
Kenya, N ’Diaye (2002:619-640) states that the adverse effects o f Kenya’s civilian 
control strategies, where the civilian government bribed or manipulated the ethnic 
composition of the officer corps,
...support Huntington’s and Welch’s theoretical postulation that only the 
professionalization and political insulation of the military are more likely to 
ensure its subordination to civilian control (2002:634),
Since this thesis is not attempting to contradict recent opinion that Huntington’s 
approach is both dated and no longer suitable as an overarching theory, but instead 
limits itself to the single experience o f a contemporary military operation, it is therefore 
permissible to test Huntington’s utility in the specific area of civil-military co-operation.
Huntington made a number of broad statements regarding the distribution of power and 
expertise between military and non-military groups. In addition to this he also 
commented extensively upon the character and outlook o f the armed forces, discussing 
at length the ‘military mind’ and its conservative realist disposition. This mixture of 
professional and attitudinal characteristics offers the scope for testing within a recent 
military deployment.
Using Huntington to understand civil-military dynamics at the ground level
Regarding the choice o f recent military deployment, there are two criteria to fulfil. 
Firstly to engage with one o f the most recent operations, thereby making the research as 
timely and as relevant as possible. Secondly, due to the increased interest in the concept 
of CIMIC within Western Europe and the US, there is a desire to examine a deployment 
that involved the forces of these regions in order to produce research that would 
subsequently contribute to the debate. An operation within the Balkans was therefore 
deemed ideal, and of the possible missions taking place, (SFOR within Bosnia, KFOR 
within Kosovo, and Essential Harvest and Amber Fox within Macedonia) Kosovo was 
considered the most appropriate. The characteristics of the Kosovo operation, including 
its recent deployment, the presence of large civilian and military groups, and the high 
level of co-operation between each, made the most appropriate example for this study.
Although the author is aware of the extensive literature on the conflict in Kosovo, the 
author wished to incorporate only those articles with a specific comment or insight into 
civil-military co-operation within the province (such as Pugh 2000:229-242, Minear, 
van Baarda, and Sommers 1999). Works detailing the political and ethnic nature o f the 
conflict were outside the scope o f this study and have therefore not been included.
A number of concepts drawn from Huntington’s work may be applied to civil-military 
co-operation in Kosovo. In line with the objectives o f  the thesis, to test theoretical 
approaches to civil-military co-operation within a contemporary context, these concepts 
have also been selected due to their potential application to other military deployments 
of a similar character. Of the statements within Huntington’s work (specifically within 
the chapter entitled Power, Professionalism, and Ideology: Civil-Military Relations in 
Theory, 1957:80-97) regarding the division of authority and expertise within civil- 
military relations, these were chosen for their independence from political and cultural 
factors, and also for their broad terms of reference which go beyond the traditional 
soldier and state nexus. On the other hand, the author believed that Huntington’s 
concepts o f subjective and objective civilian control were too dependent on institutional 
and organisational factors closely associated with a developed state (1957:80-85). The 
author also eschewed discussion on the political compatibility o f  the military with 
particular regimes and societies (1957:85-97).
Firstly the concept o f parallel authority will be explored, as this has connotations for the 
level of co-operation that can be expected between civilians and soldiers. Huntington 
stated that the level o f authority refers to the position that the group occupies in the 
hierarchy o f the governmental authority. The military has greatest power if  they have 
military sovereignty, less if  they do not possess authority over other institutions and vice 
versa, and the least when they may be subordinate to another institution.
The level o f authority refers to the position which the group occupies in the 
hierarchy of governmental authority. Vertical control is exercised over the 
military to the extent that they are reduced to subordinate levels o f authority. 
The level of authority o f the officer corps is maximised if  it is placed at the peak 
of the hierarchy and the other institutions o f government are subordinate to it: if, 
in other words, it or its leaders exercise military sovereignty. A level of 
somewhat less authority exists if  the military do not possess authority o f other
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institutions, and no other institutions possess authority over them. In this case 
two parallel structures o f authority exist; one military and one civil. This 
situation is military independence. Thirdly, the officer corps may be subordinate 
to only one other institution possessing effective final authority. In other words, 
the officer corps has direct access to the sovereign. (1957:88)
Within Kosovo, the military and civilian bodies come clearly under the second 
category, where neither has control over the other, although according to United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1244, or Resolution 1244, point 6, 
1999), the onus is upon both to consult and liase.2
Huntington states that in this case two parallel structures o f authority exist, one military 
and one civil, and this leads to military independence. Following Huntington’s logic it 
may be hypothesised that KFO R’s activities were effectively conducted independently o f  
civilian influence.
To test this hypothesis the author will examine interactions between both the civilian 
and military spheres and will specifically look for instances where the military acted 
independently o f the requests and wishes o f their civilian counterparts. Areas where the 
military changed its procedures due to civilian requests, accepted civilian guidance on 
particular matters or diverted resources to assist with civilian goals are all significant to 
the validation o f this hypothesis. If the hypothesis is correct, then the military will be 
revealed as a difficult if  not unconcerned partner. Naturally the context o f events must 
also be factored in, but the objective o f testing this hypothesis is to ascertain how pliant 
the military are to civilian groups in theatre, as the flexibility o f partners is an important 
factor in positive co-operation.
To examine the scope o f indirect civilian control, a concept that would be vital to civil- 
military co-operation where the military must work with civilians not in direct authority 
over it, Huntington’s notion of horizontal control will also be examined. Huntington 
stated that the scope of authority refers to the variety and type o f values with respect to 
which the group is formally authorised to exercise power. Horizontal civilian control is 
exercised against the military to the extent that they are confined within a limited scope
2 See Appendix A
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by the parallel activities of civilian agencies or groups roughly at the same level of 
authority.
Horizontal civilian control is exercised against the military to the extent that 
they are confined within a limited scope by the parallel activities o f civilian 
agencies or groups roughly at the same level o f authority in the government. 
(1957:88).
Following on from this, with the large number o f civilian authorities within Kosovo 
KFOR’s roles should have been limited to the military and militarily related aspects, 
whilst the civilian groups should be responsible for other sectors, where civilian 
specialists were present. Therefore it could be hypothesised that KFOR was not involved 
in activities that exceeded its professional competency when a competent civilian group 
was simultaneously present.
To test this hypothesis an analysis will be carried out o f KFOR’s non-military activities 
to ascertain whether they were involved in actions that were clearly within the mandate 
and expertise o f a civilian group that was present. This perspective is particularly 
relevant to civil-military co-operation due to the increasing number and variety of 
civilian actors within theatre. Again, other factors must be taken into account, including 
resources and relative influence of the civilian group in question. In testing the 
hypothesis the author will look for expansionist tendencies, where the military assumed 
additional tasks, resources or duties beyond its professional competence. If the 
hypothesis is valid, it will suggest that the influence of varied civilian groups can be 
extended beyond their particular contribution to a crisis situation and into ad hoc forms 
of civilian control over military forces.
Beyond testing these hypotheses the author is also going refer to Huntington’s idea of 
the professional military ethic, or ‘military mind’ (1957:59-79), not in terms o f absolute 
values that can be disproved, but as a possible guide to military preferences in a given 
situation. Huntington gives ample discussion to the concept o f the military ethic but 
summarises with the following:
The military ethic emphasizes the permanence, irrationality, weakness, and evil 
in human nature. It stresses the supremacy of society over the individual and the
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importance o f order, hierarchy and division o f function. It stresses the 
continuity and value of history. It accepts the nation state as the highest form of 
political organization and recognizes the continuing likelihood of wars among 
nation states. It emphasizes the importance o f  power in international relations 
and warns o f the dangers to state security. It holds that the security of the state 
depends upon the creation and maintenance o f strong military forces. It urges 
the limitation o f state action to the direct interests o f the state, the restriction of 
extensive commitments, and the undesirability o f bellicose or adventurous 
policies. It holds that war is the instrument o f politics, that the military are the 
servants of the statesman, and that civilian control is essential to military 
professionalism. It exalts obedience as the highest virtue o f military men. The 
military ethic is thus pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power- 
oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist and instrumentalist in its view o f the 
military profession. It is, in brief, realistic and conservative. (1957:79)
Throughout the evaluation o f the interaction between the military and civilian 
organisations in Kosovo, the author will refer back to Huntington’s concept o f the 
military ethic, highlighting those aspects which appear to be in conformity with this 
summary, as well as those which are not. If Huntington’s evaluation appears valid, then 
certain attitudinal characteristics may be ascribed to the military, and in turn certain 
expectations and preferences may be expected o f them. This will be o f significance to 
the development o f sustainable practices o f civil-military co-operation in theatre. 
Furthermore, if  the overall application o f Huntington’s theory to civil-military co­
operation in theatre is successful in full or in part, it may provide the basis upon which 
to build a new conceptual approach to the frictions o f civil-military relations in the 
Postmodern paradigm.
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C h a p t e r  T w o
Methodology
Regarding the practical aspects of the research, a two-year period from March 1999 to 
March 2001 has been chosen for analysis, which includes the bombing campaign as the 
extensive co-operation between the military and humanitarian groups was more intense 
then than at any other time of the deployment. A number of subjective reasons 
influenced the decision to choose a two-year period as opposed to a longer or shorter 
length o f time. Both the military and civilian build-up took time in Kosovo, with some 
contingents arriving as late as spring 2000. During this build up the province was at its 
most volatile and it was concluded that over-stretch and lack o f resources might be a 
stronger factor than any inherent friction between the military and civilians. After one 
year it was expected that a routine of sorts would have emerged between civilians and 
military personnel, with a division of labour and tasks agreed upon between both 
groups. However, by two years it was considered that resources and division of labour 
would be less significant, while cultural and practical differences might be more 
pronounced. It was concluded that going beyond two years would not make a 
worthwhile contribution in relation to the amount o f material to be covered.
In weighing up the possible options of data gathering it was decided to employ a study 
based upon archival research as opposed to an interview-based approach. According to 
Dooley (2001) archival data offer several advantages including their convenience and 
low cost to locate, their extensiveness, and their high reliability and validity based on 
the routine nature o f the data collection. The interview-based approach was rejected 
because o f time and resource constraints despite the numerous advantages to that 
method. The positive qualities identified by Arksey and Knight (1999) included the 
reconstruction of events using sources omitted from documentary historical sources, 
ability to explore understandings and meanings in depth and the opportunity to clarify 
accounts. However it was felt that to fully realise the potential of an interview-based 
approach a large number o f respondents would have to be engaged. Contingents in 
theatre could be made up of many different units, thus distributing potential respondents 
over a wide geographical area. The rotation o f personnel also increased the number of 
respondents required if  a comprehensive treatment of events was to be provided, whilst
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the significant time lapse between the interview and deployment, up to two years, might 
lessen the accuracy o f some o f the respondents’ accounts. By comparison, the archival 
sources used were centrally located and were often compiled within a day o f the event 
being recorded. In addition to this the archives also represented a province-wide 
summary, whereas interviewees may have been limited to certain geographical areas. It 
would have been necessary to speak to personnel from each of the four brigade areas, 
simultaneously ensuring that these respondents were also in Kosovo during the same 
time, to receive a similar overview.
Due to the high reliance on official sources in this research it is accepted that much of 
the cited material would not have been compiled unobtrusively or impartially. However 
it is not apparent that an interview-based approach engaging with members from the 
various organisations involved would have been any less obtrusive or impartial. To 
counteract bias the research sought to employ data triangulation as described by Arksey 
and Knight (1999), and endeavoured to employ a variety o f sources that differed in 
terms of perspective, engagement, time and space. Sources included accounts from 
official and independent actors as well as first hand accounts and retrospective analysis.
Paragraph 5 o f UNSCR 1244 determined that the international presence in Kosovo 
would consist o f ‘international civil and security presences’. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation-led security presence was known as KFOR, while the civil presence, 
collectively known as the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), was sub­
divided into four main areas o f responsibility headed up by a particular organisation. 
Police and civilian administration for the interim phase were directly under UNMIK, 
Institution building was carried out by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE), with economic reconstruction the responsibility o f the European 
Union (EU). Prior to deployment in Kosovo, two o f these organisations were also 
involved in the developments that led to the bombing campaign and subsequent refugee 
crisis. The OSCE handled the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) immediately before 
the NATO campaign, whereupon their personnel then moved to assist with aid efforts. 
NATO also assisted in humanitarian efforts while carrying out ‘Allied Force’, the 
bombing of the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (FRY).
Regarding military sources, most of the information on NATO’s involvement in 
Kosovo, during both the Allied Force and KFOR missions, was found within the NATO
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website.3 Within the website, the major sites of interest cover Operation Allied Force4, 
and the KFOR mission.5 Available on these pages are archives o f press briefings, 
statements, speeches, transcripts and other information that NATO or KFOR wished to 
disseminate to the media and the general public. As is usual with similar public 
relations products the majority of these sources attempt to portray NATO or KFOR 
forces in a positive and constructive light, although as far as it could be ascertained the 
vast majority of factual information presented within these products was consistent with 
other sources. Information given within these products covered a wide spectrum of 
developments within theatre, including military activities, reports of security incidents 
including background information and casualties if  applicable, changes in military or 
security strategy or focus, and media opportunities.
However, without having access to the relevant operations plans (known as OPLANS) 
for each mission it is not possible to ascertain the exact nature and thrust of NATO’s 
public relations efforts. OPLANS are restricted documents as they outline the key 
military objectives incumbent upon the mission, and are therefore highly sensitive. 
However, there was an opportunity to view one OPLAN while examining the archives 
of the OSCE (see below), and its content will be discussed here as a possible generic 
example o f media management by the military. The document, entitled ‘SACEUR 
OPLAN 10412 “JOINT GUARANTOR’”, dealt with extraction procedures for KVM 
monitors within Kosovo.6
Under ‘Concept o f Operations’ it was stated that NATO was to conduct Psychological 
Operations (PSYOPs) to influence attitudes and behaviour o f targeted audience within 
the Theatre Area of Operations (TAOO) to assist in the achievement of NATO 
objectives. A number o f PSYOP objectives and supporting themes were identified, 
which overall involved the promotion o f NATO while simultaneously discrediting 
detractors. The Public Information mission of the OPLAN was to give the media 
timely, accurate and complete information consistent with security and troop safety.
3 http://www.nato.int
4 http://www.nato.int/kosovo/all-fTce.htm
5 http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.iitml
6 C IO .G A L /5 /99 ,26  January 1999 [Restricted], 1220.15.21 C JPS-CJPLA/98, S[uprem e] A [llied] 
Cfommander] Eur[ope] O PL A N  10412 “JOINT G U A R A N T O R ”, P ossib le  extraction o f  O SCE K V M  
verifiers in K o so v o ’[Restricted]
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Within this mission key objectives and target audiences were identified, as were ‘master 
messages’ that reinforced NATO’s desired image.7
In summary, NATO’s information campaign for Joint Guarantor was intended to be 
factually accurate, yet simultaneously manipulative. Messages and concepts directed at 
the media and public were designed to give a desired image to the military, but were not 
statements of actual military intent. Military objectives within the OPLAN were dealt 
with in a practical manner and were confined by logistical capabilities rather than the 
political or moral ideals portrayed by military media products.
Not all sources o f information from NATO or NATO member states were part o f a 
specific public relations campaign or agenda. Articles from the NATO periodical, 
NATO Review, were cited when written by senior military personnel directly involved in 
KFOR or NATO activities in Kosovo. The autobiography o f General Wesley Clarke, 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) at the time, was also referenced as 
were transcripts from the United States Department o f Defence press conferences. In 
addition to this NATO HQ and KFOR personnel were contacted by emails and 
telephone calls, mostly to clarify technical points or matters o f procedure. General 
requests were submitted to NATO for unclassified material pertaining to Kosovo as 
well as specific open documents cleared for public viewing. Most requests that went to 
NATO HQ via email were unanswered, even after repeated attempts. Similarly, 
requests for information from personnel connected to KFOR HQ in Pristina were not 
always satisfied. Therefore the vast majority o f NATO and KFOR materials were 
drawn from sources that were part o f ongoing military operations, and therefore may be 
presumed to have been subject to similar influences described within the Joint 
Guarantor OPLAN.
Regarding the international civilian presence in Kosovo and its subsidiary components, 
data was gathered from each o f the lead organisations with the exception o f the EU-led 
division for reconstruction. The reason for ignoring this branch of UNMIK lies in the 
fact that, beyond the mention o f EU funding in certain projects, no mention was made 
of incidents o f serious civil-military co-operation between KFOR and this branch of the 
civilian administration. Nor was there any sector of the EU’s division that appeared to 
be of interest to the military’s operations in the province. By comparison, extensive co­
7 ibid
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operation was evident between the UNMIK- and OSCE-led divisions and the military 
forces. These facts, in addition to time constraints, discouraged the idea of pursuing the 
EU as a worthwhile source for further information.
Data on the UN’s operations in and around the province o f Kosovo is widely available 
on the Internet on a number o f official websites. The most important o f these were the 
websites o f UNMIK8, UNMIK Police9 and the UN itself.10 The range of information 
available at these sites was very similar to what NATO and KFOR made public on their 
websites and included press briefings, statements, speeches, transcripts and public 
announcements. In addition a number of other publications were also referenced, 
including annual reports, briefings and newsletters. UNMIK Police for example had 
their first annual report online during the research period as well as their own newsletter 
and crime statistics, while UNMIK holds an archive o f Kosovo news, a number of 
newsletters it produced for the province and details o f the governing structures. Again 
many o f these sources sought to portray the UN mission in a favourable way even if the 
information given was factually correct, or else sought to avoid controversial opinion. 
After cross-referencing with other sources these records were found to be accurate 
regarding description o f events that were discussed within them, but it was also 
discovered that more controversial aspects were often omitted or ignored. Newsletters 
often detailed events that had taken place but offered no analysis or opinion. Ethnically 
motivated murders that were reported would include the circumstances involved and 
official condemnations, but not any discussion of the cause o f the killings or who may 
have perpetrated them. The overriding impression received was that UNMIK 
publications avoided controversial topics in order to avoid inflaming ethnic tensions.
The press office o f UNMIK Police was also contacted and information was requested 
on a number o f technical issues regarding civil-military co-operation in security. The 
response was positive and it was possible to clarify a number o f issues that had arisen in 
the research. One other possible source o f information that were examined but deemed 
unusable was the online message board for UNMIK police.11 Despite the very 
interesting and apparently candid remarks that were made by individuals on the website 
the research did not make use o f them as they were made anonymously and could not be
8 http://w w w .unm ikonline.org/
9 http://w w w .unm ikonline.org/civpol/index.htm l, also http://w w w .civpol.org/unm ik/
10 http://w w w .un.org/
11 http://w w w .civpol.net/m sgboard.m v
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properly cited. The idea of pursuing police force members through this website for 
possible interviews was considered, but subsequently ruled out this approach due to the 
constraints involved in interviewing discussed above.
The OSCE’s online resources included a similar array o f publicly available materials.12 
Municipal profiles, press releases, factsheets and reviews as well as reports into the 
situation o f ethnic groups, progress in the judicial system and other social issues were 
just some of the items that were available online and were particularly useful to the 
study. In addition to this the Researcher-in-Residence program at the OSCE Secretariat 
in the Czech Republic was made use o f in order to study the records of the OSCE 
missions to Kosovo, including those o f the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) and the 
OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK). These documents were far more explicit than the 
organisations official statements and were occasionally critical o f KFOR and UNMIK 
operations in the province. They also describe incidents and interactions that were not 
particularly newsworthy to the international media, and therefore would not have been 
discussed in news reports or in public relations products, but nevertheless were of 
crucial importance to this study.
To avail of the program four weeks were spent at the OSCE Secretariat at Rytirska 31, 
Prague 1 in the Czech Republic during February 2002 and again for three days in 
September 2002. Under the Researcher-in-Residence program full access was given to 
the entire range o f records that the organisation held on Kosovo, consisting mainly of 
weekly, monthly and spot reports covering the organisation’s activities on the ground as 
well as other notable events.
Full co-operation was enjoyed from the staff at the secretariat who endeavoured to 
answer any questions and provide all materials that were requested. The documents in 
question were compiled with information gathered from field mission staff, local and 
international media as well as other partner organisations, such as KFOR and UNMIK, 
and therefore .represent a mix of primary and some secondary sources. It is generally 
not possible to ascertain the full extent to which secondary sources were relied upon by 
those who compiled the reports.
12 h ttp://w w w .osce.org/kosovo/
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The records from field missions are restricted material and therefore are not available to 
researchers other than those working under the official OSCE research program. 
Regarding validation o f this restricted data, third parties may contact the Prague 
Secretariat to verify that information referenced is drawn from bona fide sources, and is 
a fair and accurate representation of what is contained therein. Restricted documents 
may not be quoted from directly, but may be summarised by the researcher. Much of the 
information held within the archives was not o f interest to the research as it dealt with 
OSCE projects that had little or no input from KFOR. However detailed notes were 
made of over 100 other files that contained accounts o f co-operation between KFOR 
and the OSCE and partner organisations in various projects, as well as descriptions of 
military responses to security and humanitarian alerts in and around the province.
Beyond these three official groups the research made use of a wide number of 
independent actors who were also active inside Kosovo. Sources used included a
• I ^number of non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International , the 
International Crisis Group14, the Kosovo Ombudsperson15, Médicins Sans Frontières16, 
and the International Federation o f Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.17 The range 
and type of materials from these organisations were similar to those available from 
official bodies and included reports, press releases, statements and eyewitness accounts. 
Most o f these documents were accessed on the Internet where they were available from 
official sites. The major difference between these sources and those o f the international 
presence in Kosovo is the fact that the NGOs tended to be directly critical o f military 
actions within the province. This criticism was generally sector specific, but the variety 
of sources allowed for an insight into a spectrum of military activities and behaviours. 
For instance Médicins Sans Frontières criticised the extent o f military involvement in 
humanitarian work during the refugee crisis, the Kosovo Ombudsperson and Amnesty 
International objected to KFOR’s human right’s breaches while the International Crisis 
Group found fault with KFOR’s policies on a political and security level. As might be 
expected, not all of these sources would have offered the comprehensive and consistent 
coverage that was available from KFOR, UNMIK or the OSCE.
15 http://w w w .am nesty.org/
14 http://w w w .crisisw eb.org/
15 http://w w w .om budspersonkosovo.org/
16 http://w w w .m sf.org/
17 http://ww w.ifrc.org/
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Materials from these non-state actors often focused on particular timeframes or events, 
but also contributed a more in-depth analysis than other sources o f information. Most 
of the sources cited were first hand accounts written by individuals who had participated 
in a particular event or were in the province during the reporting period. One such 
account was a diary o f events made by a Médicins Sans Frontières doctor who spent a 
number of days working with refugees during Allied Force, while the Red Cross/Red 
Crescent magazine carried an interview with UNMIK Special Representative Bernard 
Kouchner. By comparison Amnesty International had periodic updates on the situation 
in Kosovo and produced a number o f reports on human rights problems within the 
province.
Regarding the international media, the online archives o f a number of news agencies 
were used, including the BBC18, CNN19, and the Serbian B9220. Broadsheet 
publications such as the Guardian , Times , Telegraph , and the Irish Times were 
also referenced. Naturally much of the media commentary was not particularly useful 
to this study given their pre-disposition to a more sensationalist agenda than the 
workings of civil-military co-operation. In addition to this Kosovo, as with other news 
items, faded from news coverage once the more dramatic events were over. Periodic 
recurrences o f violence served to bring the eye of the international media back to the 
province, however ongoing English language news on the province was only available 
from B92. The traditional political inclination associated with a number of the 
publications was considered, the Guardian for example is regarded as a left wing paper 
while the Times and the Telegraph are considered more conservative. However, this 
was not deemed to have impaired the quality o f the source for two reasons. Firstly, 
journalistic articles were usually employed for their valuable eyewitness accounts that 
recounted factual information and quoted witnesses and primary sources to events, and 
not for their subsequent analysis. In particular the firsthand reports from Kosovar 
refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania, and the troubled city o f Mitrovica, offered a 
local perspective that was not available from many other documents. It was felt that 
choosing this type of article over more opinionated or analytical articles helped to avoid
18 http://news.bbc.co.uk/
19 http://w w w .ciin .com /
20 http://w w w .b92.net/englisli/
21 http://ww w.guardian.co.uk/
22 http://w w w .tim esonline.co.uk/
23 http://w w w .telegraph.co.uk
24 http://w w w .ireland.com /
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or lessen the bias associated with a particular publication. Secondly the more critical 
treatment o f events by the media formed a counterbalancing effect to the official 
sources from KFOR, UNMIK and the OSCE.
The body of the thesis is divided into three major sections dealing with the military’s 
involvement with humanitarian and infrastructure tasks, their co-operation in the areas 
of policing and justice, and the manner in which they dealt with the province’s internal 
security and paramilitary groups. These sections provided a comprehensive cross 
section of civil-military relations within the province as they allowed the military’s 
interactions with different sectors and groups to be examined. The entire study was 
undertaken over an eighteen-month period, o f which nine months were spent gathering 
and evaluating primary data. The study was funded by a studentship from Dublin City 
University Business School.
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e
Military involvement in humanitarian and infrastructure 
tasks
The interaction between the military and civilian actors in the humanitarian area is the 
most focused upon element o f recent literature covering ground level co-operation. It 
represents the concept of CIMIC as conceived by NATO, and also constitutes a major 
part of what the EU would like to incorporate into its nascent crisis management 
structures. This chapter covers the military’s involvement with humanitarian and 
infrastructure activities during the bombing campaign against Serbia and the subsequent 
deployment o f KFOR. Development and use of infrastructure is a particularly good 
indication of the relations between civil and military entities in theatre as it is a shared 
resource. The extent o f control over this resource by a particular party should be a 
strong indicator o f the authority they hold in comparison to other parties. According to 
Huntington’s theory o f parallel authority the military would be an unrestrained partner 
in civil-military co-operation as the civilian agencies held no direct control over them. 
Furthermore, due to pessimistic aspects of the military ethic and the corresponding 
restrictions o f what Huntington calls horizontal control, the military would not be a co­
operating partner if  there were competent civilian groups simultaneously present.
NATO’s co-operation with the UNHCR during ‘Allied Force’
In looking at the relationship that existed between the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 
the run up to the Kosovo crisis, we can see to what extent the military incorporated civil 
society sensitivities into its operational plans. As a body that represents many IOs and 
NGOs (approximately 50 o f 250 registered NGOs involved in the refugee crisis were 
UNHCR implementing partners25) the position of the UNHCR is important for two 
reasons.
25 The K osovo  refugee crisis, A n  independent evaluation o f  U [nited] N [ations] H [igh] C [om m isioner] for 
R [efu gees]’s em ergency preparedness and response, E va lu ation ] P [o licy] A [nalysis] U [n it]//2000 /001 , 
February 2 0 0 0 , G eneva, p .ix
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Firstly it is the recognised lead agency in co-ordinating NGOs in a crisis situation and 
can assist and fund NGOs directly.26 Secondly the organisation could articulate the 
concerns o f civil society actors at an executive level. The extent o f NATO’s reaction, 
or lack thereof, to these issues was revealed in the early stages o f the crisis and it 
provides fertile ground for testing Huntington’s theory.
With conflict again stirring in the Balkans on 2 September 1998 NATO Secretary 
General Javier Solana called Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees to discuss possibilities for joint contingency planning.27 While the High 
Commissioner was not against close co-ordination she declined the invitation for joint 
planning as she feared that it would blur the agendas between the various organisations. 
‘I must emphasize that UNHCR’s role as lead humanitarian agency must remain clearly 
distinct from the OSCE [Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe] and
• • im  • • • • • OONATO missions. Theirs are political missions.’
NATO wasn’t deterred by this refusal and the alliance continued on its own to develop 
contingency plans for a humanitarian emergency and by 2 February 1999 it had 
identified likely areas o f NATO support to the UNHCR in transport, logistics and air 
operations, although numbers and scenarios were not outlined. During the same 
period diplomatic overtures, such as they were, to calm the situation in the province 
failed and NATO began to bomb the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (FRY) on 24 
March 1999. Instead of forcing Milosevic into submission, the first outcome of 
Operation Allied Force was a flood o f refugees to the mountain passes o f principally the 
Albanian and Macedonian borders. The time for a humanitarian response was at hand.
For its part, NATO’s humanitarian effort was to be overseen by the Directorate of Civil 
Emergency Planning (DCEP) and its newly formed Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
subsidiary, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre (EADRCC).30 It 
was felt by some in retrospect that a stronger role for NATO in the humanitarian sector
26 United N ations H igh C om m issioner for R efu gees H andbook for E m ergencies, 1999, Second Edition, 
U N H C R , G eneva p.5
27 The K osovo  refugee crisis, A n  independent evaluation o f  U N H C R ’s em ergency preparedness and 
response, E P A U /2000 /001 , February 2 000 , G eneva, p .10
28 Statement by  Mrs Sadako Ogata, U nited N ations H igh C om m issioner for R efugees, to  the Euro- 
Atlantic Partnership C ouncil, B russels 18 N ovem b er 1998
29 The K osovo  refugee crisis, A n independent evaluation o f  U N H C R ’s em ergency preparedness and 
response, E P A U /2000 /001 , February 2 000 , G eneva, p .110
30 N A T O  H andbook, N A T O  O ffice  o f  Inform ation and Press, 2 001 , p .190
46
would clearly enhance the institutional position of the EADRCC, and it was remarked 
that ‘...during the Kosovo emergency, the centre became a focal point for contact 
between NATO and the humanitarians’.31 Certainly NATO lost no time in highlighting 
the EADRCC.
As you know NATO is not an organisation which specialises in refugee 
questions, the UNHCR is clearly in the lead there, but you may have heard of 
our Euro Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre, which is here at 
NATO Headquarters. That has been activated for some time now to coordinate 
NATO's assistance to the UNHCR in terms o f dealing with refugees if  the 
UNHCR needs our help, for example in terms o f logistics, transport and 
whatever...
By engaging in such humanitarian affairs the military alliance was now into the territory 
of the UNHCR (and the broader civil society community which it represented), and the 
two organisations entered into discussions on how best to divide the load. In a letter to 
NATO on 3 April, Ms Ogata had been careful not to ask for NATO help specifically, 
but for assistance from ‘Alliance Member States’. She also asked for the support to be 
provided through NATO’s civil-emergency department, which in turn meant the 
EADRCC, in order to retain the ‘civilian and humanitarian nature o f the aid 
operation’. This move had been intended to dilute military involvement by bringing 
humanitarian support through a PfP subsidiary, and to make a distinction o f sorts 
between the broader NATO partner countries and NATO itself. This would have 
allowed the UNHCR to retain its neutrality and distance itself from one o f the parties to 
the conflict.
However, NATO wanted close co-operation. A NATO meeting on 4 April with the 
European Union (EU), OSCE, Western European Union (WEU), Council of Europe 
(COE) and UNHCR was aimed at developing, in the words o f a military spokesperson, 
a ‘practical no-nonsense, non bureaucratic, coordinated approach bringing the military
31 The K osovo  refugee crisis, A n  independent evaluation o f  U N H C R ’s em ergency preparedness and 
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and the civilian aspects into close harmony to have the most effective, immediate 
impact on the situation’.34 Four days later the fundamentals of NATO’s humanitarian 
effort were outlined in a number of points. Firstly NATO would not seek to create an 
independent humanitarian role for itself. Secondly the UNHCR in Geneva would have 
the lead role in the operation, it was they who established priorities and would identify 
the requirements for the humanitarian effort. Thirdly the requirements were determined 
on the ground by the UNHCR and NATO would co-ordinate the flow of aid. Fourthly, 
NATO would eventually be replaced by civil organisations.35 These dictums gave the 
impression that the military would have a complementary role to the UNHCR, filling in 
as required and relinquishing tasks when competent civilian organisations became 
available. In fact the statement already displayed a sidelining of the UNHCR. Ogata’s 
letter of 3 April had stated that ‘Evidently, UNHCR would provide the necessary co­
ordination, guidance and technical support’.36 Now a subtle shift had taken place where 
NATO was the co-ordinating body, and the UNHCR only set the priorities. The scene 
was set for the military alliance to push forward with the joint assistance that it had 
planned independently o f the refugee agency and the corresponding concerns of civil 
society actors.
At this stage it can be clearly seen that the horizontal control concept drawn from 
Huntington’s theory, regarding the military’s involvement in non-military activities, is 
inaccurate. Although the military was well equipped by dint of its resource base and 
huge logistical capacity, it lacked the neutral credentials, humanitarian mandate, 
knowledge base and technical expertise of the UNHCR. Between both the military 
forces and the UNHCR, it was NATO that set the agenda through its pro-active 
planning and uncooperative approach to a supposedly co-ordinated humanitarian 
strategy. The UNHCR was never given the opportunity or authority to become the lead 
partner, despite public and private assurances to the contrary.
Ironically the conditions that falsify horizontal control are those that support military 
independence and parallel authority. The relationship between NATO and the UNHCR
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in the run up to the refugee crisis displays military independence from a parallel civilian 
authority, exactly as Huntington predicted. While the UNHCR wished to retain 
impartiality during the beginning o f the conflict NATO ignored the subtleties of the 
organisations neutral position. By pursuing their own agenda, NATO did not really 
afford the UNHCR the assistance it required to retain neutrality, even though it could 
have complied by allowing member states to give assistance bilaterally as the High 
Commissioner suggested. Both o f these trends, a military intervening into a non­
military area and retaining its operational independence at the same time, were 
continued at the ground level in both Macedonia and Albania
Macedonia
Although a degree o f friction was present in its evolution a relatively straightforward 
relationship was established between the UNHCR, NGOs and the military in 
Macedonia. NATO forces were detailed to construct refugee camps whose subsequent 
running was then passed to the UNHCR and NGOs, and aid was distributed by the 
UNHCR and NGOs with logistical help from the military. The major, if  not only, 
source of friction lay with the Macedonian authorities.
In the initial stages the massive influx o f refugees from Kosovo panicked the 
Macedonian government and they contacted the US embassy for support, including 
financial assistance and offers from NATO countries to take refugees. An immediate 
decision was made for NATO military forces in the country (there to implement a 
Rambouillet agreement that never materialised) to build refugee camps and this was 
relayed to High Commissioner Ogata. She objected on the grounds that civilians should 
construct the camps instead.37 However, there appeared to be little room for manoeuvre 
as by 2 April an estimated one third of Kosovo’s pre-conflict population, or upward o f
634,000 people, had been displaced.38 Ogata accepted the offer o f assistance from 
NATO and the North Atlantic Council immediately directed General Jackson’s force in 
Macedonia to assist with the inflow of refugees and border crossings.39 By April 4
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NATO forces o f the Allied Rapid Reaction Corp (ARRC)40, working in conjunction 
with the UNHCR, the Red Cross and Red Crescent, and the OSCE, opened a refugee 
reception centre at Stenkovic in Macedonia41 as well as working on six other camps.42 
By dint o f their available manpower and logistical advantages military forces were now 
operating as the lead partner in a non-military operation.
Conditions on the Macedonian border were extremely difficult due to the fact that the 
government was holding out for international support. There was no food, negligible 
medical assistance and no support from international organisations.43 Doctors and 
nurses from the Red Cross, Medicins du Monde and the International Medical Corps 
were at hand, but were denied access to the refugees by the Macedonian government.44 
Within a few days (the Macedonian government having received their package of aid 
guarantees) the situation began to improve. Essential supplies began to trickle in and 
were given out by a combination of military and civil agencies. In one example the 
food supplied by the British contingent was distributed by both military forces and the 
UNHCR.45
Working relationships did not have a good start. While the refugees and IGOs 
wondered at the lack o f support available for them, friction was evident between the 
military, the UNHCR and the Macedonian government. One anonymous senior British 
officer blamed the UNHCR for the failure, ‘They have been caught on the hop. They 
did not expect so many refugees and they are reacting very slowly to this human 
catastrophe’.46 As a stopgap measure British troops used food from their own reserves 
and assisted in the delivery and distribution of rations, but had to wear civilian clothes 
to avoid being targeted by Serb snipers.47 Although it was a practical solution the 
presence of the military now made the camps, situated just across from the area of
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hostilities, a possible site of attack for Serb forces. The construction o f refugee camps 
also presented difficulties as the UNHCR and the Macedonian authorities argued over 
the space between the tents and wire fences around the camps. One officer whose work 
at a refugee camp at Bojane was delayed said that he was ‘waiting for them [the 
UNHCR and the Macedonian government] to sort it out’ .48
This incident displays an amount of deference by the military forces to the UNHCR and 
the civilian government. However it must be remembered that this was a technical, as 
well as political, matter that was completely outside o f the military’s expertise. In 
addition to this it must also be borne in mind that i f  the UNHCR had complete control 
the military would not have been involved in the construction o f the camps at all. From 
the military’s point o f view the issues appeared to be ones o f practicality to be satisfied 
with immediate solutions, regardless of whether they were in line with civilian thinking. 
However, the UNHCR and other civil society organisations realised the importance of 
proper construction and their fears about inadequate and intimidating constructions 
were soon realised. One article described a Macedonian run refugee centre at Radusa 
(built by NATO forces) being more like a prisoner o f war camp than anything else49, 
and such claims were only strengthened by the reports o f brutality against the 
refugees.50 The military, though availing o f a huge resource base and able to quickly 
deploy, could provide rapid solutions but seemingly without any understanding of the 
long-term effects. One NGO placed the relationship in context,
Although heavy logistical assistance has been useful, NATO is first and 
foremost a military organization which is currently involved in the conflict. It is 
not a humanitarian actor and is neither responsible nor able to coordinate 
humanitarian relief activities for refugees. Protection and assistance for refugees 
is the responsibility o f the UNHCR.51
Indeed the extensive involvement o f the military in helping the refugees was a definite 
culture shock, even for those well heeled in aid operations. As a Médicins Sans
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Frontières staff member put it, ‘The presence of so much armed green comes as a shock 
for the Doctors Without Borders veterans, something without precedent. A 
humanitarian mission is difficult to square with a military mission’.52 The military for 
their part had difficulty with the many and varied character o f civil society actors 
involved in the crisis and one military spokesperson spoke critically o f the NGOs. 
‘There is a lot o f rivalry among the agencies, a lot of egos. Some need to be reminded 
that the welfare o f these people is their first concern’.53
Overall however, the joint efforts in Macedonia were a success. Camps were 
constructed, aid was received and despite cultural differences between the military and 
civilian actors, a productive working relationship was achieved. When the time came 
for NATO forces to withdraw their support and central role in the management of the 
refugee camps in Macedonia and cede control to UNHCR and NGOs the hand-over 
went smoothly, and the most pressing issue facing the civilian authorities was the 
provision o f security in the camps following the military withdrawal.54 NATO forces 
retained 100 personnel in their four camps55 in line with a commitment made on the 10 
April by General Jackson to keep an eye on security inside them.56
From the perspective o f Huntington’s parallel authority and horizontal control concepts 
a similar accuracy and inaccuracy is evident. The military remained a proactive and 
involved group on the ground, whilst retaining a large amount o f independence. It was 
the military who began work on refugee camps, a decision that was made independently 
of the UNHCR despite the fact that it was the lead organisation and also had better 
technical knowledge o f the camp requirements. Although there were issues regarding 
the military’s handling o f the refugee centres, overall the military authority appeared to 
prevail by virtue of their resource base. The UNHCR and other organisations were 
dependent on military support and therefore could not form a viable alternative, despite 
their discomfort with the relationship. However the generally successful interaction 
between the military and civilian groups, with the exception o f the Macedonia 
government, meant that there was not as much reason to challenge the independence of
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the military on anything other than technical issues. Horizontal control o f the military 
was therefore not effected by the presence o f the many and varied civilian 
organisations. In fact it was the Macedonia government that was the ultimate authority 
and obstacle to military plans for the refugee crisis. Due to the civilian government’s 
obvious primacy within the country, the relationship between it and the military is not 
one that can be evaluated through Huntington’s concepts o f parallel authority or 
horizontal control.
Albania
The situation for NGOs in Albania was very different due to a number of key factors. 
The UNHCR’s presence on the ground was firstly very poor, its one Albanian staff 
member in the Kukes sub-office had to deal single-handedly with 64,000 refugees 
between 27 March and 29 March.57 At the same time the Albanian government was 
using the conflict to strengthen its ties with NATO and it gave the alliance a large 
degree o f latitude in its operations. When SACEUR General Wesley Clark met 
Albanian Prime Minister Pandeli Majko he described the meeting as ‘overwhelmingly 
positive’.
The young prime minister...approved every request. May we use an additional 
airfield? Of course, use all airfields. May we repair the highway to Kukes? 
Please do so. And the road to Skopje? You may have all roads and all 
government facilities -  take anything you need.
The UNHCR found itself excluded by a combination o f the above factors, and also by 
its weakness in asserting its own mandate as the lead organisation. One example of this 
was the UNHCR’s decision to delay its emergency mechanism until the 29 March, 
which meant that emergency staff did not arrive at Albania’s northern border until 2 
April. In the words o f one commentator ‘This further undercut the status o f UNHCR in 
Albania, and reinforced the inclination of Tirana to work with NATO and individual 
governments for assistance.59’ NGOs who could have expected to use the UNHCR as
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an interface with IGOs and governmental authorities now had to jockey with each other 
to get access to the resources coming into the country. The independence of the 
military forces, on the other hand, was guaranteed, as was their ability to shape their 
response to the humanitarian emergency.
With the UNHCR relegated, the main scrum for aid took place within the Emergency 
Management Group (EMG), a centralised body set up by the Prime Minister’s office to 
deal with the humanitarian response. All of the major international organisations 
provided liaison staff to the EMG and in this way it became a central contact point for 
field missions. Although this allowed for requests and information to be sent both 
ways, it was a cumbersome arrangement that was slow and inadequate.60 In addition to 
this, and contrary to UNHCR practice, NGOs were excluded from the EMG in the 
initial stages. For the 178 registered and 50 -  60 unregistered civil society organisations 
now working on the ground in Albania61, their only recourse was the UNHCR funded 
Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC). In turn the HIC, instead of distinguishing 
itself as a proper resource in its own right, simply functioned as a portal to the already 
inefficient EMG.62
In the midst o f this messy arrangement NATO now deployed Albanian Force (AFOR) 
to the country, a direct contravention o f its earlier pledge not to make an independent 
humanitarian role for itself.63 In late April this force led by Lt General John Reith was 
deployed into Albania in a rather hotchpotch fashion, drawing together under one 
umbrella the separate military forces who were already in the country. National 
contingents such as Italian and Greek forces, which had provided training and aid under 
military assistance agreements with Tirana, were switched to humanitarian work under 
AFOR.64
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Further military contingents were then moved into the country to fill up the numbers.65 
This was not the first official NATO entity to arrive in the country, as the ACE Mobile 
Force (Allied Command Europe, one o f NATO’s ‘Immediate Reaction Forces’ which is 
designed to be available for ‘an early military response to a crisis66) had also been in 
Albania with some additional support before this time67.
Regarding Huntington’s concepts of parallel authority and horizontal control in civil- 
military co-operation, the deployment of AFOR is possibly the single most significant 
event o f the Kosovo refugee crisis. Much more so than in Macedonia NATO had 
created an independent role for itself in a non-military arena at a time when competent 
civilian groups were simultaneously present. It had done so even though the civilian 
authority for refugee matters, the UNHCR, had clearly requested that this should not 
happen. This occurred because o f the inability of the civilian organisations to provide 
an alternative that enjoyed the massive resources, political clout and unified structure 
that NATO had in its favour. From the domestic perspective o f the government in 
Tirana NATO was clearly the more valued partner in the crisis, and with the support of 
the Albanian government behind it, NATO could conduct itself with as much 
independence as it desired from the wishes o f  its civilian counterparts. The military 
organisation was again conforming to the character o f an independent actor expanding 
into areas outside o f its expertise. However the resulting civil-military co-operation was 
not nearly as productive as it was in Macedonia.
In light o f the rather turgid attempts at co-ordination by the EMG, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the arrival o f AFOR created high expectations among NGOs, IGOs
sa
and Albanian officials. Unfortunately the expectations were misplaced. One senior 
aid worker was quoted as saying ‘There is a lot o f talk from NATO about how much 
they are doing but here at the sharp end they are having no effect at all’.69 Journalists 
who observed AFOR’s refugee work stated that it had ‘the appearance of muddle and
70lack of co-ordination ’ and that ‘it was clear that nobody was in charge. Not the
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NATO troops, not the Albanian police and not the UNHCR’.71 A representative of 
Médecins Sans Frontières put the entire situation in context, ‘You have a situation here 
where different armies make their own deals with the government, where NGOs are 
dealing on their own, and the UNHCR is trying to negotiate with the government. What 
kind of co-ordination is that?’72 It was later written that there was ‘little systematic 
information available on the bilateral military support agreements for the refugees in 
Albania’.73 In an ironic footnote it was also mentioned that not even NATO’s civilian 
emergency division, the vaunted EADRCC, could provide ‘a ready overview of which 
militaries did what in the humanitarian sector’.74
However, when it came to tasks more within the military expertise the NATO forces 
were extremely capable. AFOR’s deployment had an immediate positive effect at the 
Albanian ports o f entry, and also in the repair o f Albanian roads and infrastructure75, 
areas which NATO forces had been improving even before AFOR was deployed.76 
Two places in particular where problems were alleviated were Rinas airport and the 
Seaport o f Durres where large amounts o f humanitarian aid were entering the country. 
However, despite AFOR’s improvements to the infrastructure, the UNHCR was 
uncomfortable with its presence. The decisions regarding the force had already been 
made prior to Ogata’s acceptance of NATO assistance on the 3 April, and had never 
been discussed with the High Commissioner. On 2 April the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) approved preparation o f a plan to deploy a NATO force to assist the 
humanitarians77, the operations plan was completed by 11 April and not discussed at a 
high level until the High Commissioner’s visit to Brussels on 14 April whereupon it 
caused ‘considerable concern’.78
Officials questioned whether an additional force of 8000 men really was needed 
to support humanitarian functions, and worried that some AFOR units might be
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shifted to military functions if  NATO were to engage in a ground war in 
Kosovo. Moreover, if  AFOR had only a humanitarian function, why was 
UNHCR not consulted in its preparation? The situation certainly encouraged 
impressions that a humanitarian label was being used as a cover for military
70functions.
On 19 May the number of refugees who crossed into Albania was less than 2080, and of 
the refugees in the country 85-90% were now with host families81. However by 28 May 
American contingents continued to work on the infrastructure, while at the same time 
the bombing campaign was intensifying. Naturally the refugee population required 
huge amounts o f aid to be continuously transported, thereby requiring corresponding 
maintenance on what was some o f the worst infrastructure in Europe. However 
statements by military officials were two-pronged. A Pentagon briefing gave details on 
the activity, officially aimed at improving the humanitarian situation.
‘.. .you've heard much about the road between Kukes, where there’s a very large 
population o f refugees, because it's close to the border, and Tirane... So we're 
going to put some engineers now to work this road and significantly improve
• * 89this line o f communication.’
When asked whether the activity would serve a dual use the military spokesman, 
General Mike McDuffie, became evasive, stating that he did not want to get into the 
‘operational piece o f it’. However, he admitted to its broader uses.
Certainly, infrastructure improvements that you make for whatever reason [are] 
going to benefit you in other things that you do... I mean if  you've got a good 
road, you use it in any type o f operation... Those infrastructure improvements, I
n-i
mean it's a win/win. You can almost say a win/win/win.
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Due to the terrain on the Albanian border, it was the preferred choice above Macedonia 
and southern Serbia if  NATO had to make an aggressive entrance into Kosovo, a 
scenario that was being seriously contemplated.84 A plan for inserting ground troops 
into Kosovo had been drawn up prior to the refugee crisis and those plans still provided 
a useful template. In an interview on 12 April White House Chief o f Staff John Podesta 
said ‘Last autumn NATO did do an assessment o f putting ground troops in and those 
plans and assessments could be updated quickly if  we decided to do that, needed to do 
that.85’ He was backed by Defence Secretary William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs o f Staff General Henry Shelton. Cohen stated that ‘These plans could be 
updated fairly quickly if  such a request were ever made.’86 Although a ground attack 
into the province would need sixty days to plan and ninety days to deploy, General 
Wesley Clark had decided that NATO forces would still be able to prepare the ground 
even without a proper military plan in place.87 As it turned out by June 29 the very 
same harbours and routes that AFOR had improved to their own specifications were 
ferrying KFOR troops and materials into Kosovo.88 During a Department of Defence 
briefing on the same date Pentagon official Kenneth Bacon made it clear that their 
deployment plans had been made previously, ‘...our deployment plan, I think as 
General McDuffie said, was laid out some time ago.. . ,89
The image of the military as an independent and expansionist actor finds further 
credibility when considering the possible strategic implications o f their presence 
adjacent to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). By engaging in activities of a 
dual use nature they could assist both the humanitarian situation and prepare for a 
military invasion. By doing this NATO was subverting the humanitarian effort into a 
preparatory war exercise, a move that shows complete abandon o f the wishes o f the 
civilian humanitarians. Huntington’s concept o f parallel authority is verified again, 
whilst the horizontal control scenario is correspondingly weakened.
However the conclusions do find favour with Huntington’s concept o f a conservative 
realist military ethic. By engaging in infrastructure and relief work, the military could
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both maximise its ability to strike at Serbian forces, as well as assisting the 
humanitarian problem. This latter effect would in turn lessen political criticism of 
‘Allied Force’, detractors o f which argued that the bombing had caused the crisis rather 
than helped it. Whereas a conservative realist approach might simply bring maximum 
force to bear, this was obviously not an option within the political circumstances. By 
integrating with the humanitarian activities the military could further its agenda within 
the existing constraints. However the problem with applying Huntington’s conservative 
realist ethic is that there are many possible permutations o f actions that would also serve 
to maximise the military’s power over the situation. For example, more aggressive 
posturing on the borders o f FRY would have presented a far more threatening image to 
Milosevic than delivering food to refugees. Whereas the conservative realist ethic lends 
greater understanding as to the military’s strategic agenda, it is not subtle enough to 
explain why interaction took the form it did.
Between Macedonia and Albania, we can also see a significant difference in civil- 
military co-operation on the ground. Ironically General Jackson’s force, which had 
been in Macedonia without a humanitarian mandate, was the one that enjoyed the better 
relationship with civil society actors. AFOR by contrast was deployed as a 
humanitarian force, but failed to impress itself upon the humanitarian organisations it 
was supposed to be supporting. The difference between the relative success of each 
may lie in the fact that the former, by dint o f the political and geographic factors in 
Macedonia, could not further a military strategic agenda and therefore could be a more 
pliable partner for the humanitarian effort. AFOR by contrast had been developed 
independent o f any input from the humanitarians and was deployed to a country that 
could not have been more conducive to NATO’s strategic planning. While AFOR 
laboured upon tasks of a dual-use nature the co-ordination of the humanitarian effort 
suffered accordingly. The military was less independent in Macedonia because the 
civilian government there did not allow it the freedom to act, whereas in Albania NATO 
forces had the freedom to do as they please. With greater independence as a parallel 
authority the military could usurp the humanitarians, and horizontal control was 
correspondingly weakened.
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KFOR humanitarian and infrastructure w ork in K osovo
Infrastructure
20,000 NATO and non-NATO troops entered Kosovo on 12 June under the banner of 
KFOR, and found a dangerous and difficult environment left in the aftermath of their 
bombing campaign and KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) and Serb aggression. ‘There 
was little electricity or water. Homes were destroyed, roads were mined, bridges down, 
schools and hospitals out o f action. Radio and TV was off the air. Ordinary life in 
Kosovo was suspended.’90 After a rapid build up inside the province KFOR began to 
reconstruct parts o f Kosovo’s shattered infrastructure and by January 2000 KFOR 
engineers and soldiers had built or repaired 200 km of roads that assisted ‘both military 
and civilian traffic alike,’ as well as having rebuilt and reinforced six bridges and 
restored much o f the rail network.91 Examples o f  such improvements included 
Podujevo,92 Klina,93 Stimlje94 and the ‘goat road’ between Mitrovica and Zubin Potok.95 
However the scale and choice o f infrastructure improvements were firstly to fulfil 
military requirements. A KFOR spokesperson was candid about the military’s 
objectives.
Obviously, the rebuilding and reconstruction is one o f the four pillars of the 
UNMIK mission. So basically the overall responsibility is under UNMIK. 
However, as far as KFOR is concerned, we have been working on bridges when 
it was either necessary for our own mission, or when it was seen as an urgent 
requirement for the overall security and civil presence in Kosovo. We talk here 
about main roads and areas where a huge amount o f supply had to go through 
and could not be contacted by train.96
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This approach displays the self-sufficiency and self-reliance of the military approach, 
and also displays a willingness to expand into areas that fell into the authority o f civilian 
groups. Infrastructure improvements were also continued in Macedonia. In October 
1999 General Klaus Reinhard negotiated with the Macedonians regarding the upgrade 
of Skopje airport and roads to handle the vastly increased traffic,97 and by November 
KFOR were opening a bypass for Blace ‘to alleviate the impact o f KFOR traffic on 
limited local infrastructure.’98
Within Kosovo KFOR’s major strategic interests were to connect the headquarters and 
major bases of the four multinational brigades (MNB’s) in the north (Mitrovica), south 
(Urosevac), east (Gnjilane) and west (Pec), intersecting at Pristina where the fifth 
Multinational Brigade (MNB Central) and the KFOR commander (COMKFOR) was 
based. Infrastructure improvements, especially major projects, carried out by the 
military usually lay on routes directly connecting these MNB’s to each other or to a 
major artery from Albania or Macedonia. For periods o f time the military often 
monopolized certain routes in the build up o f their forces.
In November 1999 KFOR officially opened the railway line between Kosovo Polje 
(close to Pristina) and Pec.99 Repair work was also carried on the Pristina/Pec road with 
improvements carried out on the Zajmovo road bridge100 and around the town of 
Klina101. The railway line from Kosovo Polje also serviced MNB Central while Kosovo 
Polje’s railway yards were run by UNMIK and KFOR combined, with KFOR running 
some trains themselves. Similarly on the southern routes by June 2000 KFOR was 
still monopolising the main railway track between Pristina and Skopje, which also ran 
through Multinational Brigade South Headquarters in Urosevac. The railway line at the 
time was only being used for military cargo and not for civilian traffic.103
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99 KFOR N ew s U pdate by M ajor R oland Lavoie, KFO R Spokesperson Pristina, 12 N ovem ber 1999
100 KFOR N ew s Update by Lt.-Cdr. Philip A nido, KFOR Spokesperson Pristina, 13 M ay 2000
101 M unicipal Profile, Klina, 1 M ay 2 000 , Organisation for Security and C o-operation in Europe, M ission  
in K osovo , D ém ocratisation
102 KFO R Press U pdate by M ajor Roland L avoie, KFO R Spokesperson Pristina, 16 A ugust 1999
103 M unicipal Profile, KaCanik, 21 June 2 0 0 0 , Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
M ission  in K osovo , D ém ocratisation
61
The road route parallel to the railway line was also being improved between P ristin a 
and Kacanik (close to Blace).104 In Gnjilane, the site o f a major US base of 6000 
troops105 and a primary build up point for military forces in the early days of 
deployment106, a ring road was completed in 2001 to accommodate the heavy KFOR 
traffic that was worsening road conditions.107 Road works were also undertaken to 
improve the route between Pristina and Gnjilane by the forces o f MNB Central108 and 
the Gnjilane US camp109 respectively. From Prizren to Pristina (an extension of the 
Kukes border route from Albania) was improved by military forces of Multinational 
Brigade (MNB) South led by Germany110, including a bypass and road construction 
carried out under their direction111.
Whereas the military’s involvement in these activities is understandable and 
commendable, what is noteworthy is the degree o f control that they exercised over 
critical infrastructure. Not only did KFOR commission or construct the major 
improvements (KFOR often directed local contractors in the work), they also retained 
responsibility for the maintenance o f their major roads, including sanding and salting on 
all main roads and ‘those roads that are vital for the mobility o f KFOR.’112 At every 
level the military controlled and guarded the lines o f transport deemed important to 
them. Even within the cities a distinction was drawn between the upkeep of the streets 
with KFOR maintaining the routes that directly connected their urban headquarters to
1 n
the major highways. Ordinarily such maintenance tasks would be carried out by 
civilian authorities.
These actions reaffirm the military’s independence from civilian authorities, and their 
preparedness to duplicate the task o f civilian organisations in specific areas. Regarding
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Huntington’s parallel authority and horizontal control concepts KFOR was an 
independent force expanding into non-traditional and non-essential tasks. However it 
must be noted that KFOR undertook many infrastructure improvements as the only 
competent party to do so during the force build up, and the subsequent operation and 
maintenance o f the infrastructure was not beyond their expertise. What is more 
important is the extent o f their involvement and control over the infrastructure. The 
military forces often assumed responsibilities that could just as easily been handled by 
civilian organisations.
In addition to the above improvements KFOR was also actively involved in a myriad of 
locally based large and small scale public works, o f which only a few samples can be 
listed here. In Strpce US KFOR helped in the repair o f a chlorination plant in October 
1999114, while French KFOR attempted to clean up the water supply in Vucitm115. 
Unfortunately the latter found it beyond their ability due to the very poor infrastructure 
that existed even before the war, a common problem in many sectors. KFOR also 
attempted to conduct smaller repairs on phone lines in Obilic116 but again the efforts
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were not sufficient. School and power plant repairs , winterisation programmes , 
installation o f street lights119 and repair o f power lines120 are only a very small sample 
of the common and frequent tasks undertaken by the military forces in Kosovo.
Without denigrating the contribution made by the military in this area, it is clear that 
there are two very different agendas attached to each. Where the military had a strategic 
interest, the interest was translated into full-scale renovation and construction followed 
by ongoing maintenance and total control. Where the military did not have a strategic 
interest but rather humanitarian responsibility, they engaged their resources in 
development, but in a fragmented and multifaceted way.
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This is not to state that the military’s social contributions are anyway lessened, but it 
does point out that the military are a very particular entity, with clear objectives to 
further and consolidate, and that this is reflected in much o f the infrastructure work that 
they engaged in. An example of this can be seen regarding the ‘Goat Road’ in Zubin 
Potok, where although the route had a very high humanitarian value, the military gave it 
minor attention by comparison to those that served their primary strategic interests.
The Adriatic Highway crosses the municipality through the villages Zupce, 
Varage, Uglijare, Zubin Potok, Donji Jasenovik, Gazivode and Banje (24km). It 
is in rather good condition and connects Zubin Potok with South 
Mitrovice/Mitrovica. However, Kosovo Serbs need to travel to North 
Mitrovice/Mitrovica via a gravel mountain road (also “goat road”), as the main 
road leads through Kosovo Albanian populated villages and cannot be used by 
Kosovo Serbs for security reasons. The alternative route was improved by 
French and Danish KFOR units last year, but is still very bumpy and in winter 
and after heavy rains impassable for civilian cars. This makes it difficult for 
Kosovo Serbs to travel to Mitrovice/Mitrovica on a daily basis. However, when 
possible, there is a local minibus operating during daytime. The local road net 
consists o f 148 km o f dirt roads and needs repair.121
The military’s interaction with the province’s infrastructure again suggests conformity 
with the Huntingtonian military ethic. What maximises the military’s operational 
capacity, and therefore their relative power, is guarded and maintained. Although 
KFOR did expend resources on social infrastructure, it was clear that this did not 
receive the same attention as those projects that were important for the military’s 
operations. This in turn supports the concept o f a parallel authority, where the military 
developed the infrastructure primarily to suit their own strategic interests. This would 
naturally be required when a long-term military operation is to be embarked upon, 
however the reluctance to share authority is important. Following on from this civilian 
horizontal control is weakened as the military assumes more responsibility over civilian 
and dual-use infrastructure, and civilians are subsequently excluded from the operation 
of that infrastructure. This pattern of military independence and exclusion is typified by
121 M unicipal Profile, P ec, Septem ber 2001 , Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
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the m ilitary ’s running  o f  the airport at Pristina, w h ich  w as critically  exam ined follow ing 
an aviation accident in  late 1999.
O n 12 N ovem ber 1999 a  W orld Food Program  fligh t from  R om e to  P ristina crashed into 
a m ountain  range 30 m iles north  o f  its destination .122 A m ongst the international 
com m unity an  im m ediate ‘need to know ’ inform ation  po licy  seem ed to  go into effect 
regarding the cause o f  the accident. The O SC E m entioned  in  their spot report on the 
incident that they  had  been  left out o f  the inform ation  loop as they  had  no sta ff aboard
1 'y'K
the aircraft, w hile  one new spaper hinted that the p lane  m ay  have been  shot dow n by 
the S erbs.124 E igh t days later Pristina airport w as c losed  to all civ ilian  traffic as a 
concern arose tha t there had  been a  conflict in  com m unications m ethodology betw een
IOC
the m ilitary  in  charge o f  the airport and incom ing civ ilian  flights. A n  investigation 
by the Bureau Enquetes-Accidents later confirm ed th is to  have been  one o f  the factors 
leading to  the crash. Their report found tha t the accident had been  caused and 
contributed to  by a  num ber o f  factors, including poor procedural discip line by the  flight 
crew, crew  fatigue and unserviceable instrum ents.
H ow ever another cause identified w as the opening o f  the  aerodrom e to  civ ilian  traffic 
w ithout an  advance evaluation o f  the operating conditions or o f  the conditions for the 
distribution o f  aeronautical inform ation. The repo rt’s findings noted  tha t the air traffic 
control services used  by  the m ilitary  at Pristina w ere R A F procedures tha t differed from  
civil standards and  practices. The m ilitary approach controller in  contact w ith  the flight 
also had  no experience o f  civil procedures before h is arrival at P ris tina .127 It also 
described how  K F O R  issued m ilitary  N O TA M S (N otices to  A irm en) tha t w ere to tally  
inaccessible to  civ il operators using the usual channels. It w as stated  that i f  the 
N O TA M S had  show n that the service w as provided  according to  the regulations in  a 
m ilitary docum ent, JSP 318A, it ‘m ight have pushed  civil operators to  get further
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inform ation on  the nature  o f  the service p rov ided .’128 R eferring  to  JSP 318A  it was 
reported that civil crew s did not, for the  m ost part, know  its contents or the 
specifications linked w ith  the  operation o f  Pristina, ‘w hich  w as only  described in detail 
in  aeronautical docum entation  w hich w as not available to  c iv ilians.’129
A lthough the conflict o f  procedures betw een the m ilitary  and civ ilian  m ethod o f  aircraft 
control w as n o t the sole cause o f  the accident, it still h ighlighted the undesirable 
situation o f  hav ing  som e procedural inform ation restricted  to  m ilitary  users only, and to 
applying m ilitary  traffic  control to m ixed  flights. A dded to th is w as the fact that K FO R  
had been  aw are that the  in tegration o f  civ ilian  flights in to  the  m ilitary  system  was an 
issue. Four m onths p rio r to  the accident a  K FO R  spokesperson, in  answ er to a question 
w hy civ ilian  air traffic w as unable to com e through  P ristina  replied , ‘That is a very good 
question. I th ink  a  lot o f  it has to  do w ith  the  absence o f  c ivil aviation regulations. As 
far as civ ilian  traffic is concerned w e w ill have to w ait for the set up o f  the civil aviation
IOA |
structure.’ W ith  th is foreknow ledge the excessive secrecy  surrounding the 
N O TA M s, the conten t o f  w hich on the days prior to  the accident w ere fairly  m undane, 
is hard to ju stify . In  the w ake o f  the  report the investigation  team  subsequently
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recom m ended tha t a  rev iew  o f  procedures take place. K F O R  responded by stressing 
the m ilitary  p rocedures regarding their control over the  strategically  im portant airport. 
‘That rev iew  w as quickly  carried  out and, as a result, additional em phasis was placed in 
aeronautical docum entation  that Pristina is a  m ilitary  a irfield  and am plified the N A TO
I o'}
m ilitary procedures in  u se .’
The incident supports H untington’s concept o f  a  parallel authority  insofar as the dual- 
use infrastructure w as again  subject to  the  total control by the  m ilitary authorities, this 
tim e to  the detrim ent o f  civ ilian  aviators. A s there w ere no com petent civilians to 
undertake airport m anagem ent it w as natural for the m ilitary  to  assum e control over the 
airport facilities, how ever th is does no t by  itse lf  explain  w hy the m ilitary  procedures 
w ere kept secret. K F O R ’s failure to  publicise the m ilitary  procedures stem m ed 
prim arily  from  their reluctance to share restricted  inform ation  w ith  civ ilian  air traffic. 
The fact tha t P ris tina  a irport w as the focus o f  friction betw een  R ussian, U K  and US
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K FO R  on  entering the province m ay have heightened  the  sense o f  secrecy betw een the 
various operators. Since the issue had  been know n o f  som etim e previously , it seem s 
unlikely  that it w as due to sim ple bureaucratic failure. T his characteristic  secretiveness, 
in  itse lf a m anifestation  o f  a  desire to  increase relative pow er b y  denying know ledge, 
proved  a  d istinct draw back  to  civ il-m ilitary  co-operation in  th is instance. This behavior 
lends support to the  values o f  H untington’s m ilitary eth ic, and portrays the m ilitary as 
being p rim arily  concerned w ith  security and relative pow er. A s fo r the concept o f  
horizontal control, it m ust be noted that civilian operators for the airport w ere 
unavailable, and therefore the conditions to  fully te s t horizon tal control w ere not 
fulfilled. H ow ever it is notew orthy that, despite the large am ount o f  the civ ilian  traffic 
into the airport, the  civilians w ere not fu lly  accom m odated by  the  m ilitary  authorities.
P ro p e r ty  U sage
Entering K osovo also brought w ith  it  the  problem  o f  accom m odation , for m ilitary  and 
civilians alike. D ue to  the w idespread destruction caused  by  the  hostilities betw een the 
K L A  and the Y ugoslav arm y fo llow ed by  N A TO  bom bing, m any  governm ent buildings 
had  been  destroyed and residences set on fire  th rough  ethnically  m otivated  arson 
attacks. P roperty  w as therefore at a  prem ium , and the  forem ost concern  w as the 
procurem ent o f  adequate build ings for field offices, H Q s and billeting. This w as a 
problem  faced by  all organisations on  the ground, and created  m uch friction betw een 
the in ternational com m unity, the m ilitary, local popu la tion  and residual K LA  
representatives. O ne undesirable outcom e, unavoidable a t least in  the short term , was 
the  b illeting  o f  soldiers in  factories tha t had p reviously  p rov ided  em ploym ent in  the 
local area. In a t least five o f  K osovo’s 29 M unicipalities (30 by 2 0 0 0 133), m ilitary 
contingents had  taken  up residence in  the prem ises o f  a  prev iously  significant em ployer 
o f  the locality .134 O f  these five, four had been m ain  em ployers before  the w ar, three o f  
them  had  contingents based  in  m ore than  one prem ises per m unicipality , and one 
contingent w as recorded  as actively  causing resentm ent th rough  its use o f  an  entire 
hotel.
133 U[nited] N[ations] M[ission] I[n] K[osovo]/REG/2000/43 27 July 2000 Regulation No. 2000/43 on the 
number, names and boundaries of municipalities.
134 Municipal Profiles for Klina 1 May 2000, Urosevac 3 May 2000, Prizren 10 July 2000, Pec 5 May, 
Lipljan 23 June, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Démocratisation
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In  K lina tw o factories that p rev iously  m ade w eapons and shoes respectively  w ere 
occupied by Portuguese K FO R , a  contingency o f  300 p ersonnel135. It is not know n 
w hether the occupied factories w ere operational at that tim e. In  L ip ljan  800 personnel 
o f  F innish  and C anadian K F O R  w ere in  residence in  a  paper m ill tha t had been one o f  
three enterprises tha t had p rovided  the m ain  source o f  em ploym ent in  the  town. In  this 
case the paper m ill and one o ther industry  w as reported  as be ing  non-operational prior 
to  being used as a  m ilitary H Q 136. In  th is province departing  Serb m anagers w ho had 
left the area during the w ar had  som etim es rem oved key  parts o f  factory equipm ent, 
rendering them  unw orkab le .137
The situation w as m ore reprehensible in  three o ther provinces w here K F O R  M N B HQs 
w ere based. In U rosevac it w as reported  that the m ain  factory , p roducing pipes, was 
housing 600 G reek K FO R  and very  little  production  w as tak ing  p lace .138 A  sim ilar but 
w orse scenario also happened in  Prizren, w here 2500 G erm an and T urkish K FO R 
occupied four o f  the larger factories, leading to  a  reduced  capacity  for production in 
each. Pec w as w orst o f  all w ith  the report stating that the  capacity  o f  m any o f  the social 
and state-ow ned com panies and farm ing  operations w as severely  reduced ‘due to war 
dam age and K F O R  occupation o f  p rem ises’. H otel M etoh ija  it w as w ritten, was 
com pletely taken  over by  som e o f  the 600 Italian K F O R  personnel, ‘m uch to  the 
resentm ent o f  the local popu lation ’.140 By th is stage m ost contingents had been  in 
theatre fo r over six m onths.
F riction also occurred betw een the O S C E  and K F O R  over the  sam e issue in  the early 
stages o f  deploym ent. In  late  June the O SC E team  in M itrov ica  com plained that there 
was a lack o f  available office space fo r a  field office and tha t m any o f  the potential 
locations had already been  taken  by  K F O R .141 A n oral appeal w as subsequently  m ade 
to  the K FO R  com m ander a  w eek  later to  have K FO R  units, w here possible, refrain  from  
taking over build ings earm arked by  the O S C E .142 A t the  sam e tim e K F O R  expressed 
great concern  to the O SC E about the  lack  o f  a  police force, yet w hen  the O SC E sought
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sites for a potential school they  discovered that the original tra in ing  academ y in V ucitm  
was also under occupation by K F O R 143. B y m id-July, K L A  representatives in  Pec had 
becom e frustrated  by  the seizure o f  public  buildings and schools by  K F O R .144 K FO R 
w ere no t the only culprits in  th is dispute as U N M IK  w as party  to  the seizures and was 
associated w ith  the com plaint. U N M IK  w as also criticised by  a  p rovisional K LA  body 
for confiscating build ings after having declared them  public  p roperty .145 O n the other 
hand the K L A  them selves had been  in  the process o f  occupying  bu ild ings across the 
province and had  them selves to be rem oved ,146 especially  from  police stations which 
were due to  be occupied by U N M IK  personnel.147
Regarding the m ilitary  requisitions it stands to  reason tha t one cannot be too judgm ental 
w hen discussing the  use o f  public  and private properties by  the  m ilitary  w hen arriving 
in  theatre. P ractical issues including the size o f  the  contingent, availab ility  o f  adequate 
prem ises and the resources available w ould  all be im portant factors in  the  decision o f  a 
m ilitary com m ander in  choosing prem ises. O ther considerations w ould  include w hether 
electricity and w ater w as available (there w as poor or in term itten t supply in  som e o f  the 
m unicipalities listed  above). Industry w ould  find it  d ifficu lt to  operate w ithout either, 
and d ifficu lt in  general w hen destruction is w idespread, and i f  p lan ts w ere idle then a 
case could  be m ade for their tem porary use. Therefore it w ould  be erroneous to try and 
rigidly assert that their actions conform ed or o therw ise w ith  H un ting ton’s theory in this 
regard. H ow ever it also has to  be noted that p roduction  w as still underw ay in m any 
parts o f  K osovo, including in  m any o f  the prem ises detailed  here, and therefore the 
policy  often  harm ed the developm ent o f  the local and  provincial econom y. M ore 
im portantly  the m ilitary  did not alw ays com pensate for their occupation, as a statem ent 
by the K osovo O m budsperson revealed.
A  large num ber o f  individuals ow ning real and/or m ovable property  or having a 
property  in terest in  socially-ow ned property  in  K osovo have approached non­
governm ental organisations and the O m budsperson to  com plain  about the 
occupation, dam age, or bo th  to that property  by  K F O R  and about the
143 SEC.FR 538/99, 22 June 1999, The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo, 19-21 June 1999 [Restricted]
144 SEC.FR 605/99 15 July 1999, OSCE Mission in Kosovo Weekly Report 8-14 July [Restricted
145 SEC.FR 649/99, 5 August 1999, OSCE Mission in Kosovo Weekly Mission Report, 29 July -  4 
August 1999 [Restricted]
146 SEC.FR 538/99, 22 June 1999, The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo, 19-21 June 1999 [Restricted]
147 KFOR Press Conference by General Sir Mike Jackson and Interim Special Representative Sergio De 
Mello Pristina, Kosovo 21 June 1999
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im possibility  o f  ob tain ing com pensation fo r the  occupation or dam age to  their 
property. T hese individuals also allege that no adm inistrative or jud icial 
rem edies ex ist either to  challenge the  actual occupation or dam age to  the 
property  or to  claim  com pensation for the  financial or m aterial losses 
su ffered .148
A lthough the problem s o f  finding adequate p rem ises can  be understood, to  deny 
com pensation and rem uneration  for its use is obviously  counter productive. H ow ever 
the O m budsm an did accept that in  m any circum stances ow ners o f  property were 
com pletely satisfied by  the com pensation that they  had  received  from  u sers .149
This situation w as com pounded by the lack o f  a  Status o f  Forces A greem ent, otherw ise 
know n as a SO FA , w hich  w as still no t concluded betw een  K F O R  and the Federal 
R epublic o f  Y ugoslav ia by the beginning o f  2 0 0 2 .150 The only clarification regarding 
the international security  presence w as an U N M IK  regu la tion  that m ade U N M IK  and 
K FO R  personnel exem pt from  any legal process inside K osovo .151 A lthough it did 
com m it U N M IK  and K F O R  to setting up ‘C laim s C om m issions’ to settle th ird  party 
liability, no th ing  o f  that nature  had been  established by  the  tim e o f  the O m budsperson’s 
report. The lack o f  leg islation  regarding property righ ts and usage led to som ething o f  
an  ‘anything goes’ situation. The O m budsperson u ltim ately  found against K FO R  (and 
U N M IK ) on a num ber o f  counts regarding their im m unity  from  prosecution, how ever 
there w as no w ay to  enforce the  ru ling as the O m budsperson’s ju risd ic tion  did no t cover 
K FO R  personnel.152
Independent o f  his conclusions on  the incom patib ility  o f  U N M IK  Regulation 
N o. 2000/47 on  the Status, Privileges and Im m unities o f  K FO R  and U N M IK  
and  Their Personnel in  K osovo (18 A ugust 2000) w ith  recognised international 
standards, the O m budsperson also concludes th a t the failure o f  U N M IK  to 
regulate further the structure and procedures o f  the C laim s C om m issions called
148 Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo Special Report No. 1 on the compatibility with recognized 
international standards of UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47 on the Status, Privileges and Immunities of 
KFOR and UNMIK and their Personnel in Kosovo (18 August 2000)
149 UNMIK news No. 9 1 -7  /05/01 Ombudsperson's Report questions an UNMIK Regulation
150 Correspondence with KFOR Main PIO office, 24 April 2002, See Appendix B
151 UNMIK/REG/2000/47 18 August, Regulation No. 2000/47 on the Status, Privileges and Immunities of 
KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel in Kosovo
152 UNMIK/REG/2000/38 , 30 June 2000 Regulation No. 2000/38 On the establishment of the 
Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo
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for under Section 7 o f  said R egulation and the consequen t failure o f  U N M IK  
and K F O R  to establish  such C laim s C om m issions constitu tes a  vio lation o f  the 
right to  a  court guaranteed under A rticle 6 o f  the  E uropean  C onvention on 
H um an R igh ts.153
The scenario w hereby K F O R  personnel w ere exem pt from  local prosecution is a  
com plex one, and has m ore factors involved than  sim ple adherence to  a  m ilitary  ethic or 
conform ity w ith  H untington’s parallel authority and horizon tal control concepts. It is 
fair to  argue that in th is case the political m otivation o f  th e  troop  contributing nations 
(TCN s) is the prim ary reason  for the m ilitary ’s im m unity  from  prosecution, rather than 
the behavioural characteristics posited  by H untington. H ow ever the legal situation 
again  underscores how  the m ilitary  forces enjoyed a  para lle l existence o f  the type that 
H untington described. D espite  the entreaties o f  local civ ilians and the office o f  the 
O m budsperson, the m ilitary  d id  no t respond to requests to  set up a  C laim s Com m ission. 
N or d id they  respect the O S C E ’s earlier claim s to  certain  p roperties at the beginning o f  
deploym ent. The behaviour o f  the m ilitary  in  th is regard  supports H unting ton’s m ilitary 
ethic and his parallel authority  concept. A lthough K F O R  had  im m unity from  
prosecution, it w as no t prepared  to  com prom ise th is freedom  through  the establishm ent 
o f  a C laim s C om m ission, a  board  that w ould  disburse m oney  to  those w ith  genuine 
grievances ra ther than  becom ing a vehicle for p rosecu tion  o f  m ilitary  forces. The 
m ilitary, w hile  no t being  com pletely  intransigent or insensitive  to  the p light o f  the 
property ow ners, apparently  w ished  to deal w ith  the m atter on  a local level w here they 
could  reserve the righ t to  offer com pensation instead o f  surrendering  control to a central 
body.
T h e  K osovo b ro a d c a s t  system
K FO R  w as ex tensively  involved in  the reconstruction o f  K osovo’s broadcast system . 
The m ilitary  re-bu ilt the netw ork, controlled  frequency a llocation  and  at tim es becam e 
involved w ith  disputes relating to  the re-estab lishm ent and use o f  facilities.
153 Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo Special Report No. 1 on the compatibility with recognized 
international standards of UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47 on the Status, Privileges and Immunities of 
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One such dispute occurred in  late June 1999 w hen K F O R  arranged a m eeting with 
Serbian m edia representatives to re-integrate K osovo A lban ians into the operations o f 
R adio and T elev ision  (RTV ) P ristina .154 K F O R  orig inally  tried  to  establish  an 
executive board fo r R T V  Pristina after a  group o f  A lbanians attem pted to  force entry 
into the RTV  bu ild ing .155 The B oard consisted o f  four Serbs, three A lbanians and one 
m em ber each from  K F O R  and UN M IK . The O SC E  d id  no t a ttend  the first m eeting o f 
the board on 25 June, bu t d id  attend the second m eeting  on  the  28 June on  w hich  it 
subsequently w rote a  spot report, the details o f  w hich  follow .
The second m eeting  w as to start w ith  a  sym bolic v isit o f  form er K osovo A lbanian 
em ployees to  the R T V  building, w here they  w ere to  be granted access to  the  first floor 
only. The executive board  w as then  to  discuss the in tegration  o f  K osovo A lbanian  and 
K osovo Serb sta ff in  the  organisation’s structures. It is unclear w hich  authority  m ade 
this decision although since both  K FO R  and U N M IK  had  been  involved in  the first 
m eeting it m ay be p resum ed  that they  had, or should  have had, know ledge o f  the 
decision. Instead o f  the  sym bolic visit, 200 K osovo A lbanians turned  up and quickly 
spread throughout the  building. W hen K FO R , O SC E  and  U N M IK  representatives 
entered the m eeting room  bo th  ethnic groups w ere already  in  discussion. The Serbian 
sta ff had assem bled outside the office, stating that they  had been  threatened by the 
K osovo A lbanians, w ho had beaten up and threatened  to  kill a  num ber o f  them . A 
K osovo A lbanian  jou rna lis t speaking on b eh a lf  o f  his ethnic com m unity, w hile  stating 
that he was no t responsib le  for individual behaviour, u rged  o ther K osovo A lbanians to 
conduct them selves in  a  peaceful m anner. A  bom b th rea t then  forced K F O R  to clear the 
building. Serbian s ta ff  w ere again threatened on  the  w ay  out o f  the building, and they 
asked K FO R  to provide them  w ith  an escort to  the border, a request that K FO R  
com plied with.
The situation w as best sum m ed up in  the w ords o f  an  U N M IK  spokesperson w hen he 
described it as a  ‘particu larly  thorny issue’ w ith  ‘claim s and counter c la im s’.156 W hat is 
o f  interest to th is study w as the im m ediate reaction  o f  the  m ilitary  after the m eeting. 
The O SC E recorded tha t K F O R  approached them  after the incident and m ade it clear
154 SEC.FR 565/99, 1 July 1999, The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo, Activity Report 28 -  29 June 
1999 [Restricted] N.B. The reports did not say whether the Serbian broadcast authorities involved were 
Kosovo Serbs or otherwise.
155 SEC.FR 566/99, 1 July 1999, The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo, Spot Report: Meeting of the 
Executive Board for RTV Pristina, 28 June 1999 [Restricted]
156 KFOR Press Statement, Pristina, Kosovo, 12 July by Major Jan Joosten
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that they w ould prefer no t to be involved in  further negotia tions regard ing  R TV , and 
stated that from  here on in  they w ished for the O SC E to take responsib ility  for the status 
o f  the facilities and staff. The O SCE d idn ’t  agree to  this, and decided to  rem ain  in 
touch w ith  K FO R  concerning the continuing efforts to  in tegrate K osovo Serb and 
Kosovo A lbanian s ta ff  w ith in  RTV. A t the end o f  the  report into the  m atter it was 
stated tha t there w as little doubt that they  (the O SCE) w ould  continue to be pressed  by 
K F O R .157 A t subsequent press conferences in  Pristina, general questions regard ing  the 
status o f  RTV w ere answ ered by an U N M IK  spokesperson .158
In this instance H untington’s horizontal control appears to  be validated  as the m ilitary 
attem pted to avoid involvem ent in  an area tha t they believed  could  be best undertaken 
by the OSCE. The reaction  o f  the m ilitary  tow ards the  in tegration  issues appears to be 
one o f  d isdain for such  a  m essy affair. I f  one w ere to  evaluate the  situation from  an 
angle o f  realist self-interest, as H untington’s m ilitary  eth ic w ould  suggest, the reaction 
is understandable. K F O R  attem pted to  extricate itse lf  from  an  obligation that had no 
m aterial benefit to  their circum stances, and could  be  reso lved  or m anaged by a 
com petent civ ilian  group w ho w ere sim ultaneously  present. H ow ever it m ust be noted 
that it w as the m ilita ry ’s decision, rather than  the p resence o f  com petent civ ilian  bodies, 
that led to  the request to  rem ain  outside o f  R T V ’s negotiations. Therefore H untington’s 
horizontal control concept is not as strongly supported  as it m ight first appear. K F O R ’s 
subsequent involvem ent in  the com m unications infrastructure further rejects the idea o f  
the m ilitary being  com partm entalised by  civ ilian  groups.
K FO R  had no sim ilar d isdain for the  physical aspects o f  the com m unications 
infrastructure and it exercised the fu llest control over hardw are and frequency 
distribution. In  July  1999 requests to beg in  b roadcasting  w ere being d irected  to K FO R  
rather than  the O SC E or U N M IK , because ‘K FO R , w hich  has the capacity  and basically 
the control o f  the allocation o f  frequencies has been  receiv ing  these requests [to 
broadcast].’159 K FO R  did how ever coordinate them selves w ith  the O S C E ’s D epartm ent 
o f  M edia A ffairs (D M A ) and U N M IK  and in  early N ovem ber 1999 the D eputy  H ead o f  
the O SC E m ission  chaired a  m eeting w ith  several O S C E  staff, U N M IK  and K FO R
157 SEC.FR 566/99, 1 July 1999, The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo, Spot Report: Meeting of the 
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representatives to  d iscuss the O S C E ’s authority  to  regulate m ed ia  in  K osovo .160 The 
D M A ’s role as Tem porary  M edia  Com m issioner (TM C ) brought up  three points for 
d iscussion; w hat the lim its w ere for the new  O SCE authority  to  regulate m edia, how  
w ould  it w ork  in  co-operation w ith  U N M IK  and K FO R , and how  far the International 
C om m unity  w as w illing  to go to  enforce its authority. It w as suggested during the 
m eeting (it is n o t reported  by  w hom ) that the  In ternational C om m unity  should  develop 
an im m ediate response m echanism  to v iolations, or else risk  being party  to the act. 
K F O R  did no t give an im m ediate response to this, instead  stating that they  w ould 
research th is question  and report back. B y contrast, on  the  m atter o f  frequency 
allocation K F O R  representatives stressed tha t the responsib ility  fo r m anaging 
frequencies throughout K osovo lay w ith  them , and that they  should  be  involved before 
the  O SC E m ade any allocations.161 O n that m atter O M IK  later m et w ith  K FO R  and 
U N M IK  representatives and consulted experts from  the  International 
Telecom m unication U nion  in  M ay 2000 on broadcast frequency  m anagem ent and the 
establishm ent o f  a  frequency p lan  for K osovo. H ow ever, the  O SC E later com plained 
that, although they  had  been  g iven  the authority to issue licenses in  O ctober 1999, 
K F O R ’s control over the broadcast frequencies had m ade th is m ore difficult. This was 
later resolved by  an agreem ent betw een K FO R  and the O SC E, w here the O SC E w ould 
be free to  choose the frequencies, w hich w ould  be then  approved  by  KFO R.
This in teraction again show s sim ilar traits to the R T V  events, and rather than  supporting 
the concept o f  horizontal control, it is the parallel au thority  m odel that is m ore relevant. 
K F O R ’s behaviour w ith  the com m unications infrastructure is rem iniscent o f  the 
m ilita ry ’s attitude tow ards the transport infrastructure in  bo th  K osovo and Albania. The 
m ilitary  w ere carv ing  out part o f  the strategic resources and w ere unw illing to share 
control w ith  a  civ ilian  group, or involve them selves as fu lly  in  social m atters. O n the 
social question  o f  broadcast v io lations the m ilitary  w ere unprepared  to  give an answer, 
bu t on  the m atter o f  frequency  allocation, strategically im portan t to  K FO R , there w as no 
hesita tion  in  stating their position  o f  control. In  furtherance o f  H untington’s parallel 
authority  m odel, the m ilitary  continued to  be an  independent actor, i f  no t an
160 SEC.FR 860/99,12 November 1999, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Weekly Report No. 18/99, 3-9 
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uncooperative one, on  control o f  the netw ork  frequencies. H orizontal control is 
som ew hat supported w hen  the m atter o f  m edia  control is exam ined. O n regulation o f  
the m edia, w hich  w as the  O S C E ’s departm ent by  v irtue  o f  its m andate, the m ilitary had 
no im m ediate contribution to  m ake. Their request to  research  the question displays 
their lack o f  expertise and their inability to assist in  tha t m atter. H ow ever it m ust also 
be noted that the m ilita ry ’s interest in the social developm ent o f  the infrastructure was 
very m uch second p lace to  their prim ary strategic in terests.
Further events in  broadcasting  displayed the m ilita ry ’s independence. K F O R ’s tight 
control over K osovo’s transm ission  equipm ent w as a  po in t on w hich  there w as no 
com prom ise, even to  the detrim ent o f  the civ ilian  adm inistrators. D uring the rebuilding 
o f  K osovo’s terrestrial netw ork  com plications arose over the use o f  M ount Zviljan for 
transm ission purposes. In  late M ay 2000, the Southern  B rigade o f  K FO R  decided that 
Z viljan could not be used  for civ ilian  purposes, even  though  it had  been the site o f  the 
m ajor southern transm ission  tow er until the bom bings, because it had  been taken  over 
by G erm an K F O R  for expanded electronic w arfare .164 A no ther nearby  site was selected 
as an option, adding an estim ated U S$600,000 to  the cost o f  the  project being 
undertaken by  a  Japanese technical team . D ue to  the  in transigence o f  the m ilitary the 
U nited  N ations D evelopm ent Program m e (U N D P) w as left w ith  the task  o f  finding out 
w hether the m oney could  be found or n o t.165 A nother instance o f  covert activity by the 
m ilitary  relates to the closure o f  Radio S on 14 A ugust 2000. The TM C  sent a letter to 
Radio S on  12 A ugust, requesting that they  cease all operations for failing to fill in  an 
application. The station  continued to broadcast and K F O R  subsequently  m oved in to 
close it dow n tw o days la te r.166 H ow ever, after K F O R  secured the facility, they 
continued to broadcast on the frequency to give an illusion  o f  norm ality  and to avoid
1 7
strong reactions in  the  already turbulent Z vecan  area. Such subtle tactics, though 
understandable under the circum stances, m ay  be called  into question as far as issues o f  
transparency and trust build ing  are concerned as they  in troduce the risk  o f  backlash in 
return  for short-term  gain.
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Another po in t o f  in terest w as the am ount o f  radio  stations directly controlled by the 
m ilitary. O f  the 58 radio stations broadcasting in  K osovo in  A ugust 2000, six were 
directly contro lled  by K FO R , w hile five w ere in ternational com panies broadcasting into 
K osovo168, being the B ritish  B roadcasting C om pany, V oice o f  A m erica, Deutsche 
Welle, R adio F ree E urope and R adio France In ternational.169 Program m ing carried by 
the m ilitary ’s station in  Pec w as in  the language o f  the  m ilitary  contingents (Italian, 
English, Spanish  and Portuguese) as w ell as A lban ian  and Serb .170 A n A m erican 
produced p rogram  broadcast in  M NB East w as p roduced  in  Serbian, A lbanian and 
English and contained  ‘safety announcem ents for local c itizens and soldiers as w ell as 
other item s o f  in terest to  a ll’ in  addition to  ‘W estern  top  40 style m usic ’.171 A t the same 
tim e the O SC E  had received  47 m ore applications for broadcasting  licences.172
These activities d isp lay  the sam e traits exposed in  earlier aspects o f  civ il-m ilitary  co­
operation. K F O R  dem onstrated  a  large degree o f  independence from  the desires o f  
civilian groups and involved them selves extensively  in  areas w here com petent civilians 
w ere sim ultaneously  present. H untington’s para lle l authority  m odel is strongly 
supported by  the behaviour o f  the m ilitary  w ith  regard  to  the  control and running  o f  the 
broadcast system . K F O R  displayed the greatest independence possib le from  their 
civilian counterparts w hen they  appropriated the  M ount Z viljan  transm itter to the 
detrim ent o f  the developm ent program m e. In  th is even t their strategic in terest was 
clearly defined by  their use  o f  the facility  for electronic w arfare, and the concept o f  the 
m ilitary ethic seem s particu larly  accurate here. T heir in teraction  w ith  R adio S again 
shows a w illingness to  dispense w ith  openness in  o rder to  preserve security. H orizontal 
control is also w eakened  w hen the m ilita ry ’s invo lvem ent in  m edia and broadcasting 
services is exam ined. W hile one could defin itely  argue that the 45,000 soldiers o f  
K FO R  are en titled  to  their ow n social broadcasting, a  coun ter argum ent could  be m ade 
as to  w hy the m ilitary  had  to  control these stations. C ou ldn ’t  civ ilian  operators have run 
the stations and p rovided  program m ing fo r the m ilitary , ra ther than  vice versa?
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H ow ever it m ust also be pointed out tha t despite these  incidents, broadcasting was 
considered one o f  the best exam ples o f  ongoing co-operation  betw een K FO R , UN M IK , 
O SCE and other civ ilian  organisations involved in  com m unications. K FO R  were 
independent, bu t no t unresponsive. The dialogue in  the  O S C E ’s records show s m any 
incidents w here m eetings ended w ith  satisfactory  decisions being reached, including on 
financing173, in frastructure174 and adm in istra tion .175 T he O SC E once described the 
reconstruction o f  the K osovo Terrestrial T elev ision  N etw ork  as the  resu lt o f  the fruitful 
co-operation betw een  the tw o donor nations (Japan and the  U nited  States), the UN DP,
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O SC E and K FO R. A  successful resu lt o f  the co-operation  could  be seen in  the 
establishm ent and adm inistration o f  the B roadcast F requency  P lan  for K osovo approved 
by the O SCE, U N M IK  and K FO R, w hich  required  all radio  stations to  switch 
frequencies. O n 16 N ovem ber 2000 w hen  the p lan  w as im plem ented  ninety percent o f  
radio stations com plied  im m ediately w ith  the re-tun ing .177
H e a lth  C a re  P ro v is io n
The p rovision  o f  health  care w as one o f  the greatest responsib ilities for the international 
com m unity  in  K osovo, and w as seen as a  barom eter o f  the  success or failure o f  peace 
building in  the province. A  jo in t report from  the O SC E and the U N H C R  stated that
A ccess to  adequate health  services is life sustain ing and a m ajor factor in 
determ ining i f  m inorities rem ain  w here they  are or seek other alternatives. 
A ccess to health  care is frequently  cited to  U N H C R  as a  supporting ground in 
m inority  requests for assisted departure from  the p rov ince .178
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U nw illing to  see a  farther exodus o f  the m inority  com m unities (Serbs, R om a and other 
m inorities w ere fleeing K osovo A lbanian violence) the international com m unity 
attem pted to  find other w ays to provide health  care w hen the  m ainstream  facilities were 
out o f  bounds.
U N M IK  has now  chosen to pursue a policy  o f  ‘co-ex istence’ rather [than] 
‘m ulti-e thn icity ’ w hen it com es to  essential services like health  ...paralle l 
facilities can be set up i f  relationships betw een ethnic com m unities are such that 
one group w ould  have no access to health  care .179
Form ing an essential part o f  these parallel structures w as K FO R , w hose security 
expertise and m edical resources were a necessary  requ irem ent for m inority  assistance. 
W hereas m ost com m unities could access prim ary health  care locally , either through 
their ow n enclave services or those extended by the m ilitary , difficulties arose w hen 
further care w as needed. M obility  w as a  m ajor p roblem  as m inorities w ere unable to 
safely travel to  the  necessary hospital w ithout a K F O R  or U N M IK  Police esco rt.180 
Even w hen an escort w as provided, it w as accepted that the m inority  patients and their 
fam ilies often  had  justifiab le  fears for their safety w hile in  the hospital. They were 
therefore reluctan t to avail o f  public health  services outside o f  their enclaves.181 It was 
also noted  that hospitals them selves restricted  adm ission o r d iscrim inated on an ethnic 
basis. Jo in t U N /O SC E  reports on the state o f  m inorities in  K osovo highlighted the 
com plexities o f  the  situation faced by the m ilitary  in th is respect.
F requently  K FO R  escort is needed for patients to  m ake it to  the hospital. On 
arrival they  m ay w ell be faced w ith  security  concerns em anating from  the  sta ff 
and/or v isitors. This m ay necessitate K F O R  security  p resence to  be m aintained 
w hile the patien t rem ains in  the hosp ita l...K o so v o  Serbs are particularly  
vulnerable to restricted access to  m edical facilities and increasingly  resort to 
K F O R  m ilitary  hospitals w here security  and im partiality  o f  service is effectively 
guaran teed .182
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K FO R  provided  health  services in  a  num ber o r w ays, e ither d irectly  through their own
capabilities, or by  provid ing  transport and escorts. T o give som e idea o f  the  scale o f
assistance G eneral K laus R einhardt w rote tha t ‘K F O R ...h e lp ed  provide em ergency
m edical care, including a  daily average o f  m ore than  1000 consultations, as w ell as
em ergency hospitalisations, im m unisation program m es, am bulance and aerial m edical 
1
evacuation serv ices.’ H ow ever the services provided  differed from  m unicipality  to 
m unicipality, depending not only on  local requirem ents, bu t also on K F O R ’s resources.
M edical assistance could  range from  in-patien t care at m ilitary  hospitals a t the high end 
to non-guaranteed  escort and transport services a t the low est level. In  M itrovica where 
the R egional G eneral H ospital w as only accessib le to  K osovo Serbs, the M oroccan 
K FO R  H ospital w as able to cater for in-patients o f  o ther com m unities.184 K FO R  also 
provided transport for K osovo A lbanians to  facilities in  the southern regions w hen 
security reasons p revented  them  from  travelling . M obile team s w ith  a m ilitary  escort 
also v isited  K osovo Serb enclaves w ith in  the  reg io n .185 Sim ilarly in  P ristina  where 
m inority  com m unities suffered due to a  reduction  o f  supplies, lack o f  s ta ff  and freedom  
o f  m ovem ent, R ussian  K FO R  provided  hospita l services to K osovo Serbs and other 
m inorities. In  O rahovac the local health  sector included  one hospital and six  health  
centres, also know  as iambulantas\ W ith  the  help  o f  G erm an and D utch K FO R, these 
structures p rovided  basic m edical treatm ent, w hile m ore u rgen t and com plicated cases 
could be referred  to either the A rgentinean M ilitary H ospital in  D jakovica or the
i  an
G erm an M ilitary  H ospital in  Prizren. In  K osovo Polje the K osovo Serb and K osovo 
A lbanian inhabitants avoided using the sam e facilities, bu t the R ussian  K FO R  hospital 
w as able to offer support to the local health  centre by  prov id ing  instrum ents and other 
equipm ent. R ussian  K F O R  doctors also assisted  in  perform ing surgeries. In Pec 
m unicipality  the ambulanta in the Serb village o f  G orazdevac w as staffed by Italian
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K FO R  m edical s ta ff and Serbs and other m inority  groups w ho w ere in  need  o f  u rgent or 
in-patient m edical trea tm ent w ere sent to  the local K F O R  h o sp ita l.189
In  other m unicipalities there w as less help available and  co-operation  betw een the 
m ilitary  and  IGOs w as m ore com m on. In  K lina Portuguese K F O R  offered an outpatient 
service to  the local popu lation  for three hours each  evening , using  their ow n supply o f  
drugs and equipm ent. T hey also co-operated w ith  the  In ternational M edical C orps’ 
E m ergency M edical Support team  to provide an em ergency  m edical service for 
pa tien ts .190 In S rbica patients from  the tw o K osovo Serb enclaves w ere assisted by 
Médicins Sans Frontières, and in  case o f  em ergency cou ld  be transported  to  the hospital 
in  M itrovica by K F O R 191, w hile in  L ipljan tow n  the hea lth  centre w as assisted by a 
m ixture o f  K FO R  personnel and other international N G O s.192
B elow  this level o f  support the  m ilitary  assistance becam e m ore fragm ented. In  Obilic 
the Serb m inority  had  to  re ly  on sm aller health  c lin ics th a t w ere dependent on 
equipm ent forw arded from  the o ther clinics. H ow ever th is w as som etim es a problem  
due to  unavailab ility  o f  a  transport or escort from  K F O R .193 In  K osovska K am enica 
bo th  R ussian  and A m erican  K F O R  provided som e m edical care w ith  m obile clinics by 
visiting  the  villages, bu t continuity  and frequency w ere n o t guaran teed .194
D espite the  v ital level o f  support being offered by  the m ilitary , especially  for m inorities, 
both  the U N H C R  and the O SC E felt that it w as unsustainable fo r tw o reasons. F irst o f  
all the m inority  com m unities w ere rely ing  on  health  services obtained outside o f  
K osovo’s norm al health  care system . This necessitated  e ither the  creation  o f  a  separate 
system , or the use o f  K F O R  health  facilities or health  facilities outside o f  K osovo .195
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In their op in ion  the creation o f  separate system s for hea lth  care w as too costly and it 
sim ply pro longed  the  d ivision w ith in  K osovo, although  they  accepted the tem porary 
need to ensure access to  necessary  health  care th rough  o ther m eans. ‘The costs and  
policy  ram ifica tio n s  [em phasis added in  report] o f  estab lish ing  separate services at 
secondary and tertiary  level are d aun ting ... ’196
Regarding the m ilitary  contribution it w as felt that reliance on  K F O R  m edical facilities 
w as ultim ately  inappropriate and unsustainable. The lim ita tions o f  K F O R  facilities had 
been highlighted w ith  respect to  gynecological and ante- and  post-natal services, These 
were specialist fields that one w ould  no t norm ally  associate w ith  a  m ilitary field 
hospital bu t w h ich  K F O R  w ere obliged to  provide in  th e  absence o f  a  v iab le  alternative 
for m inority  patients. A nother ad hoc solu tion w as the obtain ing o f  care in  Serbia, but 
this w as an  unpopular choice w ith  the O SC E and U N H C R  as it o ften  required  a K FO R 
escort, and u ltim ately  encouraged people to  depart from  K osovo .197
It is clear from  the  m ilitary ’s significant contribution to  K osovo ’s healthcare system  that 
they gave w hatever support they  could  in  accordance w ith  their available resources. 
C ivilian influence does not appear to  have been  factor in  the relationship  betw een 
m ilitary and civ ilian  healthcare providers. This s ituation  does not support or w eaken 
the concept o f  a  parallel m ilitary  authority, instead  it appears that the m ilitary gave 
w illingly and no coercion w as attem pted or needed  fo r th is to  happen. Regarding 
horizontal control o f  the m ilitary  we can see that K F O R  w ere involved in  activities that 
exceeded their professional com petence, although ex tan t factors m ust be considered. 
The m ilitary  p rov ided  healthcare out o f  hum anitarian  necessity  rather than  a strategic 
desire to  encroach  upon a  predom inantly  civ ilian  sector, as happened  in  broadcast and 
transport. A lthough a com petent civ ilian  group w as geographically  present w ithin 
K osovo’s existing healthcare infrastructure, it rem ained for all in tents and purposes off- 
lim its for the non-A lbanian  m inorities. H ad  an  alternative been  available it is unlikely 
that the K F O R  contingents w ould  have drained their resources in  healthcare provision if  
all com m unities could  be accom m odated w ith in  the ex isting  infrastructure.
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Chapter conclusion
Overall this chapter has supported H untington’s concept o f  a  parallel m ilitary authority, 
and w eakened his idea o f  horizontal civilian control. T he m ilitary  forces were 
displayed as independent actors, w ith corresponding expansion ist tendencies. The 
m ilitary ’s strongest assertions o f  independence, and thereby  para lle l authority, could be 
seen in  their interaction w ith  sectors that w ere strateg ically  im portan t to them , such as 
usage o f  the broadcast system  and transport infrastructure. H ow ever, we find that the 
notion o f  horizontal control does no t fare nearly  as w ell and is w eakened by  the 
m ilitary ’s involvem ent in  hum anitarian  assistance, refugee  cam p construction and 
health  care. It m ust be noted that extant factors often  appeared  to  be im portant to  the 
outcom e o f  civ il-m ilitary  co-operation in a num ber o f  areas, including K F O R ’s 
im m unity from  prosecution  and their extensive p rov ision  o f  health  care. D espite this, 
the m ilitary ’s p red isposition  to strengthening their rela tive  p o w er th rough  the control o f  
strategic assets is clear, and th is supports H untington’s assertion  tha t the m ilitary have 
an inherently  conservative realist ethic.
C uriously  we can see tha t w here m ilitary  independence w as m ost strongly exercised, 
horizontal control w as m uch  less relevant, such as in  hum an ita rian  support in  A lbania, 
and the broadcast and transport infrastructure o f  K osovo, and  th is m ay  be indicative o f  a 
m ore fundam ental problem  in  H untington’s concepts w hen  applied  to the com plex 
relationships o f  to d ay ’s civil-m ilitary  co-operation. Iso lating  the  factors that cause the 
m ilitary to  oscillate from  a  p lian t partner at one point, for exam ple in  healthcare, to an 
independent and expansionist actor at another point, such  as in  com m unications and 
transport, is a  necessary task. T he m ilitary  ethic m ay b e  m islead ing  as a  guide in these 
m atters as m any o f  K F O R ’s actions w ere those o f  a  group th a t frequently  attem pted to 
better the living conditions in  K osovo w ithout exploiting  the  opportunity  for ulterior 
m otives.
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C h a p t e r  F o u r
Military Co-operation on Policing and Justice
K F O R ’s involvem ent in policing and ju stice  issues is im portant for tw o reasons. Firstly 
it w ill dem onstrate how  the m ilitary  acted w ith  respect to  the  legal codes o f  Kosovo, 
thereby revealing  w hether they  conform ed to H unting ton’s independent authority 
m odel. Secondly it w ill display w hether the m ilitary  d isdained  involvem ent in  the 
civ ilian  aspects o f  security, again in  conform ity  w ith H un ting ton’s concept o f  horizontal 
civ ilian  control. A ccording to  H unting ton’s concept o f  paralle l authority  K FO R  w ould 
not a llow  itse lf  to  be constrained by  the prevailing  legal codes, and w ould exercise 
independence from  the civilian structures in  K osovo as th ey  w ere no t in  direct authority 
over the m ilitary. R egarding involvem ent in  policing  and ju stice  activities K FO R 
w ould, in  accordance w ith  the horizontal authority described  b y  H untington’s work, 
w ithdraw  from  po lic ing  and ju stice  once civ ilian  authorities becam e available. In both 
cases H un ting ton’s m ilitary  ethic w ould  dictate that the m ilitary  m axim ise i t ’s pow er 
relative to  those entities about it, w ould  be pessim istic  regard ing  the outcom es o f  
situations, forcing them  to p lan  accordingly, and w ould be re luctan t to  engage itse lf in 
tasks or operations w here the outcom e w as unknow n.
C o -o p e ra tio n  w ith  th e  ju d ic ia l system
Internal security  for K osovo w as non-existent w hen K F O R  entered the province, 
law lessness w as w idespread  and ethnically  m otivated recrim inations had already begun. 
To m ake m atters w orse gangs and crim inals from  A lbania w ere crossing the border to 
exploit the  anarchy o f  the situation .198 W ithin  this environm ent K F O R  w as tasked w ith 
establishing a secure environm ent and ensuring public  safety  and order until the 
international civil presence could take over th is responsib ility .199 The specifics were 
fleshed ou t by  Sergio V ieira  de M ello, the tem porary Special R epresentative o f  the 
Secretary G eneral (SRSG ), w ho gave K F O R  the perm ission to  detain  and hold  people
198 SEC.FR 541/99 The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo, Activity Report, 23 June 1999, period 22nd 
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suspected o f  serious crim es.200 The public im age that the  m ilitary  pu t forw ard o f  their 
role w as one o f  fairness and im partiality, and w as period ica lly  reiterated  during the 
build  up.
K F O R  w ill be  on the ground throughout all o f  K osovo, here to  protect all 
o rd inary  K osovar citizens, Serbs and A lbanians alike. T hat o f  course is our 
central m ission. O ur jo b  is to establish and m ain ta in  a  secure environm ent for 
all the ordinary  peoples o f  K osovo and tha t is w hat w e are doing. K FO R  troops 
are p rovid ing  a robust and even-handed p ro tec tion  for everybody, regardless o f  
their ethnic, relig ious or cultural background. W e are m aking  K osovo a safer 
p lace for every ordinary citizen.201
U nfortunately  the entire apparatus o f  courts, detention facilities and adequate personnel 
to s ta ff them  w as m issing, as w as a  legal m andate to  fo rm  in terim  solutions. D uring the 
sam e period  the O SCE, U N  and K FO R  held  a jo in t m eeting  to  d iscuss the detention by 
the m ilitary  forces o f  16 K osovo A lbanian and K osovo Serb m ales for serious crimes. 
The m eeting  brought up a  tranche o f  issues that bedev illed  the  entire effort. K FO R  
indicated that they  could  no t continue to detain the  m en  w ithou t the  initiation o f  judicial 
proceedings, and w ere correspondingly  reluctan t to assum e control o f  a  detention 
facility. The m ilitary  urged the U N  to im m ediately appo in t an  international ju ris t to 
begin due process and then  asked the O SC E to assist in  the  identification  o f  K osovo 
Serb and K osovo A lbanian judges to form  an interim  panel to  adjudicate those arrested 
by K FO R .202 The O SC E  agreed to  this. In  spite o f  their in itia l reluctance K FO R  also 
opened a  detention centre on  23 June, possib ly  in  response to  the  fact that house 
burnings and lootings w ere on the increase across the p rov ince203, and K FO R  was now  
frequently  involved in  gun battles. B y late June in  P rizren  alone, K F O R  had  m ade 108 
arrests for robbery , rape, theft and arsons204 and w as renew ing  its calls for the O SCE to
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speed up the p repara tion  o f  a  police training facility .205 L aw lessness had reached such a 
degree tha t all o rganisations now  saw  the policing  issue as the  num ber one priority .206
B y July  E m ergency Jud ic ia l Panels w ere travelling  to  K F O R  bases to in terrogate m ore 
than 200 individuals tha t w ere held for serious crim es, w hile  the O SC E organised the 
schedule o f  the hearings and m onitored the  proceed ings to  ensure com pliance w ith 
hum an rights standards.207 The panels w ere divided in to  tw o  m obile units, consisting o f 
tw o defence law yers, tw o  prosecutors, one investigative ju d g e  and three secretaries 
each. T ransported  th rough  the  province by  K F O R  or O S C E  vehicles, the units review ed 
the cases w hich  w ere p repared  by  K FO R  m ilitary  po lice  and then  decided w hether the 
defendant should  be released  or not.208 K F O R  held  219  detainees by 20 July, o f  w hich 
the panel decided to  release  116.209
A t this stage w e can see tha t the behaviour o f  the m ilita ry  is no t conform ing to  the 
expectations o f  the  H un ting ton’s predictions. K F O R ’s in teraction  w ith  the O SC E and 
the U N  over th e  estab lishm ent o f  legal m echanism s show s that the m ilitary  were 
unw illing  to act independently  in  this situation, and instead  sought sanction from  their 
partners and paralle l civ ilian  authorities. H ad they  been  a sim ply  independent actor the 
m ilitary m ight have detained  personnel w ithout any reference to due process and 
allow ed the civ ilian  au thorities to take care o f  the finer points. H untington’s m ilitary  
ethic is no guide on  th is m atter either as it is again  no t subtle enough to  posit a 
particular outcom e. F rom  their requests it appears th a t K F O R  desired to  protect 
them selves from  negative publicity  over non-conform ity  w ith  legal codes, w hich w ould 
correspond to  the  m ilitary  ethic. O n the other hand  by  conform ing to such legal codes 
and w aiting for relevan t ju d ic ia l structures to  be estab lished  K FO R  w ould  be ham pered 
in  their pursu it o f  the p rov ince’s security and tha t o f  th e ir ow n personnel, an outcom e 
that does not conform  to  the m ilitary  ethic. W hat is m ore accurate from  the m ilitary 
ethic is the pessim ism  described  by H untington, and here  it could be in terpreted that the 
m ilitary d id no t w ish  to  engage them selves w holesale in  tasks w hich  they  w ere ill-suited 
to handling.
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Regarding the horizontal control o f  the m ilitary  w e can  see that, a lthough K FO R  were 
involved in  activities n o t strictly w ithin their expertise, they  are m any  qualifying 
factors. A dequate po lice  forces w ere no t im m ediately  available, so therefore 
H untington’s horizontal civ ilian  control could  n o t be  exercised. In  addition  to this, 
K FO R  w ould  have included m ilitary police units and  therefore  w ould  have had  an 
elem ent o f  expertise. H ow ever it m ust be noted th a t th is w ould  refer to  only  a  small 
am ount o f  K F O R  forces, and m ost soldiers w ith  the  fo rce w ould  n o t be trained on 
police procedures. A nother factor is the level o f  insecurity  w ith in  the province during 
the early stage o f  K F O R ’s build  up. So vio len t and insecure  w as the  province that the 
task  o f  securing basic  order m ay have been  beyond po lice  forces alone even i f  they  had 
been present in  sufficient num bers. Therefore the  question  could  be asked w hether 
K FO R  w ere perform ing  only  police duties, or w ere th ey  in  fact engaging in  m ilitary 
peace enforcem ent? In fact they  were perform ing b o th  ro les as the situation required, so 
at tim es they w ere engaged in  a  policing role, and at o ther tim es in  a  m ilitary  role. 
H ow ever the horizontal control m odel can only be p roperly  tested  w hen  civilians are 
present alongside K F O R  in  significant num bers, a  scenario  that in  certain  sectors was 
still som e m onths off.
The provision o f  E m ergency Judicial Panels appeared to  signal progress o f  sorts on the 
law  and order front. A  K F O R  spokesperson w ent so far as to  call the instigation o f  the 
m obile courts £a  w atershed  in  the re-establishm ent o f  a  norm al civ ilian  jud ic ia l process
o  1 n
in  K osovo’. U nfortunately  m any o f  the  p rov ince’s crim inals, a lthough apprehended 
by K FO R, had been  allow ed to  go free. O f  the 800 peop le  th a t had been  arrested  by the 
m ilitary since they  entered the province, 600 o f  those  w ere released  before the 
em ergency panels had  m ade their review s.211 D iscrepancies also began  to  em erge in 
both K FO R  po lic ing  and in  the  em ergency jud ic ia l system  as the O S C E ’s Legal System  
M onitoring Section (LSM S) began to  investigate K osovo’s law  enforcem ent 
procedures. A t the  G erm an M NB in P rizren nine K osovo Serbs that w ere accused o f  
w ar crim es did no t appear on  the official list o f  detainees. A ccord ing  to  K F O R  this was 
because G erm an K F O R  did  no t arrest the  m en and therefore  they  w ere not registered. 
U nited N ations C ivilian  Police  (U N C IV PO L) w ere supposed  to  have arrested  the m en,
210 KFOR Press Statement by Major Jan Joosten 2 July 1999, Pristina, Kosovo
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but that w as not confirm ed.212 A n opposite yet equally  w orry ing  incident w as recorded 
at US K FO R  C am p B ondsteel w here the detainee list contained  109 people, bu t only 89 
w ere in  detention according to  KFOR. N o reason  w as g iven  to  the  LSM S for the 
discrepancy.213
Further confusion  occurred w hen suspects in  a L ip ljan  deten tion  centre run  by  K FO R 
w ere released on  the condition that they surrendered their passports, report to 
U N C IV PO L once a  day and no t change residence. T his fo llow ed com m ents by the 
P resident o f  the C ourt o f  P ristina that he w ould  n o t a llow  K F O R  to im pose such 
conditions. D espite  the non-com pliance the LSM S considered  the P residen t’s rem arks 
to  be a precedent and recom m ended that it be com m unicated  to  other courts and K FO R  
legal advisers.214 B y N ovem ber 1999 the relationship  betw een  K F O R  and the legal 
authorities o f  K osovo w as m ore difficult. The LSM S v isited  C am p B ondsteel again, 
w here an  investigating judge  and a  prosecutor in form ed them  or their concerns 
regarding a  detainee w ho w as still in  m ilitary  custody despite  the  fact that a  release 
order had been  issued  by  the court. They also to ld  the LSM S that a  detention order for 
tw o detainees, w hich  expired the previous m onth, had  no t been  renew ed yet the 
individuals rem ained  in  the cam p. Furtherm ore, three detainees arrested  for kidnapping 
on 28 Septem ber 1999 only saw  a  judge  on 18 O ctober 1999, contravening the 72 hour 
tim e lim it before going before a  judge under article 196 o f  the FR Y  C ode o f  Crim inal 
procedure. K F O R  to ld  the LSM S that the individuals rem ained  in  custody because o f
01 S
the vast am ount o f  evidence against them .
H ow ever the m ilitary  also had  its ow n concerns regard ing  the legal system . In 
D ecem ber 1999 K F O R  inform ed the O SC E that despite  the  possib le  innocence o f  six 
Kosovo Serb detainees in  Cam p Bondsteel, the m obile court operating out o f  Pristina 
had ordered their continued detention. K FO R  also to ld  the  O SC E that they  saw  two 
patterns in  crim inal procedure in  the G njilane area. F irstly  tha t K osovo A lbanians 
detained for the  sam e or sim ilar crim es as K osovo Serbs w ere rou tinely  released where 
the victim  w as a  K osovo Serb. Secondly K osovo A lbanians from  the  Y itina area were
212 SEC.FR 851/99, 9 November 1999, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Weekly Report No. 17/99, 27 October 
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believed to  have falsely  accused K osovo Serbs o f  serious crim es.216 Interestingly, when 
K FO R  legal advisers m ade a request for the release o f  th ree  o f  the  Serbs to the camp 
com m ander, he w as reluctant to  com ply for tw o reasons. H e stressed his concern for 
the safety o f  the detainees i f  allow ed to leave, bu t he w as also w orried that the 
subsequent coverage in  the local press could endanger h is troops. Later the same 
m onth  K F O R  arrested  K osovo A lbanians in  U rosevac w ho had  threatened  tenants who 
refused to  leave their prem ises. E ven  though they  w ere w orking  for a  self-styled 
parallel adm inistration  and w ere in  possession  o f  identification  cards stating this, an
01 R
investigating judge  released the m en.
Contrary to  the m ilita ry ’s first concerns about hav ing  p roper m echanism s for due 
process, they  w ere now  prepared  to  ignore those m echanism s. The prelim inary 
experience o f  H unting ton’s parallel authority  and horizontal control concepts in the area 
o f  ju stice  do n o t m atch  the pattern  o f  behaviour that subsequently  em erged from  KFOR. 
The m ilitary  soon began  exercising independence from  the  legal authorities appointed 
by  the U N M IK  Special R epresentative o f  the Secretary G eneral (B ernard K ouchner at 
that tim e). The application o f  the m ilitary  ethic at th is po in t appears m uch m ore 
productive. K F O R  firstly  sought legal sanction and approached its civ ilian  counterparts 
to  assist in  th is, thereby  protecting itse lf  from  possible criticism . H ow ever, as m atters 
unfolded in  the  province K F O R  began  to  ignore the  system  in  p lace and chose instead to 
apply their ow n  judgem en t as they  saw  fit.
A t the sam e tim e those legal authorities had accusations o f  gross b ias being levelled at 
them . The LSM S for its part conducted a  b rie f  investigation  into the  legal system  and 
then  produced  a  report on  their findings.
LSM S believes there is a  grow ing tendency  by  bo th  the jud ic iary  and 
prosecutors to  introduce ethnic bias to  the detrim ent o f  the  m inorities into 
jud ic ia l proceedings. A lthough the curren t evidence em anates from  pre-trial
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detention hearings, i f  it continues in  the  crim inal trials the w hole legal system  
could  be endangered .219
A m nesty In ternational also produced a report on  the sam e issue and reached  m any o f  
the sam e conclusions as the LSM S regard ing  the ram pan t d iscrim ination  in  the 
Em ergency Judicial System . H ow ever they  also m ade n o te  o f  the m ilita ry ’s reaction to 
som e o f  the release orders.
In  som e cases, the  Com m ander o f  K FO R , D r G eneral K laus R einhardt, has 
ordered the  continued  detention o f  ind iv iduals despite  a release  order from  a  
judge, using  his authority under Security  C ouncil R esolu tion  1244. This 
practice, in  itself, is open to  legal challenge and  does no t enhance respect for 
K osovo’s new ly  established jud ic ia ry .220
K FO R  did  adm it to  the O SC E that in  exceptional circum stances they  continued to  hold 
detainees in  defiance o f  legal orders w hen they  considered  the individual to  be a  direct 
threat to security, and tha t th is in  their op in ion  w as leg itim ised  by  R esolu tion  1244 and 
the M ilitary and T echnical A greem ent. The O SC E  in  tu rn  tried  to  develop the 
concept o f  a  rev iew  body  to  act as a  special appeal board , b u t th is did n o t get o f f  the
777 • • •
ground. K F O R  w as now  using its ow n m andate to  ac t as ju d g e  and incarcerator o f  
suspects, and w as expanding  into activities o f  a  civ ilian  group tha t w as present. W hilst 
one could  argue that m any o f  the K osovo jud ic ia ry  appeared  to  be com prom ised, a  
counter argum ent w ould  state that the ju d ic ia ry ’s com petence w as still far greater than  
that o f  K F O R  in  legal m atters. The concept o f  horizontal control, therefore, is 
underm ined by  the  activ ities o f  the m ilitary  in  th is regard , and the conservative realist 
ethic appears m uch  m ore accurate. W hy recognise the authority  o f  the jud ic ia ry  w hen 
you suspect tha t th ey ’ll release individuals w ho pose a  security  risk? T he aspect o f  
pessim ism  w ith in  the  m ilitary  ethic is also relevant here, as K F O R  did  no t tru st the 
jud ic ia l system  to deal w ith  individuals tha t the m ilitary  deem ed to  be dangerous. In  
addition to  th is, K F O R ’s flouting o f  legal procedures d id  not m ean  tha t the  legal system  
ceased w orking  entirely. In  som e respects one could  say  tha t K F O R  had  the best o f
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both  w orlds. O n one hand they  w ere not forced to  shou lder the entire burden o f  the 
jud ic ia l system , som ething that they  w ere originally  concerned  about, w hile on the  other 
they could  ignore unpalatable civ ilian  ru lings w hen they  w ished.
A lthough it m ight appear that K F O R ’s m otivation  on  th is  po in t w as sim ply to disallow  
v io len t crim inals to roam  K osovo at w ill, further investiga tion  show ed the issue to be 
som ew hat m ore com plex. The rationale behind  the  leng th  o f  deten tion  at the tim e was 
based upon  the applicable FR Y  Code o f  C rim inal Procedure. I f  the crim e m erited  a 
sentence o f  longer than five years, then  pre-trial deten tion  cou ld  last up to six  m onths. 
I f  it carried a  m axim um  o f  five years, then  three m onths w as the  longest a  suspect could 
be held.223 The LSM S discovered that 81, or one th ird  o f  the  individuals held  by 
K FO R , the U N  C ivil A dm inistra tion  and U N C IV PO L  w ere  in  custody for six m onths or 
longer by the  beginning o f  2000. Furtherm ore, the O S C E ’s investigation team  also 
discovered that several detainees w ho should have been  released  o r indicted by  the 
three-m onth  rule, rem ained illegally  incarcerated .224 O ther d isturb ing  facts also cam e to 
light. Tw o individuals w ere arrested  on  the basis o f  acts fo r w hich  the relevant crim e 
had no t been  identified, for exam ple ‘threat to K F O R ’ or ‘suspect in  shooting’, while 
the basis for the arrest o f  another th ree individuals w as no t know n. Inform ation
O') ^
regarding the reason  and m onth  o f  arrest for four ind iv iduals w as also unknow n. By 
M arch 2000 detention facilities in  M itrovica, Pristina, C am p B ondsteel and P rizren held 
26 people illegally. In response to  th is B ernard  K ouchner im plem ented in  D ecem ber 
U N M IK  R egulation 1999/26 w hich  allow ed the Suprem e C ourt to  extend the period o f  
detention by up to  six  m onths in  individual cases.226 T he O S C E  found the regulation 
unlaw ful and friction betw een  them  and U N M IK  continued. In  his rev iew  o f  O M IK ’s 
activities betw een 1999 and 2001 M ission  H ead D aan E verts said tha t the ‘absence o f  a 
habeas corpus rem edy by  w h ich  a detainee m ay  challenge the  unlaw fulness o f  his/her 
detention and continued executive deten tion’ w as am ong the  m ost serious problem s 
w ith  the K osovo justice  system .
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B eyond th is po in t the situation approaches legal argum ents and counter-argum ents that 
do not fall w ith in  the expertise o f  the author. H ow ever the  practical details o f  the 
situation are thus. The m ilitary a t tim es did not honour th e  authority  o f  either the 
m obile courts, or the applicable law s concerning detention. A t least som e o f  the 
m otivation  regarding extended detention w as clearly due to  the  b iased ju stice  system  in 
operation, although others seem  to be m otivated  by self-in terest. It w as obvious to all 
key observers, including the m ilitary  them selves, th a t th ey  w ere no t the right 
organisation to  undertake policing  and detention duties. T he lack  o f  train ing and 
facilities for the role w as also com pounded by the rela tive independence o f  the arm y 
from  the civil system . I f  K F O R  d idn’t w ant to com ply w ith  civ ilian  regulations on  this 
m atter, they  sim ply d idn’t. In  an in terview  w ith  R ed C ross/R ed  C rescent M agazine, 
K ouchner gave the  follow ing evaluation o f  the  law  and o rder situation  in  K osovo during 
his tim e there, including an am biguous reference to  the m ilitary.
W e had neither the police force nor a  ju d ic ia l m echan ism  suited to the 
s itu a tio n ...W e w ere w rong to  expect an im m ediate resto ration  o f  the A lbanian 
ju d ic ia l system . W hat w as needed w as an  in ternational ju d ic ia l body during the 
transition. W e should have institu ted  a state o f  em ergency, bu t w ho w ould  have 
enforced it? N ot the arm y.228
H untington’s concept o f  parallel authority  is verified  by  these exam ples o f  m ilitary 
in teraction w ith  the jud ic ia l system . D espite K F O R ’s first concerns, they acted 
independently  o f  the civilian authorities in  jud ic ia l m atters, and th is could  be seen in 
their reluctance and refusal to conform  on  judgem ents regard ing  detainees. O utw ardly 
the m ilitary  ethic appears to be again  quite valid  in  th is scenario, how ever there are 
qualifying factors. M any occasions w here K FO R  refused to honour the prevailing  legal 
codes w ere no t sim ply to do w ith  preserving or furthering their ow n security. K FO R  
often acted  in  contravention o f  the legal system  because they  believed  that the 
prosecuting jud ic ia ry  w ere ram pantly  biased, a  factor tha t w as recognised  by civilian 
groups involved  in  the process. H ow ever, as far as K F O R ’s respect for the jud icia l 
system  is concerned, H untington w as correct in  his predictions o f  parallel authority, 
w hereby the m ilitary  w ould  act independently  o f  entities no t in  direct authority over 
them .
228 In Action, Bernard Kouchner, rebel with a cause, Red Cross/Red Crescent Magazine, Edition 4, 2001
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O n the m atter o f  horizontal civilian control w e see th a t the  civ ilian  structures for 
dispensing ju stice  w ere o ften  ignored or superseded by  K F O R ’s ow n in terpretation o f  
U N SC R  1244. B y doing  this, the m ilitary w ere not sim ply  rem aining independent o f  
the legal system , it w as in  effect replacing and duplicating  it. Ironically , although the 
m ilitary conform ed to  H untington’s concept o f  paralle l authority, it is th is same 
independence that allow ed K FO R  to  breach the  horizontal control tha t H untington 
described. N o t only  is H untington’s concept o f  paralle l authority  w eakened by this 
scenario, it does in  fact contribute to  the argum ent tha t the  parallel authority  fram ew ork 
m ay actually  exclude horizontal civ ilian  control. T aking in teractions w ith  the jud iciary  
and com paring them  w ith  the m ilita ry ’s co-operation w ith  the  hum anitarians, w e begin  
to  see a  p a ttern  w hereby  the  m ilitary  ignored the confines o f  horizontal control, such as 
they w ere, w hen their strategic or security concerns w ere threatened.
K F O R  m eth o d s  o f  po lic ing
K FO R  m ethods o f  po lic ing  are o f  in terest to the application o f  H unting ton’s theory in  a  
num ber o f  respects. Since policing  is an  area in  w hich  the m ilitary  forces w ere not fully 
trained, K F O R ’s engagem ent w ith  the task  seem s to  show  som ething o f  a  learning curve 
in  progress. This gives an  opportunity  to  see how  the  m ilitary  reacted  to  civilian 
requests for security , and in  tu rn  how  the  m ilitary  developed  their ow n m ethods to  give 
that security. This allow s us to  see w hether K FO R  acted  independently  o f  civilian 
influence, as p e r the parallel authority  concept, and also w hether they  respected the 
confines o f  horizon tal civ ilian  control. H unting ton’s m ilitary  ethic m ay also be useful 
in  explaining w hy the  m ilitary  chose the courses o f  actions tha t they did.
In the first m onths o f  the K F O R  build  up arson, grenade attacks, assassinations, threats 
and in tim idation w ere rife, m ostly  against Serb and R om a com m unities and other 
m inorities, bu t also betw een K osovo A lbanian citizens. K FO R  soldiers w ere in  the 
m iddle and frequently  cam e under fire and w ere forced to  open fire in  return. G eneral 
R einhardt w as later to  say tha t K F O R ’s m ain  challenge w as ‘keeping a  lid  on  ethnic 
tensions and tackling  crim e’.
229 Commanding KFOR, General Klaus Reinhardt, NATO Review, Summer-Autumn 2000, p. 17
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The O SC E w as m ore explicit w hen it spoke o f  the m ilita ry ’s in ternal security efforts. 
‘It should be  noted  tha t w hilst efforts o f  th is m agnitude are n o t exclusively  geared for 
the pro tection  o f  m inorities, in  large part they  are for all in ten ts and purposes geared 
tow ards m inority  pro tec tion’.230 In line w ith  the assessm ent o f  the  O SC E and General 
Reinhardt, K F O R ’s m anpow er expenditure reflected  the prio rity  o f  policing functions. 
A  m ilitary  press statem ent gave the fo llow ing figures.
O n average, 200 soldiers in each  M ultinational B rigade a rea  are on  static guard 
at houses, locations w here m inorities gather, and at patrim onial sites. KFOR 
soldiers conduct 860 patrols th roughout K osovo every  day. Three out o f  every 
four soldiers are perm anently  patro lling , m anning checkpoin ts and helping the 
population, especially  ethnic m inorities.231
Static guards w ere often  em ployed at likely  areas o f  attack, u sually  m inority  enclaves, 
to offer a  2 4 -hour security  presence. H ow ever the choice betw een  m obile patrols and 
static guards w as often  problem atic, and a  jo in t O S C E /U N H C R  report on the status o f 
refugees stated that ‘h igh  levels o f  static security  are unsustainable , [and] over reliance 
on  them  can lead to  a  false sense o f  security  that can no t be m ain ta ined .’232 In support 
o f  th is the report recounted the experience at R ecan in  the Suva R eka m unicipality, 
where a  static guard w as m ounted  to p ro tect a  K osovo Serb m inority .
This recom m endation w as m ade in  v iew  o f  th e  fac t th a t existing efforts to 
provide security  th rough  regular patro ls had p roved  ineffectual, since the 
w rongdoers sim ply w aited  for the patrol to  pass before  carrying out acts o f  
vio lence and in tim idation. D uring Septem ber and O ctober 1999 a string o f  
serious incidents had been  recorded but the situation  w as calm ed considerably 
after the  installation o f  the checkpoint. The checkpoin t w as w ell received by the 
local population  w ho com m ended the perform ance o f  the  soldiers m anning it.
230 Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, Period covering November 1999 through 
January 2000, UNHCR OSCE, 11 February 2000
231 KFOR News Update Pristina, 21 December 1999 by Lt.-Cdr. Philip Anido, KFOR Spokesperson. 
N.B. Different figures are available from different sources, see also ‘Commanding KFOR, General Klaus 
Reinhardt, NATO Review, Summer-Autumn 2000, p. 17’ and also ‘Assessment o f the Situation of Ethnic 
Minorities in Kosovo, Period covering November 1999 through January 2000, UNHCR OSCE, 11 
February 2000’, however the numbers are not dramatically apart.
232 Assessment o f the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, Period covering November 1999 through 
January 2000, UNHCR OSCE, 11 February 2000
93
H ow ever, it w as w ithdraw n on D ecem ber 18th apparently  because K FO R 
perceived it to  be  ineffectual.
Locals expressed  their concern that the  service had  been  w ithdraw n so suddenly 
w ithout their hav ing  been  consulted o r inform ed. In  th is instance concerns that 
the situation w ou ld  revert to pre-checkpoint conditions w ere allayed through  the 
use o f  alternative K FO R  patrolling m echanism s and the establishm ent o f  an 
U N M IK  Police  sub-station.233
Erecting static guards and checkpoints, such as in  R ecan, w ere a  com m on response to 
increased violence in  a particu lar area. A fter a  grenade attack  in  L ip ljan  U N M IK  Police 
and K FO R  w ere requested  to set up m ore perm anent observation  posts234 w hile another 
grenade attack against Serbs in  O rahovac prom pted  the  m ilitary  to  increase overall 
security there, including  checkpoints to  the entrance o f  the Serb quarter.235 H ow ever 
due to  restraints on  budgets and on personnel it w as no t alw ays possib le to  m aintain  the 
guards, nor for the static guards to be replaced by  innovative m easures w hen withdrawn. 
A  new ly built O rthodox  church in C em ica in  the G njilane M unicipality  w as badly 
dam aged in  a  bom b a ttack  in  the early m orning o f  15 January  2000236 shortly after 
K FO R  had w ithdraw n a  static guard and replaced it w ith  m oving  patrols. Sim ilarly 
a grenade attack  against an A shkali com m unity  in  V u c itm  tow n  in  O ctober 2000 
happened after a  checkpoin t had been w ithdraw n, w ith  one grenade landing at a spot 
w here the guard had  been. The checkpoint had also been  rep laced  by m oving patro ls.239 
N or w ere static guards any guarantee o f  safety  in  their ow n righ t as the fo llow ing event 
shows. O n 28 D ecem ber 1999 K FO R  reported  a bom b attack  against a  Serb com m unity 
in  V itina (M NB W est), an  assault regularly  carried out against m inority  ethnic groups.
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Y esterday afternoon ju s t after 4 o 'clock  a  hom em ade bom b w as throw n into a 
Serb Café in  the tow n o f  V itina. E ight people w ere in ju red  in  the attack, tw o o f  
them  quite seriously. The tw o m en, and a th ird  w ith  m inor injuries, w ere rushed 
to the Cam p B ondsteel (US) m ilitary  hospital. T he others refused  treatm ent on 
the scene. A ll the injured are suffering from  shrapnel w ounds bu t are resting 
quietly  and are in  stable condition. T hey  are all expected  to  recover. U N M IK  
Police have arrested  four individuals in  connection  w ith  the  attack, how ever they 
have been released  due to  a  lack o f  evidence.240
A n O M IK  report on the sam e incident w as m ore open, and  revealed  not only the 
problem s o f  m ilitary  policing, bu t also the difficulties caused  by  the  subsequent loss o f  
confidence in  the security  forces. A  K F O R  C om m and P ost w as only  30 m etres from  
the scene o f  the attack in  V itina, and despite the fac t tha t they  had  a heavy presence in  
the area they  failed to  detain  attackers w ho had  perpetrated  the  th ird  such attack in five 
m onths.241 In the afterm ath  o f  the explosion  K F O R  prov ided  im m ediate first aid, but 
w hen they  attem pted to  transfer the w ounded to  C am p B ondsteel th is w as initially 
refused by  bo th  the v ictim s and local Serbs. T heir fear o f  a  m edical evacuation was 
based upon the grounds that other Serbs w ho had been  transferred  to  P ristina  H ospital 
had died from  their w ounds.242 The to tal lapse o f  confidence in  the international 
security forces ability to pro tect them  m eant that only  three out o f  the eight people 
injured by the grenade subsequently  received  proper m edical attention.
W hatever the benefits o f  static guards th ey  w ere considered  unsustainable by both the 
O SCE and the U N H C R. They felt that the use o f  such m easures only had  a tem porary 
value and that in  the long run  they  w ould  be in  fact detrim ental to  the  w ell being o f  the 
com m unity being guarded.
Static guarding how ever, as a  response to  im m inent th reats is o ften  the only w ay 
to  pro tect such overriding rights, as that to  life and liberty. The im m ediate
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im pact o f  th is on  the  beneficiaries is generally  w elcom ed  but i f  such m easures 
have to  be continued  to the extent that norm al life is n o t possible, these same 
beneficiaries are likely  to  come to resent the fac t that they  have to  live under 
constant guard and m ay  opt instead to m ove to  a  safer location w ith in  K osovo or 
further afield .243
H ow ever they  also accepted  that the onus w as n o t on  th e  m ilitary  alone to  better the 
situation but upon  the entire international effort, civil and m ilitary alike, to im prove 
conditions th rough  prom oting  a  sense o f  to lerance.244 The m ilitary  for their part, had 
never been particu larly  enthusiastic for static guards. Follow ing the m urder in  A ugust 
2000 o f  an 80 year o ld  Serb m an  who had been  shot several tim es in  the head, K FO R  
H Q  under G eneral Juan  Ortuno decided to  rev iew  their patro lling  and security 
techniques and concluded  that
K FO R  cannot prov ide static guards or checkpoints everyw here, all o f  the tim e. 
I f  w e did, w e w ould  be less capable to  react to  developing security  situations. 
A lthough static guards provide som e m easure o f  security, they  are predictable 
and people  can easily  go around them . A  better approach  is to  introduce a less 
regular pa tte rn  o f  patro lling  so that arm ed elem ents w ill be unable to  predict 
w here they  m igh t be intercepted by  K F O R  soldiers.245
The use o f  static guards in  K osovo is significant to the  application o f  H untington’s 
parallel authority  concept as it shows the m ilitary  responding to  civ ilian  requests to 
provide security  in  a  w ay  that K F O R  often felt w as counter productive. In  this w ay we 
can see tha t the  m ilita ry ’s actions in  m inority  p ro tec tion  w as not alw ays conducted 
independently  o f  civ ilian  influence, nor w as it conducted in  a w ay that corresponded to 
the conservative rea lism  o f  the m ilitary ethic. The m ilitary  ethic w ould  n o t see K FO R  
expending resources, at the  cost o f  other security  operations, in  the pursuit o f  w hat they 
w ould  consider to  be o f  only  psychological im portance. H ow ever, w hat is also 
interesting is the  rationale  behind  the allocation and w ithdraw al o f  static guards at 
particular tim es. O n occasions K FO R  w ithdrew  static guards w hen there w as no 
attacks, only to  have attacks occur once the guard post w as w ithdraw n. I f  the guard
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posts them selves had been  attacked, w ould  th is have been  sufficient reason for the 
m ilitary to keep  them  there? This seem s in  line w ith  pessim istic elem ent o f 
H untington’s m ilitary  ethic, w here he describes the  m ilitary  as constantly  expecting the 
w orst and attem pting to  p lan  for it. Since there  w as no tang ib le  indication o f  insecurity 
the m ilitary  appeared  to believe that they  w ere squandering  resources in  a useless 
exercise, even though  the guards w ere often  the m ost successful source o f  protection 
available. B y follow ing a  realist and pessim istic  ethic in  pursu it o f  security, and in  turn 
w ithdraw ing the  static guards to safeguard resources, K F O R  w ere a t tim es in  fact 
inviting insecurity.
Overall how ever, regarding the parallel authority  concept w e can see that it is m uch less 
valid  in this scenario as K FO R  did respond to  c iv ilian  requests, and furtherm ore, 
civilian requests on  a m atter that fell w ith in  m ilitary  expertise, a  reversal o f  sorts o f  the 
horizontal control m odel w here respective expertise and professionalism  creates its own 
boundaries. W e can also see that th is appeared to  cause a  sort o f  internal conflict for the 
KFO R, who appeared  to  be to m  betw een responding  to  the  civ ilian  requests for static 
guards on one side, and on the other side to  their ow n conventional choice o f  m obile 
patrols. H ow ever such adaptability  is also the hallm ark  o f  a  m ilitary  in  theatre, and the 
h istory o f  w arfare displays a m yriad  o f  exam ples w here conventional w isdom  was 
dispensed w ith  w hen  it d id  not suit the operational conditions o f  the  m ission. The six- 
m onthly ro tations o f  K FO R  contingents m ay have d isrupted  th is learning curve and in 
effect, allow ed the  scenario to be p layed  out again  and again.
In  addition to their flexibility  another reason  that the m ilitary  favoured m obile patrols 
w as because it a llow ed them  to operate w ith  greater visibility . D uring the initial stages 
w hen the  m ilitary  w as spread th in ly  over the  province and violence w as ram pant, a  high 
profile approach w as opted for.
Y ou all have seen K F O R  vehicles and soldiers on  the ground and helicopters in 
the air th roughout the province. K F O R  forces are stepping up their street 
patrols. W e w ant all K osovars to  see K FO R  troops on  the streets and on  the 
ground providing a  visible rem inder and a physical guarantee o f  our extensive
246security  presence.
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M ilitary  foo t patro ls w ere em ployed in  m ost o f  the m ajor u rban  areas and w ere reported 
as w orking w ell in  Prizren247 (at one stage K L A  personnel pa tro lled  w ith  them  although 
th is created  separate problem s, see next chapter) and in  o ther cities across K osovo.248 
In  M itrov ica by  contrast, a tow n  w ith  a large Serbian enclave separated from  their 
A lbanian  neighbours by  a river, K F O R  w as criticised  fo r no t having  a  v isible foot 
presence. Instead  the m ilitary  m anned tanks and arm oured  personnel carriers at the 
bridge and o ther m ajor junctions. The O SC E noted  tha t foo t patro ls w ere proven  to  be 
effective in  deterring crim e and build ing confidence and  u rged  K F O R  to  begin  them  in 
M itrovica as w ell.249 In fact the non-use o f  patro ls a t th is stage m ay  have been  a 
significant factor in  the loss o f  control in  the city later on  (see nex t chapter).
D espite th is K F O R ’s policing tactics could at tim es be quite  sophisticated, and 
rem iniscent o f  those used in m any capital cities across the  w orld. A fter one attack 
against a  Serb hom e in  U rosevac guarded  by K F O R  the assailan ts tried  to  escape by  car 
yet the m ilitary  w ere able to track  the vehicle from  the air.
T he attackers then  fled aw ay in  a  w hite Z esta  s ta tion  w agon. A n Apache 
helicop ter w as dispatched, fo llow ing the  car as it sped  tow ard  Pristina. As it left 
U rosevac, a  w hite  M ercedes B enz jo in ed  the Z esta  en  route to  Pristina. M NB 
C entre assisted  M NB E ast by  apprehending one severely  w ounded person  at the 
P ristina  H ospital and the Zesta.250
The patro lling  operations carried out in  P ristina w ere also  im pressive. The city had 
assigned to  it a  700 person  B attle G roup that w as d iv ided  into four com panies, three o f  
w hich covered  the  city  w ith  the  fourth  engaged in  specialist operations. The com panies 
had arm oured personnel carriers and Landrovers a t their disposal bu t patrolled 
principally  by  foot, using  the vehicles as a  Q uick R eaction  Force.251 The m ilitary also 
guarded the  strategically  im portant areas o f  the city  w h ich  ‘w ere crucial to  its running, 
certain  parts that are im portan t tha t rem ain, i f  you  like in  U N  and K FO R
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responsib ility ...like  the  Telephone exchange.’252 T he com m anding officer also m ade 
the decision to have his platoons live am ongst local residents in  apartm ent b locks w here 
people w ere in tim idated, or in  areas prone to  crim inal activity.
W hen it cam e to the actual apprehension o f  suspects, the m ilitary  m ethod seem ed 
broadly in  line w ith  standard police procedures.
W e have to have som e justifica tion  to  arrest som ebody, to go into this specifics, 
basically  w e cou ld  look at a lot o f  th ings like w itnesses, it is only a  part o f  the 
evidence, obviously, and also the presence o f  crim inals on the crim e site and 
also the attestation o f  true forensic analysis for exam ple betw een the w eapons or
0 SI
bullets or o ther kinds o f  am m unition found on  the  site.
H ow ever a m uch  m ore proactive approach w as happen ing  on  the ground in  Pristina, 
w here the system  seem ed calculated to  produce arrests and  evidence for ease o f  
prosecution, bu t a t a  substantial risk  for those to be protected.
W hat I can te ll you  is this, the w ay  that w e are try ing  to  get the jud ic ia l system  
ro lling  and the  ru le  o f  law  here, w e have changed  the operation slightly  so that 
w e can capture people in  the act o f  a ttem pted  m urder, arson, kidnapping, 
hostage taking, burglary  or indeed straight forw ard  in tim idation red handed. A s 
red-handed  m eans we then have  the w itness statem ents, evidence, forensic 
evidence tha t w ould  then lead to the  jud ic ia l m achine to  go round.254
Here we can see tha t the  concept o f  horizontal civ ilian  control, although no t strictly 
falsified due to  the lack o f  civilian police in  the  p rov ince a t that tim e, w as being 
underm ined not ju s t  by  the m ilitary ’s involvem ent in  the po lic ing  activities but by their 
developm ent o f  their ow n system  o f  policing. M obile patro ls, in terception o f  fleeing 
suspects and gathering o f  forensic evidence and w itnesses are o f  course a positive 
observance o f  po lice procedures by  the m ilitary . C hanging operations to catch suspects 
in acts o f  serious crim e is not, and gives the  im pression  tha t m ilitary  forces were 
ruthlessly cu tting  com ers in  safety in  order to  detain  suspects. This behaviour is m uch
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m ore in line w ith  H untington’s m ilitary ethic, w here conservative realism  w ould  be in 
line w ith  the M achiavellian  end being ju stified  by the m eans. A s in  o ther exam ples 
w here the m ilitary  intervened in  areas outside o f  their expertise, such as refugee camp 
construction and aid  co-ordination, the m ilita ry ’s po lic ing  m ethods are notew orthy  for 
their inherent draw backs. K FO R delivered an im perfect solution in a proactive fashion, 
and those concerned suffered from  the m ilita ry ’s lim ited  know ledge o f  correct 
procedure. H ow ever the  situation is understandable considering  that it w as recognised 
by the m ilitary  them selves that they w ere no t a suitable substitu tion for civ ilian  police 
forces. A fter one year o f  K FO R ’s presence in  K osovo G eneral K laus R einhard t stated
C ivilian  policing rem ains an area o f  concern, how ever. C om m on crim inals and 
organised  crim e are flourishing in  the  partial pow er vacuum  that w ill no t be 
filled  until m unicipal elections are held  later this year [2000]. There is an  urgent 
need bo th  for m ore U N  police and for m ore local K osovo police, as w ell as the 
infrastructure to support them . U ntil the international com m unity  provides the 
resources needed, K FO R  soldiers are having to  step in  to  fill the gap, carrying 
ou t duties for w hich  they are not trained.
C o -o p e ra tio n  w ith  Po lice  Services
It is difficult to  ascertain  the nature o f  the  relationship  betw een  police and the m ilitary 
forces operating together in  Kosovo. A lthough it is possib le to see the types o f  jo in t 
operations engaged in, it is m ore problem atic to assess the  level o f  friction that m ay 
have occurred betw een both, or to understand w hether resource or culture differences 
w ere the catalyst. A dded to this is the fact th a t co-operation  varied  betw een regions and 
areas, w ith w orking relationships becom ing d ifficult at tim es. E ven though both 
organisations are fundam entally  different, the  com m on culture o f  secrecy  in both  does 
not contribute to an  easy evaluation. H ow ever, the fact tha t there w as structured co­
operation, although subject to  constant evolution, lessens the  relevance o f  H untington’s 
parallel au thority  concept. This is no t to say how ever, tha t an  independent group is 
alw ays uncooperative, instead the argum ent here is that less co-operation w ould  m erely 
be indicative o f  m ilitary  independence, rather than  the p ro o f o f  it.
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O n the m atter o f  horizontal civilian control w e can  quick ly  see tha t th is concept is too 
rigid to explain  the relationship  betw een the po lice  and m ilitary  forces in K osovo, as 
both groups o ften  m erged their resources and efforts to achieve com m on objectives. By 
doing so, bo th  groups supplem ented the efforts o f  the  o ther rather than  duplicating and 
replacing. Therefore w e can see by som e o f  the fo llow ing  exam ples o f  jo in t civil- 
m ilitary co-operation that H untington’s horizontal control m odel is neither being 
supported or w eakened in  a blatant fashion, but is underm ined  in  its relevance for being 
so indeterm inate. C ivil-m ilitary  co-operation betw een  U N C IV PO L  and K FO R  was 
developed into a synergetic relationship, rather than  conform ing to  H untington’s idea o f 
civilian control bu ilt upon  relative expertise, a k ind  o f  ‘boxing  in ’ o f  the m ilitary by 
having civilians responsible for all non-m ilitary tasks.
The international police deployed in K osovo had  tw o m ain  goals, to provide an interim  
service and to  develop an indigenous force. This w as to  be achieved in  three phases.
In the first phase it was recognised that K F O R  w ould  ensure public  safety and order 
until the in ternational civil presence could  do so itse lf  and U N M IK ’s civilian police 
w ould advise K F O R  on policing  m atters. In  the second phase U N M IK  w ould take over 
responsibility  for law  and order from  K FO R, and U N M IK  police w ould  have executive 
law  enforcem ent authority. K FO R  w ould  then  have a support role. The th ird  phase 
w ould see the K osovo Police Service (the K PS) tak ing  responsib ility  for law  and order 
from  U N M IK .257
A t the beg inning o f  the  m ission  w hen K F O R  w as build ing  up its forces in  the province, 
the U N  redeployed  about 200 unarm ed police personnel from  B osnia and H erzegovina 
to  K osovo to  provide the core o f  an international po lice presence.258 The first group o f  
police liaisons to the  m ilitary  w ere deployed to  the  separate M N B s on 3 July 1999. 
Police forces w ere a ttached  to separate contingents in  an advisory capacity  to assist the 
m ilitary on policing  activities. This in  addition to  a U N  situation centre for policing and 
security issues w as described as ‘an im portant part o f  the co-operation betw een U N M IK  
and K F O R ’.259 H ow ever, due to a num ber o f  factors the  first phase dragged out and it 
was a year before executive pow ers had  been  transferred  to  the police in  four out o f  five
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regions.260 The very slow  build  up o f  police forces in  K osovo w as due to the tardy 
response to  requests for police by U N  m em bers. Po lice  forces, unlike soldiers, are not 
usually  ready  fo r deploym ent overseas and by m id-F ebruary  2000 only 2,056 U N M IK  
police out o f  an  authorised 4,780 had been deployed .261 A lso in  contrast to m ilitary 
units, police units are no t se lf  sufficient and have to  have all o f  their supporting 
equipm ent and vehicles procured  for them , adding to the  logistical d ifficulties.262
A lthough the police had  been  attached to contingents to  assist the  m ilitary  and direct 
them  in their law  enforcem ent activities, their in itial inpu t w as small.
Through Phase one, U N M IK  Police liased closely  w ith  K FO R  to  assist them  in 
securing public  safety  in  Kosovo. K F O R  w as the  p rim ary  agency for patrolling, 
pro tection  and investigation in  the w hole o f  K osovo. U N M IK  Police assisted 
and  advised K F O R  w ith  lim ited m eans.
In fact the first officers to  enter the country w ere ligh tly  arm ed or unarm ed, and served 
in  a  m onitoring  capacity .264 Ironically the m ilitary  w ere giving the im pression o f 
train ing in  the police, ra ther than  vice versa. In P ristina  a K F O R  com m ander spoke o f  
‘incorporating the U N M IK  Police Force’ into the m ilita ry ’s security  operations265, and 
the  force w as subsequently  allow ed to take the lead  in  arrests for looting and 
in tim idation.266 B y Septem ber m urder cases and detainees w ere also being handed over 
to U N M IK  Police in  certain  areas (although K F O R  generally  continued to be the 
arresting party )267 and their Central C rim inal Investigation  U nit was review ing over 180 
cases o f  hom icide.268
O n the surface the arrangem ents betw een the police and m ilitary  forces appeared to  be a 
sym biotic relationship , w here the m ilitary w ere p rov id ing  the m uscle w hile the police 
engaged in  the m ore delicate m atters o f  procedure. W hen  police forces took over the
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responsibility  for law  and order in Pec m unicipality  the  ro les w ere divided into a two- 
tier operation. ‘W hile K FO R  is going to  concentrate on  prov id ing  an  overall fram ew ork 
o f  security, U N M IK  Police w ill now  start receiv ing  crim inal com plaints, conduct 
crim inal investigations and m ake arrests’.269 S im ilarly  w hen  K F O R  decided to  look 
into the m arkets in Pristina the operation w as conducted  in  conjunction w ith  U N M IK  
Police so that the latter’s expertise could verify  that ‘w h a t goes on  in  the m arket is 
proper, authorised, le g a l .. .’270 Later on w hen U N M IK  po lice  had increased in  strength, 
operations w ere m uch larger and m ore am bitious. A  jo in t  operation betw een U N M IK  
Police and K F O R  in O ctober 2000 used m ore than 30 po lice  officers and 290 Royal 
M arines and o ther K F O R  soldiers. Thirteen addresses w ere  cordoned o ff  and searched 
by jo in t team s o f  m ilitary  and police personnel, w ho arrested  25 and confiscated 
$50,000 (approxim ately  €53,300) and 17 assorted w eapons.271
These attem pts to integrate police and m ilitary  forces are  exam ples w here the m ilitary 
d idn ’t act independently  o f  their civ ilian  counterparts, and therefore the  in teraction does 
not conform  to  the parallel authority  concept. U sing the  m ilitary  ethic as a guide we 
m ight argue that the m ilitary  sim ply w anted a  veneer o f  civ ilian  involvem ent in order to 
legitim ise their ow n activities, an analysis that one m ight com pare to  K FO R ’s 
in teraction w ith  the K osovo judiciary . H ow ever this argum ent is sim plistic and portrays 
K FO R  as an entirely  selfish actor, and ignores the  fact that the  m ilitary  them selves w ere 
aw are o f  their ow n failings as a po lice force. W hat is m ore  likely is that the m ilitary 
and civ ilian  forces cooperated together in  an effort to  com bine bo th  civil and m ilitary 
resources to  achieve a jo in t objective, in  this case the p rov ision  o f  security  w ith in  the 
province. W hat is also evident, despite  the jo in t co-operation, is that K FO R  also 
appeared to be very m uch the lead p layer during the po lice  build  up period. How ever, 
the m iniscule num bers o f  police personnel, in  addition to  K F O R ’s greater experience 
and presence upon the ground at that stage, m ake this a  natural outcom e.
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D ue to  their slow  build  up it w as som e tim e before c iv ilian  police forces m ade a 
significant im pact in  the province. In  A ugust 1999 the  D eputy  H ead o f  U N  police in 
K osovo, U ve Schw eifer, stated that the international po lice  force in  K osovo w ere still 
no t carrying out their designated tasks. Speaking fo r G erm an  radio , Schw eifer said that 
‘the international police force had officially  taken  over their duties, bu t w ere not
979
operational y e t’. The follow ing Septem ber police forces also expressed frustration to 
journalists  about their lack o f  executive authority, stating  tha t they  w ere unable to carry 
out their duties.273 A t the sam e tim e m em bers o f  the In terim  A dm inistrative Council 
(IA C) and the K osovo Transitional Council (K TC) to ld  B ernard  K ouchner that the 
police force w as ‘ineffective’, a  charge the SR SG  agreed  w ith .274 In  February 2000 
w hen Police C om m issioner Sven Frederiksen w as asked  about the usefulness o f  the 
m ilitary  police he replied that m ilitary  police w ere so ld iers and w ould not be the 
solution to  strengthening U N M IK ’s police force.275 H e also stated that the scenario 
w here tw o K FO R  soldiers w ould  back  up one U N M IK  po lice  officer in  jo in t security 
operations w orked, bu t w as not the perfect solution.276 Instead he rem arked that ‘W e 
need international police, and w e need  them  desperately’.277
A lthough they  had received full authority  in both  security  and investigative prim acy in 
the P ristina region by Septem ber 1999 (areas o f  po lic ing  ju risd ic tion  were roughly 
corresponding to  the five areas covered by  M N B s), it w as June 2000 before they  were 
transferred  in  Pec, the fourth  o f  five regions. The fifth  reg ion  w as M itrovica, ‘in w hich 
U N M IK  Police has full investigative authority, but K F O R  retains technical [or security] 
p rim acy .’278 H ow ever it could not be said that security  affa irs in  K osovo existed on 
dichotom ous levels. The extrem ely  d ifficult security  situation  m eant that U N M IK  
forces w ere alw ays reliant on K FO R  assistance to  ex tract them  from  situations that 
turned hostile  and even m undane incidents could elevate a  rou tine police procedure into 
a  serious confrontation for bo th  security forces. In  one exam ple in  Leposavic 
m unicipality  in  D ecem ber 2000, an area w hose p rim ary  crim e problem  w as the 
suppression o f  illegal logging in  the surrounding forests, a  local K osovo Serb was 
arrested for drink  driving. W hen he w as detained a  crow d o f  several hundred K osovo
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Serbs surrounded Leposavic station and took  hostages o f  local K FO R  soldiers. The 
seven B elgian soldiers w ere later released, bu t the  crow d attacked the station shortly 
before m idnight and the battle lasted for 30 m inutes, resulting  in  two dead K osovo 
Serbs. The station w as evacuated the next day.279
A t the sam e tim e tha t police forces w ere becom ing autonom ous in  their operations 
across K osovo the m ilitary  geared dow n to assist in  crim inal m atters, ensuring that the 
tw o authorities rem ained  sim ultaneously involved. In  D ecem ber 1999 K FO R  had 
enforced the M ilitary  Technical A greem ent and overseen  the dem ilitarisation o f  the 
K LA  and G eneral R einhard t instructed his B rigade C om m anders to focus their attention 
tow ards the figh t against crim e, and conduct jo in t patro ls w ith  civilian police 
services.280 A lthough the low  num ber o f  police officers could be ‘significantly 
bolstered by m ilitary  personnel and resources’ to say tha t the ‘spirit o f  co-operation 
betw een the K F O R  m ilitary  and U N M IK  police is excellen t’ w as certainly not true
9R1 «
across the board. This m arriage o f  tw o d istinctly  different approaches was 
recognised as a  source o f  friction due to  the fundam entally  different character o f  both 
parties. C onsider th is exam ple in  the M itrovica region.
M itrovica rem ains the one area o f  K osovo in  w hich  U N M IK  Police have not 
achieved p rim acy  o f  policing. D ue to  the security  situation K FO R  retains 
technical prim acy. Policing m ust be carried  out w ith  the close support and full 
co-operation o f  the m ilitary. G iven differences in  those cultures this has caused 
difficulty  w hen  the practices o f  civ ilian  law  enforcem ent have needed to be 
m erged  w ith  m ilitary  tactics, procedures and political concerns. The 
relationship  has been one o f  evolution and developm ent, com pounded by the
• 9R9
constant ro ta tion  o f  both police and K FO R  soldiers.
This was a  rather m ild  descrip tion o f  the very bad relations betw een police and m ilitary 
personnel in  the city. The co-operation betw een U N M IK  and K FO R  in  M itrovica was 
described as ‘ex trem ely  p o o r’ and U N M IK  police claim ed that they  had been prevented
279 Leposavic Station, UNMIK Police Press and Public Information Office, Pristina, 18 December 2000, 
KFOR News Update by Major Steven R. Shappell, KFOR Spokesman Pristina, 17 December 2000
280 KFOR News Update by Maj Roland Lavoie, KFOR Spokesperson, Pristina, 14 December 1999
281 Police in Kosovo, Briefing to the Security Council, DPKO, 23 April 2000, UNMIK Police Press and 
Public Information Office
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from  conducting investigations by the F rench  m ilitary .283 D uring a  particularly  bad 
bout o f  vio lence in  February 2000 that had  a  num ber o f  repercussions (see below), 
police forces and local inhabitants claim ed th a t K F O R  refused  to  in tervene w hile people 
w ere being k illed .284
W e ran  into a crow d o f  1,000 to  1,500 Serbs. The French K -For w ere standing 
on  the  com er. W e asked for assistance, and w e w ere going to go in  and get our 
officers. W e looked back and they  w ere gone. T hey all turned around and 
m arched  stra ight back into their com m and post, and left the  three or four officers 
th e re .. .and  that's the last I saw  o f  the  French K -For.285
O utside o f  M itrovica, one w ould assum e that for the  sym biotic  rela tionship  to  w ork the 
m ilitary w ould  have to accept the full au thority  o f  the po lice  on  po lic ing  m atters, and 
essentially  take  their orders from  police com m anders. H ow ever according to an 
U N M IK  Police spokesperson, bo th  support and lead ro les w ere actually 
interchangeable. U N M IK  Police w ould  support K F O R  during jo in t patrols o f  the
OQ C
border, w hile  K F O R  supported U N M IK  Police during arrest w arran t operations. 
H ow ever, w hat the exact m odalities o f  this arrangem ent are is unknow n. The U N M IK  
police press office revealed  that in  cases o f  ‘special K F O R  in terest’ the m ilitary  could 
take over responsib ility  from  the police forces i f  it w as jo in tly  agreed .287 A lthough 
there are M em orandum s o f  U nderstanding (M O U s) betw een  the  m ilitary  and police 
forces for each  o f  the  five regions the docum ents are n o t available for public  inspection 
and the specific term s rem ain confidential.288 One exam ple o f  an M O U  betw een 
U N M IK  and K F O R  that w as m entioned referred  to  the transfer o f  responsibility  for the 
security o f  the border crossing points from  the m ilitary  to  the police forces289, how ever 
generally little can be to ld  about the conten t except that they  are designed  to im prove 
co-operation.
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I w ant to bring to  your attention the increasing co-opera tion  betw een U N M IK  
Police and K FO R . Y esterday, Dr. K ouchner and m y se lf  signed a  m em orandum  
o f  understanding  on  the increasing o f  co-operation  betw een  the tw o bodies... 
This m em orandum  o f  understanding is a  concrete sign  o f  w hat w e’re  try ing to 
do to increase the  efficiency o f  our actions against all crim inal activities, and o f  
course against extrem ist attacks and actions.290
W e can see at th is po in t how  K F O R ’s actions d id no t conform  to the expectations o f  
horizontal civ ilian  control. The m ilitary ’s lack o f  train ing  in  po lic ing  issues m eant that 
they  rem ained  an inexpert choice for po licing  tasks and therefo re  w ere exceeding their 
professional com petency. A s police forces had been  g iven  technical prim acy in  the 
various regions it is safe to say that com petent civ ilian  forces w ere sim ultaneously 
present, even i f  they  w ere th in ly  stretched. H ow ever the security  environm ent in 
K osovo m ean t tha t po lic ing  and m ilitary  duties could not be com pletely  divorced, even 
w hen the recom m ended num bers o f  police becam e available. The relationship  betw een 
the m ilitary  and police forces is m uch m ore com plex than  th e  H untingtonian approach 
allow s for, as H un ting ton’s theory  is grounded firm ly in  conservative realism  and the 
d ivision o f  pow er and  expertise, for exam ple H un ting ton’s concept o f  m ilitary  
professionalism . H ow ever the dynam ics o f  civil-m ilitary  co-operation  in  operations 
tak ing  place since the early  1990s often require ad hoc so lu tions to  be form ed w hich do 
not correspond to  the m ore established relationship  o f  so ld ier/state  interaction, hence 
the m arriage o f  K F O R  and U N C IV PO L in  provision o f  security  for the province.
W hat is o f  further in terest is the nature o f  the relationship  betw een  K FO R  and the police 
forces. K F O R  w as the dom inant partner o f  the tw o, and the p oo r relations betw een the 
m ilitary  and police in  M itrov ica suggest that the m ilitary  cou ld  certainly exercise a 
degree o f  independence w ith in  the relationship, ju s t as they  d id  in  o ther previous 
exam ples. H ow ever, the  M O U s suggest that a  m ore system atic arrangem ent was in  
place, thereby suggesting  greater co-operation and less independence than  other sectors 
w here civil-m ilitary  co-operation  w as practiced. H ow ever, w ithou t know ing the exact 
content o f  the M O U s it is im possible to  say w hether they  are being  adhered to, or 
w hether breaches are a  frequent occurrence. It is also  im possib le to say w hether the 
M O U ’s represen t a  true  m eeting o f  m utual interest, o r a  sim ple d ictation o f  one party ’s
290 UNMIK-KFOR Press Briefing SRSG Bernard Kouchner, COMKFOR General Cabigiosu, Brigadier 
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interests to the other. A lthough exam ples such  as M itrov ica  m ay  suggest m ilitary 
independence, the evolving fram ew ork o f  civil-m ilitary  co-operation  in  security m atters 
suggests a  far greater inter-reliance than in  p rev ious areas exam ined, m aking 
H untington’s notion  o f  parallel authority  less relevant. T he exam ple w hereby K FO R 
had to  have the consent o f  U N C IV PO L before they cou ld  take over cases o f  special 
interest to  them  represents one exam ple o f  w here the m ilita ry  do no t appear to  have total 
independence from  their civ ilian  partners.
N egative  In c id e n ts  in  M ilita ry  P o lic ing
A  num ber o f  po lic ing  incidents occurred in  K osovo th a t cast further doubt upon the 
com petence o f  the arm y for establishing a  secure env ironm ent and dealing w ith  the 
local population. A lthough the situation was com pounded by  the presence o f  parallel 
structures belonging to  param ilitary  organisations (see n ex t chapter) tha t often enjoyed 
local support, som e negative events appeared to  be a  p roduct o f  a heavy-handed or 
sim ply confused approach. M ost o f  the fo llow ing cases support the  H untingtonian 
parallel authority  concept as they  display m ilitary  forces acting  independently  o f  
accepted procedures, and ignoring civilian requests to  instigate  internal disciplinary 
actions for those infractions. C orrespondingly, as in  o ther cases, the concept o f  
horizontal control is w eakened by these exam ples as a  num ber o f  exam ples show 
civilian  groups or experts being sidelined by  K F O R  soldiers during  their activities.
One incident tha t happened  at an  early stage in  the m ission  appeared indicative o f  the 
m ilitary’s inexpert handling o f  police m atters. O n 22 June 1999 a group o f  at least 20 
civilian m ales, along w ith  six  o ther m en  w ith K L A  insign ia  w ere w itnessed openly 
looting the  dow ntow n Pristina area. A lthough K F O R  confron ted  the group there was
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uncertainty about how  to react and the  looters escaped  w ith  the sto len  property. 
O SC E personnel saw  at least tw o occurrences o f  such  half-hearted  confrontations292, 
w hile the ITN  netw ork film ed one as it happened. W hen  questioned about K FO R ’s 
poor response to  the  event G eneral Jackson rep lied  ‘It w as an  incident w hich  obviously
291 SEC.FR 541/99, 23 June 1999, The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo, Activity Report, 23 June 
1999, Period 22 June
292 ibid
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I m uch regret, it should  no t have happened, w e have taken  som e m easures to m ake sure 
that it doesn 't happen  again .’294
A  m ore serious incident that revealed  the unsuitability  o f  soldiers for police functions 
w as the fatal shooting o f  tw o K osovo A lbanians on  3 Ju ly  1999 by  B ritish  paratroopers 
in  Pristina. The troops had  been  called out to p ro tect a  group o f  terrified  Serbs while 
K osovo A lbanians w ere cheering and firing shots into the  air during ‘R epublic D ay’ 
celebrations. The K F O R  soldiers opened fire and k illed  one m an  at the scene and 
injured tw o m ore, one w ho died later in hospital. V arious reports po in ted  out that the 
A lbanians had  been  firing into the air, and not at any o ther persons.295 O ne report stated 
the A lbanians had  been  shot in  the back as they  ran, after ignoring  or n o t hearing orders 
from  K F O R  soldiers.296 Follow ing this incident A m nesty  In ternational sent a  letter to 
G eneral Jackson asking h im  a num ber o f  questions. H ad  the  soldiers given clear verbal 
w arnings before firing, had  they  been instructed in  h o w  to  issue w arnings in  local 
languages, and had  K F O R  troops been given instructions abou t dealing w ith  local 
custom s such as firing  into the air in  celebration?297 R egard ing  the soldiers them selves
O ur understanding is tha t the w eapons o f  those soldiers had to  be taken  for 
investigation  purposes, for ballistic analysis. H ence, since all w eapons are 
personal and need  to  be calibrated for each ind iv idual they  do not have their 
w eapons and so are no t conducting patrols a t th is tim e, they  have been
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reassigned to  o ther duties w ith in  their units.
Therefore the soldiers had  been  tem porarily  taken  o f f  patro ls n o t because o f  their 
involvem ent w ith  the k illings, bu t because they  w ere w ithou t their weapons. This 
explanation leaves the im pression that the investigation w as far less vigorous than  m ight 
usually  be expected, insofar as the soldiers involved w ere no t tem porarily  taken o ff  duty 
or confined fo r the duration  o f  the investigation. H ow ever by com parison to  other 
incidents, the fact that any investigation  w as undertaken a t all is encouraging.
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A  sim ilar incident involved the k illing o f  a K osovo A lban ian  m an  by French KFO R 
soldiers in  M itrovica. O n the m orning o f  13 F ebruary  2000 during w ide scale 
disturbances in  the city, sparked by an attack on  a  U N H C R  bus carrying Serb refugees, 
tw o F rench  soldiers w ere shot, one in  the arm  and another in  the stom ach.299 Follow ing
K F O R  im m ediately  returned  fire at the build ing w here the  sniper fire cam e from  
and cordoned o f f  a large area. A t noon, snipers tu rned  their fire on Serbians on 
the street. There w ere no reported injuries and the  peop le  escaped under K FO R  
protection. A t approxim ately  12:30 p.m . K F O R  troops exchanged fire with 
snipers. Tw o snipers w ere captured, bo th  w ere w ounded. They w ere taken to 
the K F O R  M oroccan F ield H ospital where one d ied  o f  h is wounds. The injured 
and  dead m en are reported  to be A lbanian.300
On the 14 February  U N M IK  supported this statem ent by  saying ‘A  sniper was killed in 
northern M itrovica during the heavy gunfire that ensued  betw een  K FO R  and shooters 
during the  nex t four hours’.301 H ow ever, w hen  A m nesty  International interview ed 
w itnesses and view ed a  videotape o f  the events they  found th a t one o f  the supposed 
snipers, a  m an  called  A vni H ajredini who later died, w as standing on a  pavem ent 
several b locks aw ay from  w here the shots w ere allegedly  fired  at French troops. 
Also, he w as not captured as the m ilitary  reports had claim ed, b u t w as actually carried 
aw ay by  other K osovo A lbanians to m edical care after being shot by  the m ilitary.
B y 17 February  K FO R  had changed their story. N ow  they  accepted  that they had not in 
fact captured M r H ajredini, nor had they  any w itnesses to  the fact that he had been a 
sniper at all. H ow ever, they  persisted  in  the possib ility  to that M r H ajredini m ay have 
been the sniper, even though their versions o f  the location  and activ ity  o f  the snipers 
had been consistently  confused and incorrect.
T his m an  [M r H ajredini] w as am ongst the group o f  attackers, and he was hit 
w hen K F O R  soldiers returned  fire. The m an w as rushed  from  the scene by
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302 Setting the standard? UNMIK and KFOR’s response to the violence in Mitrovica, Amnesty 
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unidentified  m en  and taken to  the K FO R  M oroccan  hospital in South M itrovica 
w here he died. The fam ily asked for h is body  accord ing  to  custom , and it was 
handed  over to  their care. He w as buried on  14 February . A ll forensic evidence 
concerning the exact circum stances o f  M r. H ajred inaj's death  has therefore been 
buried. T hus it rem ains unclear w hether he h im se lf  w as one o f  the shooters in 
the  group or no t.304
K FO R  in  th is case w ere content to leave the m atter as it w as and M r H ajredini was 
buried w ith  an unconfirm ed shroud o f  suspicion over him . A m nesty International 
expressed concern  in  M arch  2000 that no investigation  had  been  ordered into the 
k illing .305 The m ilitary, rather than  accept even  the  possib ility  o f  w rongdoing, 
continued to  insinuate H ajred in i’s guilt instead o f  instigating  an  internal enquiry into the 
actions o f  the soldiers involved.
The exchange betw een  K FO R , A m nesty In ternational and the m edia, for w hom  
K F O R ’s press releases w ere intended, can be considered  as an  exam ple o f  horizontal 
control in  action. A t first K F O R  sought to portray  the events in  a  fashion that w as m ost 
lenient to their ow n position , obliged as they  w ere to  m ain tain  a  good im age to the 
civilian m edia. H ow ever, their version  o f  events w as called  into question by  A m nesty, 
a  second civ ilian  group, w ho w ere able to produce ev idence that ran  contrary to 
K F O R ’s claim s. This in  turn  led K FO R  to re-evaluate  the circum stances o f  their 
involvem ent in  M r H ajred in i’s death and to  issue a second statem ent that w as m ore 
critical o f  their position . H ad the civ ilian  groups no t been  p resen t at the tim e, K FO R  
w ould not have been  m aking  public statem ents, nor w ould  they  have been  forced to 
correct them selves. In  th is regard the m ilitary  w ere effectively  hem m ed in by the 
civilian groups w ho w ere m onitoring their actions. H ow ever, w hile this w ould 
constitute horizontal control o f  a  sort, it m ust also be no ted  tha t K F O R ’s response w as a 
subtle public relations m anoeuvre, and not the  in ternal investigation tha t A m nesty  
International w anted to  see. Therefore, w hile horizontal control w as being exercised, it 
did not constitu te a  particu larly  strong form  o f  civ ilian  control.
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Follow ing the k illing  o f  A vni H ajredini, K F O R  also rounded  up a  large num ber o f  
people in  connection w ith  the disturbances in  the city. 51 peop le  w ere sum m oned out 
o f  their houses in  the B osnjacka M ahala area  o f  the city, searched and led aw ay to 
detention. K F O R  stated that they  ‘have been  arrested  in  connection  w ith  the violence 
during searches o f  several bu ild ings.’307 W hy the decision  to  detain  these people was 
m ade is unclear as the m ilitary  gave no details o f  any w eapons or o ther evidence o f  
v iolent activity  being  found in  the hom es o f  any o f  the  suspects, a  po in t on w hich 
K FO R  w ere generally  m eticulous about. K F O R  forces then  took  the people to a 
m ilitary com pound w here they  w ere detained for up to  five days, including one w om an 
and tw o juven iles, w here they w ere periodically  in terrogated  by  K F O R  and som etim es 
U N M IK  police. The conditions in  w hich  they  w ere detained  in  w ere substandard and 
acts o f  in tim idation  w ere also used  against them .308 In  short the  entire episode bore no 
resem blance to  a  considered investigation, and instead looked  m ore like a  revenge 
operation carried  out by  the m ilitary  in  reprisal for the  w ounding  o f  French soldiers. 
A pplicable procedures w ere not fo llow ed and K F O R  handled  the situation 
independently  o f  po lice expertise.
A  representative from  the U N M IK  international civ ilian  police involved in  the 
cases to ld  A m nesty  International delegates ‘from  a  m ilitary  po in t o f  v iew  there 
m ay  have been  a  good reason to  deta in  these persons, how ever, from  a  police 
po in t o f  v iew  there w as no probab le  cause’ (or reasonable suspicion that the 
persons detained  had  com m itted  a  crim inal offence).309
Follow ing on  from  this statem ent it appears that i f  the m ilitary  had been  co-operating 
fully w ith the  police in  M itrovica, the  apprehension  o f  these p robably  innocent people 
w ould not have happened, as there w as no good reason  to  effect the  arrests from  a 
civilian poin t o f  view . H ow ever as the  m ilitary  w ere able to  operate w ithout the 
blessing o f  M itrov ica’s police in  th is regard , w e can see ho w  H unting ton’s horizontal 
control concept is again  w eakened. Police  forces w ere available but K FO R  chose not to 
em ploy them  in  th is operation, w hilst the  operation i tse lf  w as o f  dubious legitim acy
306 Setting the standard? UNMIK and KFOR’s response to the violence in Mitrovica, Amnesty 
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from  a  civ ilian  po in t o f  view. K FO R  acted independently , and ignored  the expertise o f  
a sim ultaneously p resen t civilian group.
The problem s d id  no t finish w ith  the release o f  the M itrov ica  residents either. A s part 
o f  a  package o f  m easures to reduce tension in  the city  K F O R  (assisted  by  U N M IK ) 
began arm s searches throughout the entire city  on  14 F ebruary310, beginning w ith  south 
M itrovica and then  progressing on to  a special operation in  the northern  Serb quarter o f  
the city. ‘O peration  Ibar’ used  2500 soldiers from  12 d ifferen t nations for house-to-
qii i
house searches , bu t was subsequently suspended for a  day because o f  a m arch by 
20,000 people to the city.312 B y 24 February K FO R  had  confiscated  39 w eapons o f  
various types, and an assortm ent o f  explosives, includ ing  8 b locks o f  plastic 
explosive.313 H ow ever, o f  the 39 w eapons 32 w ere rifles and sm all arm s, w hile only 
seven w ere autom atic w eapons. For a  ten-day opera tion  com bating organised 
param ilitary  groups (see next chapter) in  a  reg ion  aw ash w ith  w eaponry, the  haul was 
m ediocre. W hen it cam e to actually  detaining people fo r w eapons violations at the end 
o f  O peration Ibar the  security forces had only three peop le  rem ain ing  in  custody (one 
K osovo A lbanian and tw o Serbs), out o f  approxim ately  20 people arrested  (not 
including those detained by French K FO R  in B osnjacka M ahala).314 D espite the 
repeated public  assurances by  K FO R  and U N M IK  representatives that law breakers 
w ould  be dealt w ith  rigorously, a  revolving door system  w as in  effect, partially  due to 
the bias o f  the K osovo judiciary . The O SC E cited the  exam ple o f  three K osovo
ITS
A lbanians arrested  on  w eapons possession charges who w ere released  in  one hour.
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Considering K F O R ’s previous intransigence w ith  the K osovo jud ic ia l system , it seems 
strange that they  chose to  respect it on th is occasion, especially  considering the other 
transgressions tha t had  taken  place. The m ilita ry ’s capacity  for flouting existing 
regulations and acting  independently  w as again  underlined  by  its activities during the 
search operations. The O SC E was sufficiently w orried  about the extent o f  the m ilitary 
sweeps to  po in t out in  a letter to SRSG K ouchner tha t the search operations should be in 
com pliance w ith  the In ternational Covenant o f  C ivil and Political R ights.316 The overall 
im pression given is one o f  the m ilitary failing to  m ake a  positive im pact on the 
situation.
Taken together these negative incidents show  an  independent m ilitary  that is in 
com pliance w ith  H un ting ton’s parallel authority  concept. Just as in  their interactions 
w ith the jud ic ia l system , w hen K FO R  did  n o t w ant to  com ply  w ith  policing  procedures 
they ignored them . N either can the m ilitary  be constan tly  excused by  their lack o f  
expertise in  policing  m atters as even w hen po lice  forces w ere not available, police 
advisers were. A dditionally , by 2000 U N M IK  Police had, i f  no t fu ll num bers o f  
personnel, significant num bers per region and certain ly  enough to  provide advice on 
procedure. This is no t to  state, how ever, tha t the m ilitary  w ere never cooperative on 
policing, it sim ply states that a t tim es K F O R  could  and d id  exert their independence for 
their ow n reasons. It should  also be noted  th a t the num erous exam ples o f  poor 
soldiering in  M itrov ica suggests that the m ilitary  forces there w ere especially 
com prom ised in  ability , resources or guidance, and  therefore the lack o f  civil-m ilitary 
co-operation there  m ay not be a  good indication o f  relations in the rest o f  the province.
Just as in  previous experiences, we can  see that w here the  m ilitary  exercised their 
independence, horizontal control was correspondingly  w eak. The fact that K FO R  
ignored the police and responded in  a  defensive rather than  cooperative fashion to  the 
representations o f  A m nesty  International illustrates that horizontal control w as not a 
significant factor in influencing or directing K FOR. T he m ilitary  in  K osovo were 
capable o f  w ithdraw ing  from  civil-m ilitary co-operation in  security  and proceeding  w ith 
their ow n agenda in  the ir ow n way.
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The m ilitary  ethic appears quite applicable w ith  respect to  a  num ber o f  the above 
events. The incident w ith  the looters for instance could be in terpreted  as not only a lack 
o f  training, b u t also an  unw illingness to  get involved  in  w hat w as an obviously 
unpredictable situation. This perspective w ould  also explain  the leniency o f  the m ilitary 
tow ards their ow n personnel in  questionable m atters, w hereby  the m ilitary  were 
reluctant to discip line their soldiers w hen they had been  involved in  confused and 
difficult circum stances. W ith no clear enem y, and no clear outcom e in  confrontation, 
the pessim istic  orientation o f  H untington’s m ilitary  ethic w ould  dictate  that the m ilitary 
not only shy aw ay from  confrontation, bu t also attem pt to  pro tect itse lf  from  further 
recrim inations by  denying w rongdoing.
S uccessfu l c iv il-m ilita ry  co -o p era tio n
A lthough K F O R ’s reputation  w as certain ly  tarnished by such  negative incidents as 
described above, the m ilitary  w ere also capable o f  extrem ely  good inter-institu tional co­
operation. O ne such pro ject that required extensive involvem ent betw een  both m ilitary 
and civ ilian  organisations w as the beginning o f  the electoral process in  K osovo. V oter 
registration and m unicipal elections necessitated  a  co-ord inated  approach from  both  the 
security forces and the civil adm inistration, and although differences o f  opinion arose 
betw een various parties, co-operation overall w as very good.
The Central E lection  C om m ission w as established by  B ernard  K ouchner on 18 A pril 
2000 and w as tasked  w ith  running the election operations.317 N o tim e w as lost and the 
p ilo t reg istration  program  for elections w as prom ptly  begun  by  the O SCE at four 
registration sites in  G njilane m unicipality  on 19 A pril 2000 w ith security  provided  by 
K FO R  and U N M IK  P olice .318 The m unicipal elections them selves w ere subsequently  
set for 28 O ctober 2000.319 K F O R ’s new ly  arrived com m ander at tha t tim e, Lt General 
Juan O rtuno, engaged the m ilitary  politically  by  urging K osovars to  participate in the
317 Regulation no. 2000/21 on the establishment of the Central Election Commission, 
UNMIK/REG/2000/21
318 SEC.FR 222/00, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Background Report: The Start of Registration, 3 May 
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registration process in  a num ber o f  press conferences, including  his inaugural 
statem ent.320
For the past 50 years you have been  denied your political righ ts and have been 
unable to participate in  a  tru ly  dem ocratic process. M any o f  you have already 
taken  the unique opportunity  to p lay  a  full part and have reg istered  to vote in  the 
forthcom ing m unicipal elections. I urge those w ho have no t yet registered to do 
so now . R em em ber th a t voting is a privilege, b y  reg istering  you w ill have the 
righ t to  vote and to  influence the fu ture developm ent o f  K osovo .321
B y m id-M ay the co-operation betw een the O SCE, U N M IK  Police  and K FO R  had 
in tensified  as the international organisation began  to  focus upon  reg istration  and the 
preparations for m unicipal elections and a  special office to  assist in  the  interaction was 
established. The Jo in t E lections O peration Cell (JE O C ) becam e the  hub o f  interaction, 
and the O SC E noted  that co-operation w ith the m ilitary  th rough  the JEO C was 
particularly  good.322 To further augm ent th is provision  b o th  K F O R  and U N M IK  Police 
also p laced  liaison  officers in  O SC E headquarters.
H ow ever the m ilitary  w ere sim ply restricted  to the security  aspects o f  the  operation. O n 
the ground K F O R  also had to  undertake the m undane tasks o f  dissem inating 
inform ation on bo th  the  reg istra tion  and  election p rocedure to  the  Serb com m unity, 
including the d istribu tion  o f  6500 posters to  K osovo Serb enclaves throughout the 
province. A lthough a  private com pany w as responsible for th is task  throughout the rest 
o f  the province324, security  considerations had  to  be taken  into account due to the 
K osovo Serb com m unity’s opposition  to  provincial elections. The Serbs largely chose 
to boycott the elections325 and in tim idation w as often  used  to  achieve this. In  one
320 SEC.FR 244/00 OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Weekly Mission Report No. 19/2000, 3 - 9  May 2000, 11 
May 2000 [Restricted]
321 KFOR News Update by Major Scott A. Slaten, KFOR Spokesman, Pristina, 12 June 2000
322 SEC.FR 255/00, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Monthly Progress Report No.l April 2000, 18 May 2000 
[Restricted]
323 ibid
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episode B elgian K FO R  had to  escort OSCE registration  w orkers aw ay from  Leposavic 
as a  large crow d o f  K osovo Serbs advanced tow ards them .326
H ow ever greater security  risks concerned the K osovo A lban ian  com m unity w hose 
political parties w ere suffering spats o f  political v io lence. G eneral Ortuno, while 
conducting a round o f  talks w ith  K osovo’s political leaders, said  that he w as ‘concerned 
about recent incidents o f  possib le political harassm ent and  v io lence’.327 The m oderate 
D em ocratic League o f  K osovo (LD K , led by Ibrahim  R ugova) in  particular w as the 
target o f  a num ber o f  attacks. Faced w ith  a possib ly  destab ilising  elem ent on  the 
ground the  international com m unity countered w ith  a  jo in t approach to  the m atter o f  
political intim idation. The SR SG  established the In ter-P illar W orking G roup on 
Elections and Political V iolence and Intim idation. Set up  on  21 A ugust to protect the 
m ost v ictim ised individuals, the aim  o f  this body w as to  p ressurise  political leaders into 
m aking the elections free and fair. This m ove w as com plem entary  to  the m easures 
put in place by  K FO R, U N M IK  Police and the C entral E lections C om m ission (CEC). 
The m ilitary and police forces increased their v isib ility  on  the  ground w ith  security for 
party  prem ises, police escorts and personal protection , w hile  the CEC resorted to its 
Electoral Com plaints and A ppeals sub-C om m ission (EC A C ).
The EC A C was the prim ary  disciplinary agent o f  the civil adm inistration, and it could 
issue s tiff  penalties for any violations o f  applicable ru les and  regulations regarding the 
elections.331 B reaches o f  the E lectoral C ode o f  C onduct included defacing public and 
private property, violence, K osovo Protection C orps (ex-K L A  personnel) presence at 
political rallies, language o f  in tim idation and v io lence, public  d isplay and use o f  
w eapons, and failure to give p roper notification o f  a po litica l gathering.332 B ribing or 
threatening voters as a m eans o f  gaining their support, u rg ing  people to  vote tw ice or 
casting a  ballo t for those w ho didn 't have the righ t to  vote, or to use the pictures or 
sym bols o f  anyone indicted by  the International W ar C rim es T ribunal at The H ague was
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also prohib ited .333 The EC A C could im pose fines ranging from  D M  250 to  D M  10,000 
(€127 to  € 5 1 13334) fo r non-com pliance and in  the course o f  the  election period  the body 
fined participants up to  D M  2000 (€1022). O n the other hand  the EC A C  also dism issed 
several cases for lack o f  evidence to  support the com plaints.335 The CEC itse lf could go 
further and in  the m ost serious cases a  political party, coalition  o r candidate could be 
barred from  tak ing  part in  elections fo r up to six years. B oth  K FO R  and U N M IK  
Police assisted the EC A C  through  an intelligence sharing effort tha t fed into the civil 
structures. A  central database o f  incidents involving po litical v io lence and intim idation 
w as com piled  using inform ation from  all the relevant p illars and security  forces. This 
database then  allow ed the EC A C  to take action against perpetrators o f  the electoral 
code.337
U nfortunately  no t all o f  the  election issues could be solved by  consensus. In  the run  up 
to  the election m ore drastic steps w ere taken  and the decision  to  allow  a  num ber o f  
politicians to  carry guns w as allow ed by K FO R  and U N M IK  Police. W eapons 
A uthorisation  C ards w ere distributed to  a  sm all num ber o f  political personalities under 
strict conditions and for a  lim ited period  during the election cam paign. This m ove was 
opposed by  the O SC E w ho feared that the in troduction o f  arm s to  the electoral process 
w ould  escalate the level and nature o f  the political v io lence. B ut they  ultim ately 
deferred to  the security  m andate o f  bo th  K FO R  and U N M IK  Police and allow ed the 
m ove to  go ahead w ithout further objections. This w as p robably  influenced in  no small 
w ay by  O M IK ’s realisation  that the dem ands o f  the elections had  bo th  security forces at 
the  end o f  their resources tether. U N M IK  Police reported tha t the  increasing num ber o f  
requests for pro tec tion  risked  their operational capacities.338 K F O R  w as also feeling the 
strain  and drafted  in  four ex tra  battalions to  the province in  response to  the tension 
created  n o t ju s t by  the m unicipal elections, bu t also the elections being held  in  the
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FR Y .339 A lthough the FR Y  election w ere no t adm inistered  by  the international 
com m unity  in  K osovo, w ho sim ply chose to  ignore them 340, the  security  forces still had 
to provide security  for the public gatherings w hich  ensued. L ater the m ilitary  began  air 
insertion exercises w ith  its O perational R eserve force, stating  that it w ould provide the 
K FO R  com m ander w ith  ‘additional assets and greater flex ib ility  during the K osovo 
m unicipal e lections’.341
Efforts becam e m ore concentrated from  m id-Septem ber onw ards as the political 
cam paigns for the m unicipal elections w ere launched on  13 Septem ber by K ouchner, 
Everts and G eneral O rtuno.342 M ore im portantly  th an  the photo  opportunity  w as the 
fact that the special legal provisions laid  dow n by  civ il adm inistration  for cam paign 
expenditure and coverage now  cam e into effect.343 K F O R  and  U N M IK  geared up by 
m aintain ing h igher v isib ility  at rallies during the election  cam paign344, and K FO R 
H eadquarters organised a  jo in t p lanning exercise to rehearse  its upcom ing role. K FO R 
com m anders from  each M NB participated  w ith  O SC E and U N M IK  representatives in 
attendance. K FO R  also m ade preparations to support U N M IK  and the O SCE in basic 
election w ork w ith logistics and com m unications.345 The E lections C om plaints and 
A ppeals Sub-C om m ission reciprocated by  im posing tough  sanctions on offending 
parties, including the striking o f f  o f  a  D em ocratic  Party  o f  K osovo (PD K ) candidate in 
L ipljan m unicipality .346 The cam paign w ound dow n th ree  days before the election on 
25 O ctober w ithout any m ajor v io len t incidents. The new  K F O R  com m ander, Italian Lt 
G en Carlo C abigiosu, even said that he was ‘extrem ely  satisfied  w ith  the peaceful 
a tm osphere’.347 The stable environm ent persisted  for po lling  day w hich  ‘w as virtually 
free o f  security  inciden ts’348 and K FO R  later stated that perhaps the greatest challenge
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that they faced w as long lines. D uring the voting th ey  responded to  a  num ber o f  
requests by  U N M IK  police to  assist in  m anaging  the leng thy  queues.349
From  a  security  po in t o f  v iew  it w as clear tha t the elections operations had been a 
success. W hether the low  level o f  v io len t incidence w as directly  attributable to the 
concerted effort o f  the international com m unity  or po litical calculation by K osovo 
A lbanian po litical and param ilitary groups is hard  to  say, although the robust presence 
definitely m ade a  difference. C ertain ly  K F O R ’s contribu tion  and co-operation was 
appreciated by  the O SC E, w ho as the ‘institu tion bu ilder’ o f  the international 
com m unity in  K osovo w as prim arily  responsible for the  elections. They described a 
jo in t U N , O SCE, K F O R  and U N M IK  Police  ‘T ransitional T ask  F o rce’ (a body w hich 
helped and advised the  m unicipalities about election problem s) as an exam ple o f  
excellent in ter-p illar and in ter-organisational co-operation .350
W hy the m ilitary  m ade such a  good partner in  this co-operation  is unexplained by 
H untingtonian concepts o f  parallel au thority  and horizon tal control. For a  synergy to 
occur actors m ust be responsive to the requests and needs o f  others, and w hile they  m ay 
bring their ow n  expertise to a  project, they  cannot act independently  as their 
contribution m ust be com plem entary to  the efforts o f  others. C om m unication and 
division o f  labour betw een unlike actors is therefore required , and th is is w hat occurred 
during the election organisation. W hat appears to be the  key to  the successful civil- 
m ilitary co-operation  in  th is exam ple is tha t each ac to r contributed their respective 
expertise. K F O R  w ith  the help o f  U N C IV PO L  m ain tained  security  and contributed 
logistical support, w hile  U N M IK , the  O SC E and special e lection  bodies such as ECA C 
oversaw  the  behav iour o f  candidates and regulated  the  environm ent and fram ew ork 
w ith in  w h ich  the elections took  place. T his m ean t that m ilitary  and civilians w ere not 
engaged in  the sam e specific tasks a t the  one tim e, and therefore  w ere not differing on 
cultural or professional grounds. W hile a  com m on objective w as in  m ind  for all actors, 
the prov ision  o f  peacefu l elections to  be run  in  the  m o st efficien t w ay, the objective 
itse lf could  be subdivided into various tasks and operations that suited the expertise o f  
various actors. W hen  w e contrast th is w ith  civ il-m ilitary  co-operation  in  A lbania and 
M acedonia w e find  a  m uch  different arrangem ent.
349 KFOR News Update by Major Steven R. Shappell, KFOR Spokesman Pristina, 29 October 2000
350 SEC.FR 682/00, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Weekly Report No.49, 29 November -  5 December 2000, 
7 December 2000 [Restricted]
120
Civilians and m ilitary  personnel there w ere engaged  in  the  sam e tasks, for exam ple 
delivering aid and constructing cam ps, and th is  led  to  friction on  a  cultural and 
professional level. A nother key factor w as the  very  good com m unication betw een 
K FO R  and the civ ilian  groups through the JEO C.
W e can see from  these in teractions that, a lthough the m ilita ry  w ere no t under the direct 
control o f  the  civ ilian  adm inistration, they  d id  no t ac t independently  as per the 
H untingtonian concept. Since they w ere involved  w ith  tasks w ith in  their ow n expertise, 
it m ay be the case th a t they  felt no need to  act independen tly  since K F O R  already had 
the m andate and m ission  to safeguard the  elections. The m ilitary  ethic m ight support 
this v iew  w hen w e exam ine the nature o f  the tasks g iven  to  K FO R. D efending 
personnel and election sites as w ell as provid ing  log istical support are all tasks that have 
a  definite objective in  m ind  and are suited to m ilita ry  train ing, therefore the  m ilitary 
could foresee a  successfu l outcom e and could  re ly  upon  their professional know ledge. 
C ontrast th is w ith  po lic ing  duties for w hich  the m ilita ry  w ere ill-suited  and ill-prepared. 
N aturally  K F O R  w ould  feel m uch m ore com fortable w ith  the tasks tha t conform ed to 
their original m ilitary  ro le, so w hen applying the m ilitary  ethic w e can  see that K FO R  
w ould  have less reason  to  be pessim istic. The inheren t conservative realist approach 
defined by H untington  w ould  have been  satisfied  by the freedom  that K F O R  enjoyed in 
their pursuit o f  the e lection  security, as K F O R  could  approach  their objectives in  a 
direct m ilitary fashion, and no t feel constrained by  civ ilian  expectations as they  w ould 
w ith policing. The au thorisation o f  w eapons for po litic ians is an exam ple where 
m ilitary judgm en t w as accepted, i f  not agreed w ith , by  the O SCE.
R egarding H unting ton’s horizontal control, the election  operations appear to validate his 
concept o f  a b racketing  effect through the jux taposition  o f  professionalism . The 
m ilitary did no t overreach into the tasks o f  civ ilian  groups sim ultaneously  present, nor 
was the m ilita ry ’s a rea  o f  expertise encroached upon. H ow ever, an obvious factor is 
that the election operations had  K FO R  at the  lim it o f  their resources, and therefore they 
could not have expanded into other civ ilian  areas o f  the e lection  process. N or does there 
appear to  be any good reason  w hy the m ilitary  w ould  even have w ished to  do this. 
They already had the  freedom  to pursue their ow n agenda for the  security  o f  the 
operation, and there w ould  be nothing o f  strategic value in  the civ ilian  aspects o f  the 
election m onitoring o r preparation. C onsider for exam ple the incident w ith  RTV  where 
the m ilitary, a lthough reta in ing  firm  control o f  the  broadcast system , sought to  escape
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from  the civ ilian  aspects covering m edia  regu lation  and developm ent. In  these 
exam ples w e can see that the m ilitary could d ifferentiate betw een various aspects o f  an 
overall process o r sector. To say that the m ilitary  w anted  to  control ju s t the m edia, or 
the election process, or hum anitarian aid in  general appears to  be quite inaccurate. To 
say that the m ilitary  w anted to retain  control o f  the  b roadcast system  o f  the m edia, or 
the security o f  elections sites and personnel, or the infrastructure used  by  hum anitarians 
is m ore accurate. B y follow ing this rationale w e can  see a pattern  w hereby the m ilitary 
w ished to  control those aspects that w ere o f  strategic im portance to  their activities or 
their ability  to  prov ide security.
In attem pting to  align this argum ent w ith  H untingtonian horizontal control w e find that 
H untington’s notion  o f  the m ilitary being com partm entalised  by parallel civilian 
professionals is underm ined w hen stated in  the broadest sense. The fact that the 
m ilitary m ay be com partm entalised is accepted insofar as they  cannot g ive professional 
advice on  w hat they  know  little of, such as their inability  to contribute to  the discussion 
o f  m edia developm ent. H ow ever, to expect relative expertise to  control o r restric t the 
m ilitary appears to  be a flaw ed expectation. The m ilitary  m ay  pursue or w ish to  control 
specific parts o f  civ ilian  operations that m ay be deem ed useful or necessary  to their 
strategic agenda, and are quite proactive in  doing so.
C h a p te r  conc lu sion
This chapter has reiterated  K F O R ’s status as an independent and expansionist actor, in 
conform ity w ith H unting tons’s parallel authority  concept and  in  contravention  o f  his 
notion o f  horizontal control. Interaction w ith the jud ic ia l system , civ ilian  police and 
local population  displayed a  m ilitary that could  ignore applicable procedures and 
continue w ith  its ow n agenda.
H ow ever aspects o f  civil-m ilitary co-operation on security  m atters show ed that K FO R  
could also be a rela tively  cooperative partner, and in  the case o f  the election operations 
was a  very  im portan t contributor. Therefore H unting ton’s parallel au thority  idea is 
som ew hat w eakened  by the fact that the m ilitary  can reconcile  i tse lf  to civ ilian  needs 
even w hen  the civ ilian  entities in question are not in  d irect control over it. W hat 
appears to  be an accurate sum m ary o f  th is behaviour is tha t in  a parallel authority
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system , the m ilitary  have the potential to  be an  independent actor, rather than  being an 
independent actor in  all cases.
O n the m atter o f  horizontal civ ilian  control w e can  see tha t the trend noted in  the first 
section is repeated  here. W here the  m ilitary  exercise their independence to  a  greater 
extent, horizontal control is less relevant and effective. In  jud ic ia l and policing  m atters 
K FO R  could  disregard  the relevant authorities and install m echanism s tha t reflected  the 
m ilitary ’s preferences over those o f  its civ ilian  counterparts. In  addition to  this, where 
the m ilitary  w as publicly  confronted on  such  m atters by  civilian groups it d id  not 
capitulate, bu t instead em ployed m ore subtle m ethods o f  persuasion. Therefore it 
appears tha t horizontal civ ilian  control has no t been  a  strong determ inant over the 
m ilitary ’s chosen  course o f  action in  these exam ples. W hen  civ il-m ilitary  co-operation 
has been  successful it also appears that the  m ain  factor o f  success w as not the broad 
presence o f  c iv ilian  entities, bu t a  successful d iv ision  o f  labour that allow ed each party 
to  contribute their expertise. A  d iversity  o f  civ ilian  entities, as evident in  the judicial 
system , does no t appear to  be by  itse lf  a  strong factor in  enforcing civ ilian  control.
123
C h a p t e r  F i v e
The Military, Parallel Structures and Internal Security
K F O R ’s interactions w ith  the parallel structures w ith in  K osovo is im portant to  the 
testing o f  H un ting ton’s theory  as the structures underm ined  the legitim acy o f  the 
international adm inistration  and represented a  pow erfu l and threaten ing  elem ent w ithin 
the province. It is no ted  that the param ilitaries w ere d ifferen t to o ther civ ilian  entities, 
bu t the  study treats them  as non-m ilitary actors for tw o reasons. They do no t conform  
to a professional m ilitary  in the H untingtonian sense (see in  particu lar 1957:32-39, 
subheading ‘The C onditions o f  P rofessionalism ’), and w hat m ilitary-style 
characteristics d id ex ist d im inished w ith the d isbanding  o f  the KLA. Therefore the 
K L A  and its offshoots, as w ell as Serb param ilitaries, are considered  civ ilian  entities 
and are subjected  to  the  sam e exam ination as civ ilian  groups.
The presence o f  param ilitary  structures has connotations for H unting ton’s parallel 
authority  m odel as the  organisations form ed a th ird  pow er structure w ithin the province 
w hich w as o fficially  under the control o f  the in ternational civil adm inistration and the 
international security  presence. I f  H unting ton’s approach  to  civ ilian  organisations 
applies w ith  param ilitary  organisations, K FO R  should  be  unrestrained w ith  the 
param ilitary  structures, and should conduct its activ ities independently  o f  param ilitary 
influence. To a  lesser ex ten t the horizontal civ ilian  control concept m ay also be 
exam ined to evaluate w hether there w as a  lim ita tion  o f  the m ilita ry ’s activities. 
H ow ever the issue in  horizontal control is not w hether K F O R  w as an expansionist actor, 
but w hether the m ilita ry ’s actions m ay have been  restric ted  or com partm entalised  by the 
indigenous structures. Furtherm ore, H unting ton’s m ilitary  ethic should  prove to be a 
valuable guide in  the m atter o f  internal security  as the  conservative realist approach 
w ould  be preoccupied  w ith  the pursu it o f  security  and rela tive  pow er.
D e m ilita risa tio n  o f  th e  K L A
A t ten  m inutes past m idnight on  21 June 1999 H ashim  Thaci, C om m ander-in-C hief o f  
the K osovo L iberation A rm y, signed the U ndertak ing  o f  D em ilitarisation and
124
Transform ation w hich  w as received on  beh a lf o f  N A T O  b y  G eneral M ike Jackson351. 
The docum ent p rovided  for ‘a ceasefire by  the U C K  [Ushtria Clirimtare Kosoves, or 
KLA], their disengagem ent from  the zones o f  conflict, subsequent dem ilitarisation  and 
reintegration into civil society .’352 A m ongst o ther prov isions the agreem ent dealt w ith 
the disposal o f  all K L A  w eapons over a period  o f  90 days and m ade C O M K FO R  
responsible for enforcing the undertaking.353 W ith in  the  90 day period  there  w ere six 
significant dates to  be observed beginning w ith  the  halting  o f  all hostile acts on  21 June, 
follow ed by  the closing o f  all fighting positions on 25 June, designation and use o f  
w eapons storage sites and assem bly areas on  28 June. Thereafter foreign KLA 
m em bers w ere to  w ithdraw  from  the  province and to  dum p their w eapons at the storage 
sites, w ith  30%  to  be in  storage by  21 July, 60%  b y  20 A ugust and com plete 
dem ilitarisation by  19 Septem ber 1999.
H ow ever, G eneral Jackson  also stressed at a  press conference later the sam e day tha t the 
docum ent w as no t an  agreem ent, bu t a  unilateral undertak ing  by the K L A  to disarm  
itse lf and he reiterated  the fact that the U ndertaking w as n o t on  a pa r w ith  the M ilitary 
Technical A greem ent.354 The U ndertaking cam e into be ing  to  satisfy paragraph  15 o f  
R esolution 1244, w hich  dem anded that the K L A  disarm  under the supervision o f  the 
international security  presence. To satisfy th is clause the  K L A  unilaterally  agreed to 
disarm  itself, and the subsequent U ndertaking w as nego tia ted  to  form alise the details o f  
the dem ilitarisation and nom inated  K F O R  to supervise the  K L A ’s com pliance. It was 
G eneral John  Reith, the com m ander o f  A FO R , and no t G eneral Jackson w ho negotiated
ir e
m ost o f  the docum ent.
One problem  w ith  the  arrangem ent for dem ilitarisation  w as that it allow ed K FO R  to 
w ash their hands o f  responsibility  for the K L A  disarm am ent. W hen asked by the m edia 
how  crucial it w as for the K L A  to com ply w ith  the U ndertak ing  G eneral Jackson  replied 
‘I m ake no qualification  about com pliance ... they  have m ade an  undertaking, they  have 
signed it, they  have given it to  m e and I have received  it, it is as sim ple as that. They
351 Jackson, Lt. General Sir Mike, 1999, KFOR: Providing security for building a better future for 
Kosovo, NATO Review, No. 3, Autumn, p.19, Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990620a.htm, N.B. On the NATO site it states that the agreement was 
signed on 20 June, however Jackson writes that it was signed on 21 June.
352 Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990620a.htm
353 See Appendix D
354 KFOR Press Conference by General Sir Mike Jackson, Pristina, Kosovo, 21 June 1999
355 ibid
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m ust now, and I am  sure they  w ill, uphold  w hat they  have undertaken  to  d o .’356 Further 
questions on the sam e topic received sim ilar answ ers as C O M K FO R  sim ply deflected 
the responsibility  back tow ards the param ilitaries. T his in itial behaviour appears to 
conform  w ell to  H unting ton’s m ilitary ethic. K F O R  did  n o t im pose them selves upon 
the KLA , preferring instead to supervise the undertak ing  ra ther than  enforcing it. The 
actions o f  K F O R  could be construed as pacifist, insofar as a  pa th  o f  least resistance was 
adopted. This is no t to argue that the U ndertaking w as an  easy  com prom ise, bu t instead 
points ou t that m ore vigorous pow ers w ere availab le to  the m ilitary. A lthough 
technically  G eneral Jackson’s response w as correct, bo th  the U ndertaking and 
R esolution 1244 did em pow er K FO R  to have a  far m ore proactive ro le  in  dealing w ith 
K osovar A lbanian  m ilitants. H ow ever the p revailing  attitude o f  G eneral Jackson and 
subsequent K F O R  com m anders on this issue eventually  cam e hom e to roost at a later 
date.
Initially  how ever elem ents o f  K FO R  appeared to  be tak ing  a  tough  stance w ith  the K LA  
prior even to the signing o f  the U ndertaking. K F O R  stated  in  m id-June that any action 
by the K L A  or any o ther group calculated to  raise ten sion  in  the province w ould  be 
regarded as unacceptable.357 This stance w as supported  by  actions on  the ground w hen 
U S K FO R  disarm ed 168 K L A  m em bers in the U rosevac area, and w ere described by
•ICO
the m edia as be ing  ‘rather s tem ’ due to  the fact tha t they  frisked  the param ilitaries. 
W hen K FO R  w as asked  w hether this w as ‘the righ t w ay  to  go about i t ’ a  m ilitary  
spokesm an replied
I w ould  say it is exactly  the right w ay to  go abou t it i f  th a t is the decision and the 
opin ion  o f  the local m ilitary com m ander on the  g ro u n d ... G eneral Jackson has 
m ade it quite clear that he supports the operational decision  o f  his subordinate 
com m anders to  ensure that there are no th reaten ing  o r law  and order issues in
i • 359their sector.
356 ibid
357 SEC.FR 526/99, OSCE Task Force on Kosovo, Activity Report, 16-17 June 1999, 18 June [Restricted]
358 SEC.FR 526/99, OSCE Task Force on Kosovo, Activity Report, 16-17 June 1999, 18 June 
[Restricted], Transcript of Press Conference by Lt Col Robin Clifford, KFOR, Pristina, Kosovo 18 June 
1999
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The arms collection from  K LA  members went ahead quickly and on 20 June KFOR 
confiscated 1300 mortars and 560 landmines from  the K L A  in  Pec.360 On 2 July, four 
days after the firs t deadline in  the Undertaking, KFOR stated that there was ‘broad 
compliance’ by the K LA  and reported that seven truckloads o f weapons had been 
collected from the paramilitaries. In Orahovac 136 weapons were handed in and the 
local K L A  commander told KFOR had that 100% o f K L A  weapons for that area were 
now in KFOR hands.361 A  meeting o f the Joint Implementation Commission (JIC, set 
up by the Undertaking to monitor demilitarisation) on 5 July repeated the message o f 
broad compliance and reported that 1700 small arms and some 190 anti-personnel and 
anti-tank mines were held at the KFOR controlled Weapons Storage Sites, w ith 4380 
K LA  members in  designated assembly areas.362 Although there were periodic instances 
where KFOR forcib ly disarmed or detained K LA  members, the Undertaking was 
finished ahead o f schedule.
The final Joint Implementation Council meeting between the UCK and KFOR 
was held at HQ KFOR yesterday. Gen Ceku presented his report on UCK 
compliance to Gen Jackson and announced that the UCK had handed in  its 
weapons ahead o f their self-imposed deadline o f 19 September. There are now 
over 10,000 UCK weapons held in the Secure Weapons Storage Sites.363
Regarding a Huntingtonian perspective on this matter we can see that m ilitary 
independence from  the international c iv ilian  presence was exercised in  dealings w ith the 
KLA . The demilitarisation o f this irregular force was done through a bipartite 
settlement w ith little  input from  those outside the m ilitary or param ilitary forces. The 
Undertaking that was produced was in  many ways a favourable arrangement for KFOR, 
as they could claim  that the responsibility fo r ultimate disarmament o f the K LA  lay w ith 
the K L A  itself. This allowed the m ilita ry in  certain respects to water down the 
obligations contained w ith in  the Resolution 1244 and to have a much less proactive role 
in  disarming. Representatives from the civilian  presence, fo r example U N M IK  or the 
OSCE, did not appear to have much input into the demilitarisation process. Despite this 
it is d ifficu lt to say whether stronger c iv ilian  oversight o f KFOR would have produced a
360 SEC.FR 538/99, The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo, Period covered 19-21 June 1999,22 June
1999 [Restricted]
361 KFOR Press Statement by Major Jan Joosten, 2 July 1999, Pristina, Kosovo
362 KFOR Press Statement by Lieutenant-Commander Louis Gameau Pristina, Kosovo 7 July 1999
363 KFOR Press Statement by Major Roland Lavoie, KFOR Spokesperson Pristina, Kosovo 17 September
1999
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different outcome. Although it may be tempting to th ink that greater civ ilian  input 
could have forced the m ilita ry into a more proactive role, the fact remains that 
exigencies on the ground may not have allowed for much leeway, and that the 
agreement reached represented the lowest common denominator achievable. What is 
equally fa ir to say however, is that the lack o f c iv ilian  input in  such negotiations 
deprives civilians o f equal representation, regardless o f whether their concerns can be 
addressed or not. Therefore the basic answer is that it  cannot be known what effect 
greater civ ilian  oversight would have had upon the disarming o f the K LA . Practically 
however, it  is clear that this was one activity conducted independently o f civilian 
influence, in  line w ith  the Huntingtonian concept o f parallel authority.
While the demilitarisation programme was being wrapped up negotiations were ongoing 
regarding the formation o f a civilian corps to replace the K LA . Talks involving Thaci, 
Ceku, Jackson and Kouchner went on and the o ffic ia l deadline was extended by 48 
hours to accommodate the discussions.364 Agreement was secured on 20 September 
about role and structure o f the K L A ’s c iv ilian  replacement, the Kosovo Protection 
Corps. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana hailed the agreement as a ‘milestone for 
the ongoing implementation efforts’ o f the international community in  Kosovo. On 
21 September General Jackson o ffic ia lly  accepted the K L A ’s fu ll compliance w ith the 
terms o f the Undertaking and confirmed that the dem ilitarisation programme was 
complete.366
However, behind the media hype whipped up by the completion o f the undertaking 
were some ominous signs. Journalists questioned whether the 10,000 weapons handed 
in constituted the total number held by the K LA , and also noted that many o f the 
weapons at collection centres were ‘ in  poor condition or virtual antiques’ .367 The 
civilian replacement force also contained an armed element. Under the new plans for 
the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), 200 small arms were to be made available for 
personal security.368 These were being drawn from  a pool o f a further 2000 weapons 
held in warehouses under the protection o f KFOR for use by the KPC.369 The crest for
364 KFOR Press Statement by Major Roland Lavoie, KFOR Spokesperson, Pristina, Kosovo 20 
September 1999
365 KLA deal a ‘milestone’ for peace, BBC, 21 September 1999
366 KFOR Press Update by Major Roland Lavoie, KFOR Spokesperson Pristina, Kosovo 21 Sept. 1999
367 KLA deal a ‘milestone’ for peace, BBC, 21 September 1999
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369 KLA signs transformation into UN-approved civilian force, B92, 21 September 1999
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the KPC was sim ilar to the old K LA  insignia and even the name o f the KPC, Trupat 
Mbojtëse të Kosovës (TM K) meant either Kosovo Protection Corps or Kosovo Defence 
Corps in  the Albanian language. According to one group General Jackson was well 
aware o f this ambiguity but accepted it  in  the interests o f securing an agreement.370 
The Kosovo Serb community on the other hand did not accept the KPC as anything 
other than a renewed version o f the K LA , and their representatives w ithdrew from the 
Kosovo Transitional Council in  protest against the transformation and the deteriorating
• 371security situation.
Although established by an U N M IK  Regulation in  September 1999, the Kosovo 
Protection Corps o ffic ia lly  came into being upon the inauguration o f 46 key leaders on 
21 January 2000. Prior to this time a 90-day plan was installed to facilitate the 
transition from  K L A  to KPC. They included a selection process, provision o f ID  cards 
and wages, building o f HQs and the creation o f training courses for key personnel. 
Based on the French Sécurité Civile the KPC consisted o f an active corps o f 3000 
members and an auxiliary branch o f 2000, w ith 10 percent o f its members to be from 
m inority communities.373 Although Bosniacs, Roma and Turks did jo in , the KPC was 
boycotted by the Serbian community.
Considering the relatively high independence that KFOR demonstrated from the 
international c iv ilian  presence, and to a lesser extent the police presence, the m ilita ry ’s 
engagement w ith  the K LA  is noteworthy. Unsurprisingly the m ilita ry appeared to be 
much more m indful o f their relationship w ith  one o f the parties to the original conflict, 
to which the NATO bombing was the conclusion. However, Huntington’s parallel 
authority model does not appear to be accurate in this regard. Even though the K LA  
were not a m ilita ry in  the strict sense, KFOR did not appear to be an uncompromising 
partner in  the way it was w ith other groups.
370 What happened to the KLA?, 3 March 2000, International Crisis Group Balkans Report No. 88, 
Pristina/Washington/Brussels
371 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim administration in Kosovo, 
S/1999/1250,23 December 1999
372 Bailey, Brigadier Jonathan, Chief Joint Implementation Commission, 2000, M ilitary] Operations] 
U[rban] T[errain] Operations in Kosovo, February -  October 1999 KFOR, RAND 22nd March 2000
373 UNMIK/REG/1999/8,20 September 1999 Regulation No. 1999/8 on the establishment of the Kosovo 
Corps, UNMIK Press Briefing Transcript, 21 January 2000,UNMIK Spokeswoman Ms Nadia Younes, 
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Huntington’s m ilitary ethic appears to offer a better guide in  this regard as the m ilita ry ’s 
actions were pessimistic and pacifist. By recognising the local power and potential 
danger o f the K LA  to the safety o f the international presence, KFOR were 
demonstrating their realist or power-oriented nature. Another factor which may have 
influenced the level o f co-operation between KFOR and the K L A  was the extent to 
which the engagement was institutionalised by Resolution 1244. Whereas the 
resolution was scant on the details o f the interaction, in  the same manner in  which it was 
scant about the nature o f KFOR’s support to the international c iv il presence, the 
difference regarding the K LA  was that a process o f disarmament was set in  motion. 
This process in  turn necessitated negotiation and accommodation o f a level that 
engagement w ith  some other civ ilian  organisations would not have required. However, 
even w ith in  such a framework KFOR had to choose certain courses o f action, and in 
this respect Huntington’s m ilitary ethic is a useful guide.
KFOR’s interaction w ith the K LA  is also significant to the horizontal control concept. 
Typically throughout the study the horizontal control model has been shown to be an 
insignificant or weak factor in  defining civilian  control over the m ilitary. However, 
when examining the development o f the KPC we can see that the horizontal control 
model is much stronger. In  technical terms the province did not need the KPC as it 
already had a high m ilitary presence in KFOR, and one that would be able to act in a 
c iv il protection capacity i f  required. In addition to this since Kosovo was to remain a 
part o f the FRY, it could be argued that there was no need to duplicate the capabilities 
o f the Yugoslav m ilitary. However, practically the KPC came into being to siphon o ff 
an armed body, and in this respect KFOR would not, or was unw illing to, enforce a 
simple dissolution o f the KLA . KFOR was lim ited in  its choice o f actions and this 
therefore represents control akin to horizontal control. O f course the K LA  were not a 
civ ilian  group in the typical sense, and this is a moderating factor. However, their very 
presence did form  a boundary to the freedom o f action that KFOR enjoyed w ith other 
civilian actors, and therefore the horizontal control model has increased va lid ity in this 
regard.
U ltim ately KFOR’s hands o ff attitude to K LA  dem ilitarisation came back to cause 
greater problems for the international security force. In  December 1999 general search 
operations o f KPC assembly areas revealed a number o f unauthorised ligh t weapons and 
ammunition. Although at the time it  was unclear whether these weapons were part o f
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an unauthorised weapons depot or confiscated arms from  Yugoslav m ilitary and police 
units, COMKFOR asked Commander Ceku to observe the relevant regulations on the 
establishment o f the KPC.375 Worse was to come. On 17 June 2000 KFOR discovered 
four bunkers o f weapons and ammunition near the village o f Klecka in the Drenica 
valley area o f the province, the contents o f which were staggering.
Six large truckloads o f explosives and ammunition estimated to be over ha lf a 
m illion  rounds were removed from the facility . KFOR explosive and weapons 
experts have been working around the clock to inventory and prepare the items 
for destruction. The yield o f the firs t two [o f four] bunkers has been estimated 
to be large enough to fu lly  outfit two heavy-infantry companies, eliminate the 
entire population o f Pristina and destroy 900 - 1,000 tanks.376
Publicly KFOR expressed delight at the find, on one level justifiab ly presenting it as a 
blow against extremism and violence throughout the province. Brigadier Richard 
Shirreff, Commander o f MNB Centre stated ‘The discovery o f this cache o f weapons 
has removed dangerous tools o f aggression from the hands o f extremists. This is one 
more step that we are attempting to stop violent activity by any ethnic group operating 
in Kosovo’ .377 He gave a more candid response to the BBC when he said that it was 
‘ inconceivable that the KPC knew nothing o f the weapons cache’ . KFOR 
Commander Lt. General Juan Ortuno was content to give a more non-specific 
evaluation.
W hile KFOR troops are engaged in  continuous operations to search for such 
weaponry and munitions, today's find is the largest since KFOR's arrival in 
Kosovo. As such, it  represents a major success in  the on-going battle o f ridding 
Kosovo o f illegal weapons. It is in  the interest o f a ll Kosovar citizens to come 
forward w ith  information that m ight lead to further discoveries o f weapons. 
Elim inating the tools o f violence can only help to stabilize Kosovo, and assist in
17Q
building a peaceful and prosperous future.
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However, the haul was an embarrassment to KFOR. The Drenica area was described as 
one o f the two areas which ‘can be seen as the historical core o f the K L A ’, due to the 
fact that Hashim Thaci, one time leader o f the K LA , hailed from  the same region as did 
his strongest supporters.380 The fact that such quantities o f high-grade weapons were 
found in  the immediate v ic in ity  o f the former K LA  headquarters led to the inescapable 
conclusion that they were K LA  material. This was later confirmed by MNB Centre 
who stated that ‘KFOR Intelligence experts have considerable evidence to link the 
weapons in the bunker to UCK [K LA ] units operating during the war’ .381 Despite this 
the former K L A  Chief-of-S taff and commander o f the KPC Agim  Ceku refuted any 
knowledge o f the weapons. He then exploited KFOR’s sensitive approach to the 
disarming process by reminding them that KFOR had in  the past stated its satisfaction 
that the K LA  had demilitarised in line w ith the Undertaking.382 A t the same time 
rumours were circulated by the Kosovo Albanian local community that Serb m ilitary 
forces, prior to leaving Kosovo, stored the weapons and ammunition for later use. This 
was dismissed by KFOR.383
This episode reinforces the va lid ity o f Huntington’s m ilitary ethic. Although KFOR 
believed that K L A  members had been stockpiling weapons, they chose to portray the 
incident in  less specific terms. By doing so they did not confront the possibility o f the 
KPC posing a latent param ilitary threat w ithin the Balkans, and thus were in conformity 
w ith the pessimist, pacifist and power-oriented values o f the m ilitary ethic. Although 
the K LA  had gone away in  name it was apparent that the apparatus for a Kosovo 
Albanian extremist organisation to rearm en masse was intact. The KPC retained the 
core o f K LA  personnel and they retained in  their v ic in ity  large amounts o f weapons and 
ordnance. In line w ith  a pacifist and pessimistic outlook, KFOR’s delicate and offhand 
approach to the Undertaking had therefore satisfied a politica l objective but had not 
dealt w ith  the central issue o f demilitarising. In the wake o f the arms find, members o f 
the Kosovo Serb community, who never had any doubt that the K LA  had simply 
assumed another name, accused the KPC o f planning and coordinating terrorist 
activities. The moderate Serb National Council cited the discovery as proof that the
380 What happened to the KLA?, 3 March 2000, International Crisis Group Balkans Report No. 88, 
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KPC had been secretly stockpiling weapons and rubbished claims by Ceku and other 
senior KPC officers that they had been unaware o f the arsenal.384
Whether or not the KPC entire were co-ordinating the terrorism that was being 
perpetrated against ethnic m inorities across the province was d ifficu lt to te ll. What was 
apparent however, was that the KPC wished to retain the ab ility fo r an armed role and 
the persistence o f reappearance o f arms both in large hauls and on individual members 
o f the KPC supports this. Certainly in  the period between the end o f K LA  
demilitarisation and the o ffic ia l inauguration o f the KPC, many KPC members were 
involved in  illegal activities across the province, including acts o f intim idation and 
violence, although much o f this may have been due to the transition that was in force. 
Regarding KFOR’s pessimistic and pacifist reactions to the KLA/KPC  problems, there 
were practical reasons for them not to take on a more confrontational role.
KFOR responded to this situation w ith  a policy o f what m ight be described as 
tolerant confrontation. I f  they knew there were armed bands about they would 
go and round them up, but they did not actively set out to smash the KLA . K LA  
regional commanders were allowed to roam about in  uniform . K LA  black- 
shirted police were not much harassed. In a ll these circumstances, there was no 
obvious alternative: a policy o f open confrontation would have carried a high 
risk o f degeneration into an occupying-force vs guerrilla-band shooting war.
Essentially the m ilita ry had to tread carefully in  Kosovo so as not to become the next 
target o f the KLA . Whereas one m ight say that this did not properly fu lfil the 
obligations upon KFOR demanded by Resolution 1244, it  is also evident that other 
options were in  short supply.
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Overall we can see that the KFOR’s relations w ith  the K L A  were quite different to 
those it  had w ith  other c iv ilian  organisations. The pattern previously established, where 
KFOR was an independent and expansionist actor, appears to be reversed w ith the 
presence o f an armed group. The independence derived from  the parallel authority 
defined by Huntington did not appear to be as strong when the m ilita ry had to engage in 
a process w ith  a param ilitary organisation. Correspondingly, horizontal control appears 
to have been strengthened as KFOR found itse lf lim ited in  its freedom o f action w ith the 
KLA. Huntington’s m ilita ry ethic also appears to be even more valid once KFOR found 
themselves facing an armed group, which although not hostile as such, had the ability to 
become a significant danger to the international presence.
Kosovo A lbanian pa ra lle l structures
The disarming o f the K LA  was only one area in which the international community 
attempted to lessen the power o f illegitim ate organisations. Parallel government 
structures belonging to the K LA  and others were also in  existence and formed a 
challenge to the authority o f the international community in  Kosovo. The significance 
o f these bodies to Huntington’s concepts o f parallel authority, horizontal control and the 
m ilitary ethic is high as the bodies were less o f an overt threat than the K LA  yet s till 
demanded more delicate handling than other non-m ilitary entities. KFOR’s reaction to 
these civilian  strongmen reflects the pattern established in  its dealings w ith  the KLA, 
and apparently emphasises the importance o f relative power w ith in the relationship.
According to a UN report ‘The security problem in  Kosovo was largely a result o f law 
and order institutions and agencies... Crim inal gangs competing for control o f scarce 
resources are already exploiting this vo id .’387 Whereas many gangs from Albania proper 
had indeed entered Kosovo388, the U N ’s assessment was only partially accurate as many 
o f the competing groups described as crim inal gangs were in  fact K LA  members 
attempting to strengthen their hold on the province. In  late June the OSCE noted that 
the Serb withdrawal and the absence o f an international c iv il administration in Kosovo 
had le ft a void that the K LA  was fillin g  at an increasing rate. They reported that the
387 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 
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structures being created by the Kosovo Albanian paramilitaries could also become 
d ifficu lt to dismantle and replace w ith an internationally led administration at a later 
date. General Jackson agreed w ith this assessment, i f  perhaps in  less explicit terms.
KFOR’s arrival also coincided w ith a pretty brutal shift in  the balance o f power. 
The atmosphere was extremely volatile. KFOR’s advance was carefully 
synchronised w ith  the withdrawing Yugoslav forces to avoid a m ilita ry vacuum, 
but it was not so easy to f i l l  the void left by the departing administration.390
The concept o f parallel governments in Kosovo was nothing new as Serbian repression 
o f the provinces autonomy had led to Ibrahim Rugova’s LD K  setting up its own 
elections and administration in 1992.391 This ‘Government o f the Republic o f Kosova’ 
was joined in A p ril 1999 by a new entity, the ‘Provisional Government o f Kosova’ led 
by K LA  commander Hashim Thaci.392 Though a relative newcomer, the K L A ’s 
government structures were established in  27 out o f the 29 municipalities that existed at 
that time.393 Although each tried to avoid open confrontations w ith  the other, ‘A t times 
these structures, as w ell as rival factions o f the K LA , seemed on the verge o f an intra- 
Albanian armed conflict’ .394 This conflict ultim ately did manifest itse lf through the 
violence o f the 2000 municipal elections, where LD K  candidates were intim idated and 
attacked.
W hile Rugova’s administration in the past had dealt w ith education and health 
matters,395 the provisional government was involved w ith  more robust exercises 
including security and policing matters, bringing them into conflict w ith  KFOR and the 
UN administration. In August 1999 the provisional government criticised KFOR for 
not having done enough to eradicate alleged secret Serb forces in  Kosovo and to disarm 
a ll Serb civilians in  the area. They claimed that Serb param ilitary groups were
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operating together w ith  Russian troops and misusing KFOR uniforms and KFOR 
insignia in  order to mistreat Kosovo Albanians. K L A  members and the provisional 
government’s m inister fo r reconstruction, Jakup Krasniqi, also criticised KFOR and 
U N M IK ’s confiscation o f buildings.396 More directly the K L A ’s police forces, the 
black shirted Policia Ushtareke (PU), were involved in protection rackets and 
intim idation.
...according to many reports they are the agency used to collect ‘voluntary’ 
contributions from  businesses for the K L A ’s local administrations. And there 
have been persistent reports that the PU have been involved in  extortion from 
businesses, burning o f Serb houses and expropriation o f flats and businesses.397
Certainly reports o f the extortion were confirmed in Dragas by the OSCE almost a year
qQ0
after the international community had entered the province. However it was also 
noticed that not a ll o f the PU’s activities were selfishly motivated. In late 1999 there 
were increased reports o f the PU (and also KPC) arresting suspects and handing them 
over to U N M IK  and KFOR for tria l. KFOR and U N M IK  police did not appreciate this 
and often detained the arresting individuals themselves.399 KFOR’s reaction to the issue 
o f parallel structures and illegal policing was in itia lly  tough and along w ith disarming 
the paramilitaries they also evicted them from  public buildings that they had 
occupied.400 A fter detaining four Kosovo Albanians who had been in possession o f PU 
identity cards while they had been evicting Kosovo Serbs from their homes a KFOR 
spokesperson stated that ‘As the responsible force for law  and order in  Kosovo, KFOR 
w ill not tolerate any crim inal act that it  encounters. A t present it is the only legitimate 
policing force and w ill remain so until the international police unit is fu lly  
operational’ .401
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In  reality KFOR’s response to illegal policing differed according to the circumstances 
and produced correspondingly different results. In  some instances KFOR refused even 
informal contact w ith  PU members in  order to avoid a misunderstanding concerning the 
legitimacy o f their activity. According to the OSCE there were few problems w ith 
illegal policing in areas where KFOR had taken a tough stance and closed down known 
stations in  Pristina, Kosovo Polje, Stimlje, Glogovac and O bilic.402 PU stations were 
also searched for weapons in  Pec and across other areas o f Kosovo.403 By contrast none 
o f the PU stations had been closed down in  L ip ljan and even by March 2000 they 
operated openly. The reason for tolerance in  some areas and not in others, however, 
was linked to the lack o f o ffic ia l police manpower. The OSCE recommended three 
actions to be taken to combat illegal policing throughout Kosovo. Raising U N M IK 
Police manpower, instigating alternative solutions such as neighbourhood watch 
schemes, and adopting a zero tolerance approach province-wide. The last measure 
more than anything else, they believed, would end illegal policing w ithout any adverse
404consequences.
Overall Huntington’s parallel authority model is partially recognised w ith reference to 
the problems o f unofficial policing. KFOR did take a strong stance w ith unofficial 
units, perhaps too strong in  certain cases, in  most areas o f Kosovo. In other areas 
however, unofficia l units were allowed to continue their illegal activities. The 
difference in  reaction was due to the resources available to KFOR and the international 
community. The va lid ity o f Huntington’s parallel authority concept in  this respect 
therefore appears to be dependent on the level o f resources available to the international 
presence at large. Although the m ilita ry ’s reaction to illegal policing would obviously 
be influenced by the approach o f the local commander and the general attitude o f the 
contingent in  question, the overall trend in Kosovo appeared to reflect a desire in this 
instance to assert KFOR’s status as the ultimate security force w ith in  the province.
In relation to the horizontal control approach, the experience o f U N M IK  police is worth 
recalling here. Although a particular relationship did develop between the civilian
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police and the m ilitary, it  was clear that the m ilita ry generally had more authority. In 
addition to this the m ilita ry was an expansionist actor, developing its own expertise to 
enforce its authority w ith in  policing tasks. Given these factors, it  is not surprising that 
KFOR were not inclined to indulge attempts at an unoffic ia l policing service. The 
fragmented organisation o f these paramilitary police forces, their lack o f recognition 
from  the international community (by comparison to the K LA , KPC and KPS) and their 
varying local support meant that they occupied the bottom rung regarding security 
organisations in Kosovo. Resources rather than threat appeared to be the lim iting  factor 
to KFOR’s reactions in this case. Correspondingly, when considering Huntington’s 
m ilitary ethic, one m ight suppose that the m ilita ry would have disdained a confrontation 
and ignored the illegal policing. However, these irregular police never constituted the 
latent threat that the K LA  did, and therefore KFOR could be fa irly  confident o f 
establishing their authority w ithout a province-wide backlash.
However, as can be seen w ith KFOR’s treatment o f the K LA , the m ilitary were careful 
in  choosing their battles. Combating misdemeanours committed by some K LA  
personnel was a m inefield o f d ifficulties due to the influence and genuine popularity 
which extremist elements o f the Kosovo Albanian param ilitary structures often held. In 
one incident reminiscent o f many sim ilar occurrences, adverse public reaction closely 
followed attempts by KFOR to arrest Kosovo Albanian m ilitants.
Yesterday in  M NB East KFOR soldiers searched a building in Gniljane, 60 
people were in  the building, some o f them wearing UCK uniforms. During the 
search 15 to 20 small caliber weapons, batons, clubs, knives as w ell as 
mattresses, uniforms and a surplus o f m ilita ry gear was found. 60 individuals 
were arrested. Later that day 50 persons were released and 10 persons were 
detained at Camp Bondsteel.405
Other reports contained a different version o f events. The building in  question was 
purportedly a K LA  dorm itory and in addition to the weapons it also contained what was 
described as a torture chamber. It was also reported that while they were searching 
KFOR troops were surrounded by an angry crowd and only 9 out o f 30 individuals
‘,05 KFOR Press Briefing delivered by KFOR Spokesperson Major Jan Joosten, Pristina, Kosovo, 11 
August 1999
138
could be detained.406 The day after the raid saw demonstrations carried out by Kosovo 
Albanians to free the detainees. According to KFOR’s statement the demonstration was 
started by the 50 people who had been arrested but who were later released. The 
demonstrations attracted several hundred people who were only dispersed at the 
beginning o f curfew.407 W hile the exact details o f the events are not in  perfect 
alignment, the difficulties o f a confrontation between KFOR and some Kosovo 
Albanian m ilitants are clear. Whether the subsequent protests fo llow ing the detention 
o f the 9 or 10 suspects were orchestrated in fu ll or in  part, it  s till displayed the latent 
power o f the radical element o f the Kosovo Albanian community at the grassroots level. 
This power was matched at higher politica l levels, and dealing w ith  the political 
representatives o f the radical element was no less d ifficu lt.
Part o f the problem w ith the power o f the parallel structures was that the UN-led interim 
administration was established at a relatively late stage. Although the Kosovo 
Transitional Council (KTC) was firs t convened in  July 1999 to give the main political 
figures an input into the UN interim  administration, it  was a ‘po litica l consultative 
body’ and not an executive body.408 It wasn’t until 15 December 1999 that a body with 
administrative powers was set up. Even then the Joint Interim  Administrative Structure 
(JIAS) did not replace the parallel systems, but attempted to integrate them.409
... UNM IK's work had been hampered by the activities o f parallel structures in 
Kosovo, which are to be transformed or integrated into the new Joint Interim 
Administrative Structure by 31 January when the JIAC becomes operational.410
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Therefore the parallel structures were not being dismantled, but were fitted into to an 
U N M IK umbrella leaving Kosovo Albanian politica l leaders w ith  a solid base o f 
influence.
On 7 January 2000 Hashim Thaci complained in the Interim  Adm inistrative Council (a 
subsidiary o f the JIAS) about alleged harassment by U N M IK  police and KFOR. The 
complaint followed three isolated security incidents over a short period o f time 
involving himself, his fam ily and his parallel government headquarters.411 On 4 
January 2000 KFOR soldiers and U N M IK  Police entered the home o f Gani Thaci, 
Pristina businessman and elder brother o f Hashim, after he was seen shooting a gun. 
Inside they discovered two unregistered guns and the equivalent o f D M  1,000,000 (over 
€500,000) in  foreign currency.412 Gani was charged w ith  illegal possession o f arms, but 
was released by a Pristina prosecutor who stated that a police investigation had 
determined than no further detention was required. The next day Xavit Ferizi, a 
personal bodyguard o f Hashim Thaci was arrested in a combined UNM IK/KFO R search 
for illegal weapons in  a Pristina café. The bodyguard was carrying a weapon for which 
he had been issued w ith  an authorisation card, but at the time o f detention the card was 
w ith KFOR for renewal. M r Ferizi was released a few hours later.413
In an U N M IK  statement on the arrests issued on 5 January Bernard Kouchner stated 
that there was no lin k  between the two incidents. According to U N M IK  the arrest o f the 
bodyguard was part o f a routine check for weapons. Regarding Gani Thaci, Kouchner 
stated that no conclusions should be drawn from his fam ily lin k  to Hashim. ‘ In a 
democracy, individuals are judged by their own actions, which have no bearing or 
reflection on the reputation o f any other fam ily members.’414 Two days later UN 
policemen entered the courtyard o f Hashim’s own home, apparently w ithout reason.415
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Whether this unusual run o f incidents was a coincidence or some kind o f intim idation 
tactics being used against the Thaci fam ily, as Hashim later complained, it backfired 
against the international community. When Hashim Thaci raised the issue in the IAC 
he threatened to withdraw from  politics altogether.416 Obviously worried by the threat 
and the instability that it  m ight cause, U N M IK  and KFOR took sw ift action to placate 
the Thaci fam ily and General Reinhardt and SRSG Kouchner both gave a public 
apology for the unwarranted action. In addition to this they also issued a follow-up 
directive making a ll actions against individual members o f the IAC  by KFOR and 
U N M IK  dependent on the personal authorisation o f COMKFOR and the SRSG 
respectively.417 This was an embarrassing climb down fo r the international community 
who days before had stated that the security forces had simply followed routine 
procedure. Now the security forces appeared to be in  the wrong and the leaders o f 
KFOR and U N M IK  were, by comparison to other incidents where individuals and 
organisations had voiced grievances against the m ilita ry and c iv il presence, bending 
over backwards to accommodate the Thaci fam ily.
Again the trend noted before, where horizontal control was weak and m ilitary 
independence strong, is reversed here. The presence o f a powerful politica l figure w ith 
links to param ilitary organisations and genuine popular support was an obviously 
lim iting  factor to the KFOR’s actions (and those o f U N M IK). This displays horizontal 
control o f sorts, where the m ilita ry ’s freedom o f action was in  part defined by the leader 
o f a civilian  group who had no direct authority over KFOR. The political power 
wielded by Thaci and his followers was a sufficient lever to compel the m ilitary and the 
international c iv il presence to deliver preferential treatment. The extent o f this 
treatment, where local commanders now had to seek permission from COMKFOR 
before taking action against IAC members, completely undermined the authority o f 
KFOR w ith in  the province. The actions o f the m ilitary forces were now firm ly wedded 
to po litica l considerations w ith in  Kosovo. Following on from  this we can see that 
Huntington’s concept o f parallel authority is correspondingly much less relevant here. 
Thaci, and those he represented, were able to force concessions from KFOR and 
U N M IK  despite his relatively lim ited authority w ith in the o ffic ia l structures.
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Huntington’s m ilita ry ethic is again a useful concept in  understanding KFOR’s reactions 
to the power politics o f Kosovo. The conservative realist outlook, pacifist and power 
oriented, describes accurately KFOR’s attitudes in  this matter. Thaci’ s withdrawal from 
politics would have caused instability in  the province, probably leading to violent 
confrontations between KFOR and Kosovo Albanian civilians who supported Thaci. 
From this perspective, KFOR’s decision to placate Thaci was one calculated to bring 
greater stability and less confrontation, and therefore less danger to the m ilitary.
In another incident concerning a leading politica l figure w ith a powerful K LA  
background, KFOR became embroiled in  a row w ith  Ramush Haradinaj, a political 
leader o f a recently founded riva l party to the PDK. According to various accounts 
Russian KFOR soldiers and international police stopped a vehicle containing Haradinaj 
at a checkpoint near Malisevo on 23 May 2000. The vehicle contained weapons for 
which Haradinaj and his associates did not have a valid W AC and KFOR subsequently 
attempted to detain them. Haradinaj attempted to flee w ith  his weapon and attacked a 
Russian soldier in  doing so, but was overpowered and taken into custody w ith a slight
• • 418injury.
The fallout after this incident was considerable in both po litica l and security terms. For 
days after the incident several media outlets in  Kosovo carried articles questioning the 
integrity o f certain elements o f KFOR.419 On 24 and 25 May confrontations occurred 
between KFOR and unidentified Kosovars which resulted in  in jury to several KFOR 
soldiers. Russian KFOR bases (highly unpopular in  general w ith  the Kosovo Albanians 
due to be lie f that Russian mercenaries had helped Serb forces during the recent war420) 
were attacked w ith  rocket grenades and automatic gunfire, while a large crowd gathered 
in  Prizren on 26 May to protest KFOR’s actions.421 The incident was also used by 
several po litica l parties to revive the notion that KFOR was biased against former K LA  
commanders and party representatives referred to previous incidents where Hashim 
Thaci and Agim  Ceku were stopped and searched at KFOR checkpoints. The protests
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in the Dukangjini area o f western Kosovo where Haradinaj was a former K LA  
commander were a clear indication o f the support that he commanded in  the area and in  
Pec shops were forced to shut in  a demonstration o f solidarity and loyalty.422
A  statement by U N M IK  on 27 May outlined the international community’s reaction to 
the event. KFOR was investigated to determine ‘that a ll KFOR units behaved in  a 
professional manner and according to the standard rules o f procedure’ . SRSG 
Kouchner stated that he had personally conveyed his concern over the incident to M r 
Haradinaj and also countered the allegations that individual KFOR and law enforcement 
officials (meaning those that were Russian) were biased against Kosovo Albanians, as 
suggested by the KPC.423
Whereas Haradinaj did not enjoy exactly the positive response that Thaci did, it is worth 
noting that his transgression was much greater. By attacking KFOR soldiers and 
transporting unauthorised weapons KFOR was le ft w ith  little  option but to detain 
Haradinaj. To do otherwise would have reflected an image o f total surrender to the 
Kosovo’s stronger po litica l figures. However, the fact that KFOR was subsequently 
investigated after this incident is also noteworthy, considering the m ilitary 
transgressions o f a far more serious nature, such as the k illin g  o f A vn i Hajredini, were 
overlooked. This outcome strengthens the horizontal control argument as it displays 
how a political figure o f Kosovo, one who was not even a member o f the interim  
structures, could s till be the catalyst fo r inspection o f the m ilita ry ’s procedures. This 
intrusion also erodes the parallel authority concept defined by Huntington as it shows 
how the m ilitary could be subjected to outside interference by those not directly 
connected to it.
Huntington’s m ilita ry ethic is less useful in  this respect w ith regard to the outcome o f 
this incident simply because each course o f action carried serious risks. I f  the m ilitary 
had ignored Haradinaj’s transgressions it  would have exacerbated the general security 
situation by signalling that KFOR was too intim idated to take on local strongmen.
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On the other hand, the detention o f Haradinaj led to violent attacks being carried out 
against KFOR along w ith  other destabilising incidents. Overall, there was no path o f 
least resistance for the m ilita ry in  this regard. The m ilita ry ethic would dictate the 
KFOR would have calculated the various outcomes and selected a course o f action, or 
inaction, that would have safeguarded their personnel and authority. However, when 
the outcomes are equally unpalatable, the m ilitary ethic is o f less use in explaining an 
outcome.
Organised o r Unorganised Terrorism ?
W hile these incidents displayed the influence and po litica l power o f Kosovo Albanian 
parallel government structures, it  does not by itse lf answer the most contentious issue, 
whether these parallel structures were actively engaged in  a terrorist campaign against 
the Kosovo Serb and other m inority communities. This question, although not directly 
relevant to Huntington’s concepts o f civ ilian  control and authority, is quite interesting 
as an example o f the m ilita ry ’s reaction to a complex security problem on the ground. 
By examining these reactions through the concept o f the m ilita ry ethic we can see again 
how specific values w ith in  the conservative realist outlook appear to be underscored by 
KFOR’s activities. Referring back to KFOR’s reactions to other incidents w ith those 
w ith  param ilitary links, it  is unsurprising that KFOR eschewed a fu ll frontal attack on 
residual param ilitary structures. In  line w ith  the pessimistic, power-oriented and 
pacifist outlooks described by the m ilitary ethic, KFOR advanced w ith  a cautious and 
relatively low-key attitude. V iolent incidents were treated as the exception to the rule 
and as the work o f lone or isolated cells or individuals and o ffic ia lly  KFOR and the 
international community played down any suggestion o f an organised terrorist 
campaign.
Naturally it  was not in  the politica l interests o f the dominant NATO members involved 
in Kosovo to accept the possibility that the K L A  or its one-time associates m ight be 
involved in  the murder o f Serb civilians remaining in  the province. I f  so it  would reveal 
that parts o f the Kosovo Albanian community, whose cause had been championed by 
NATO, were no better than the demonised Serbian forces that NATO had assisted in  
driving out. This would give additional grounds fo r the argument that western countries 
had used the Kosovo incident simply to further their own politica l agendas in the region
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and that humanitarian concerns were much less important than NATO had argued. On 
the ground level these politica l pressures combined to give two practical effects. I f  
NATO countries were to retain credib ility they would have to protect the Serb 
community to the best o f their ab ility and thus appear even-handed. The other effect 
was that KFOR was obliged to play down the existence o f any centrally organised 
terrorist element that m ight be present in  the Kosovo Albanian community.
Now yesterday General Jackson met the Yugoslav religious leaders to 
underscore KFOR’s determination to make Kosovo a safe place for everyone 
and he joined w ith Patriarch Pavle, Bishop Artemeus and Bishop Artimeus to 
reassure the Serb communities on that score. In Urosevac German commanders 
are meeting w ith  the local Serb community leaders at the moment to reassure 
them that it is safe to remain. Elsewhere KFOR commanders are establishing 
contacts w ith leaders o f all the communities to urge restraint in  what is s till a
t »1 • • 424very volatile situation.
The conditions o f the Serb and other m inority communities in  Kosovo was periodically 
documented by the OSCE and UNHCR, who released eight reports during the research 
period. The executive summary o f each available report reiterated the same message, 
stating that the overall situation for m inorities was precarious and remained volatile.425 
O f principal concern was the fate o f Serb and Roma communities, but other minorities 
included Gorani, Muslim  Slavs, Turks, Croats and Cerkezi, Ashkaelia and Egyptian. 
Kosovo Albanians were also considered a m inority group in parts o f northern Kosovo. 
The insecurity o f these groups throughout the province was reflected in their liv ing 
conditions, w ith  little  or no freedom o f movement for the m ajority o f those confined to
enclaves. This in  turn negatively affected their ab ility to sustain themselves
economically or socially.
424 Transcript o f Press Conference by Lt Col Robin Clifford, KFOR, Pristina, Kosovo 18 June 1999
425 Preliminary Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, 26 July 1999, Overview of 
the Situation o f Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, 3 November 1999, Assessment of the Situation of the 
Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, Period covering November 1999 through January 2000, UNHCR/OSCE 
Update on the Situationof Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, Period Covering February through May 2000, 
Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, Period covering June through September
2000, Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, Period covering October 2000 through 
February 2001, Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, Period covering March 2001 
through August 2001. See OSCE website http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/
N.B. the second report from September 1999 was not available during the research period
145
The methods by which the Kosovo Serbs and other m inorities were brutalised and 
intim idated often suggested a systematic approach that appeared to be supported and 
directed by an organised group. The distinction between organised and sporadic 
violence was described by General John Craddock, commander o f the US forces in 
Kosovo. In answer to a question from the media as to whether revenge attacks were 
planned or not, Craddock replied,
Both. I would te ll you there are occasions where it appears there is a refugee 
that is Albanian who has returned to find the home gone- everything they had in 
life  gone, or they find part o f the house left, but a ll the goods are gone. Then 
they discover some o f the fam ily property is in  the homes o f Serbs; whether or 
not these Serbs took it or not is irrelevant. They could have been dropped o ff by 
retreating VJ or MUP. The fact is then they want to take the law  into their own 
hands, and they do. So we've found that. We've also found occasions where it 
appears that it was organised. It appears there were groups, both Serb and 
Albanian, who had an intent and a plan and then they set out and they actually 
executed that plan - poor choice o f words - but they actually conducted that plan 
and they went out to k ill someone and that's exactly what they d id ... But the 
latter is an actual intent. It's an organised effort. And indeed, that is occurring 
here, especially in the Albanian/Serb demographical areas.426
However, when asked i f  local K LA  commanders were involved in the orchestration o f 
violence, General Craddock said that he didn’t believe they were, although he revealed 
that they were tight-lipped on the matter. ‘They say nothing. They w ill not talk either 
way about that, other than they w ill put it  in  a positive context. As long as they 
[m inorities] did not participate, then they have nothing to fear. That is a ll you w ill 
get.’427
Other methods o f a more systematic nature were also documented. Abuses committed 
over property were a particularly widespread phenomenon for a number o f reasons. 
A fter the war in  Kosovo there was a shortage o f housing due the damage caused mostly
426 Department of Defence News Briefmg, August 5, 1999 - 2:00 p.m., Brigadier General John Craddock, 
Commander Task Force Falcon
427 ibid
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by destruction o f Kosovo Albanian homes and property,428 and this subsequently led to 
competition for what housing remained. Revenge and ethnically motivated attacks 
against m inorities conducted after the war also took the form  o f house burnings and 
arson. A  UNHCR spokesperson gave the follow ing account o f how Kosovo Serbs were 
being evicted from  their homes.
In  general there's a disturbing pattern that's arising in  the method o f intim idation 
used against Serbs s till in  the city. First a warning letter is received ordering 
them to leave their homes. Then the threat is delivered in  person followed a few 
days later by physical assault and in some cases even murder. In  addition, 
increasing numbers o f Serbs are being forced to sign letters transferring the 
rights to their property, to Albanians, before they flee.429
Even more disturbingly, evictions were also carried out to facilitate broader economic 
motives such as the construction o f commercial enterprises. Illegal construction was 
subsequently described as one o f the major problems across Kosovo by an OSCE report 
on the property crisis in  the province.430
One aspect o f illegal construction is building work carried out on land that is 
illegally occupied. This is o f major concern when abandoned homes belonging 
to ethnic m inorities are burned down or otherwise destroyed, and illegal 
constructions on the site begin almost immediately. Such incidents appear to be 
rising, particularly in  Prizren, indicating an organised pattern [emphasis added
t 431in  report].
But the most extreme violations carried out against m inority communities involved the 
premeditated murder o f groups o f people across the province. The worst example o f 
such an attack w ith in  the research period was the k illin g  o f seven Serbs and wounding 
o f 43 (ten critica lly) in  an attack upon a weekly convoy from  Serbia into Kosovo. The 
blast completely destroyed the firs t bus in  a seven-vehicle convoy carrying 200 Kosovo
428 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, The Kosovo Report, Oxford University 
Press, New York, p.72-75
429 KFOR Press Briefing Delivered by KFOR Spokesperson, Major Jan Joosten Pristina, [including 
statement by Ron Redmond, UNHCR spokesperson] Kosovo 11 August 1999
430 OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 25 September 2000, Background Report, The Impending Property Crisis in 
Kosovo
431 ibid, p.4
Serbs, which was escorted by KFOR. The command detonated device consisted o f 
approximately 150 pounds o f explosives and le ft a crater o f 120m2. The explosive was 
believed to have been locally manufactured and detonated by a remote control wire 
device located in  an abandoned house approximately 600 metres away.432 This was the 
second attack on a Kosovo Serb convoy travelling from  Serbia proper. On the 13 
February 2001 a sniper attack was conducted against another convoy leaving one person 
k illed  and three injured.433
Many o f these incidents required systematic planning and in  some cases substantial 
capital investment and fam iliarity w ith particular weapons, and as such are unlikely to 
be the work o f anything less than an organised group. Although a mafia type group 
could very like ly  be involved w ith evictions and illegal construction, the systematic 
attacks on Kosovo Serbs and other m inorities were highly unlikely to have come from 
any group other than organised terrorists. Nor are the perpetrators like ly  to be any other 
ethnicity than Kosovo Albanians. However although it is also quite like ly the 
aggressors were once part o f the K LA  does not necessarily mean that they retained a 
direct lin k  to individuals such as Hashim Thaci or Agim  Ceku. Those involved in 
terrorism may easily have split o ff from the main part o f the K L A  and formed their own 
networks. Some commentators believe that the terrorist element may be the remainder 
o f the old K LA  that was not siphoned o ff into politics, the KPS or the KPC, and instead 
becoming a fourth branch involved in organised crime and violence.434 K LA  or not, the 
terrorist element formed a much more substantial threat than what KFOR publicly 
acknowledged.
KFOR’s reaction to the ongoing incidents o f m inority persecution was very much in 
line w ith the qualities o f the m ilitary ethic. In  addition to pessimistic, power-oriented 
and pacifist tendencies, KFOR’s actions could also be construed w ith in  Huntington’s 
more specific statements. According to the summary o f the m ilitary ethic, the m ilitary 
stress the supremacy o f society over the individual and the importance o f order, 
hierarchy and division o f function. Certainly when offering public statements on 
terrorist activities KFOR often emphasised the position o f community and political
432 SEC.FR 91/01 OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Spot Report: Attack on KFOR-Escorted Kosovo Serb 
Convoy, 19 February 2001 [Restricted], Convoy attack kills seven, B92 News, 16 February 2001
433 SEC.FR 91/01 OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Spot Report: Attack on KFOR-Escorted Kosovo Serb 
Convoy, 19 February 2001 [Restricted], Killing sparks riots in Kosovo, B92 News, 13 February 2001
434 What happened to the KLA?, 3 March 2000, International Crisis Group Balkans Report No. 88, 
Pristina/Washington/Brussels, p.i
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leaders, and drew attention to the necessity fo r communities to do more against their 
radical elements. This approach closely follows the ideal o f the m ilita ry ethic as it  
supports the greater bodies, such as communities and institutions, at the expense o f what 
it describes as lone or outside elements, such as those involved in  violence or extortion. 
Conversely the approach does not place any value upon the strong links between the 
radical elements and their communities, or the be lie f that that sections o f the community 
would feel themselves to be represented by those involved in  violence. By doing so 
KFOR also reinforced the m ilitary ethic’s division o f function, as it  emphasised the 
importance o f the opinions o f those represented at the top o f the hierarchy, fostering the 
notion that they knew best. In  February 2000 when Kosovo’s collective religious 
community condemned violent and intolerant acts, KFOR stated that
KFOR is convinced that the vast m ajority o f the people in  Kosovo fu lly  support 
the words o f the religious leaders and that it is only a relatively small number o f 
crim inals who actively try to undermine the process o f peace and reconciliation 
w ith  their violent activities.435
The fo llow ing month KFOR described those who had shot and killed  a Russian soldier 
as ‘ some crim inal elements’ and ‘ a few terrorists’ , and continued to understate what was 
in reality a far more serious threat.436 This was the standard KFOR reaction to the 
terrorism, to crim inalise those who perpetrated the acts while at the same time 
underplaying the ab ility  and scale o f the real threat. The words ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism ’ 
were not frequently used, and only then in connection w ith  particular incidents rather 
than describing the systematic violence perpetrated by one ethnic group towards 
another. For KFOR the preferred term was ‘crim inal’ , and this referred to most 
transgressions, even i f  it  were assassination or intim idation based upon clearly ethnic 
grounds. Whether this crim inalisation o f Kosovo Albanian terrorists was part o f a 
PSYOPS (psychological operations) campaign run by KFOR, or simply a particular 
choice o f words in  broader PR campaign, cannot be defin itive ly answered without 
reference to restricted m ilitary documents.
However, i f  PSYOPS were being employed, it  would certainly not be without 
precedent. As early as 1970 a British counter-insurgency expert who was deployed to
435 KFOR News Update by Lt.-Col. Henning Philipp, KFOR Spokesperson Pristina, 18 February 2000
436 KFOR News Update by Lt.-Cdr. Philip Anido, KFOR Spokesperson Pristina, 2 March 2000
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the North o f Ireland wrote that the emphasis in counter-insurgency operations would 
‘ swing away from  the process o f destroying relatively large groups o f armed insurgents 
towards the business o f divorcing extremist elements from  the population which they 
are trying to subvert.’437 Furthermore the incorporation o f PSYOPS into peace 
enforcement mission is actively encouraged. According to some PSYOPS should be 
incorporated into missions where protecting m inorities is a key dimension, where it w ill 
‘ communicate the importance o f ending support to belligerent factions’ and ‘encourage 
identification to the local authorities o f violators and/or agents o f the belligerent 
factions’ . Certainly KFOR’s public statements were certainly in  line w ith such 
directives, as they constantly reiterated the necessity o f people co-operating for a better 
future, and focusing the blame upon the ‘small m inority ’ who were involved in 
violence. KFOR’s response to a number o f violent incidents in  November 2000 
displays a ll o f the recommended messages.
These incidents, whether ethnically, po litica lly, or crim inally motivated, coming 
so soon after the firs t free elections in  Kosovo's history, are a stain on the honor 
o f a ll citizens o f this region. Such cowardly acts run counter to the aims o f 
KFOR and the m ajority o f the people o f this sector, who are working w ith great 
determination for a better future for Kosovo. Communities must take 
responsibility fo r bringing crim inals to justice, and must take action against 
violence wherever it occurs.439
Although it  can be argued that the use o f PSYOPS or PSYOPS-type measures gave 
KFOR an extra ‘stick’ to use against Kosovo Albanian terrorist groups, such a line o f 
reasoning would be o f little  comfort to the Kosovo Serb community who were on the 
receiving end o f prolonged terrorist action. Political comments and ground level 
realities continued to be very far apart.
437 Kitson, Frank, 1971, Low Intensity Operations, London, Faber p. 199
438 Bonn, LTC Keith E., Baker, MSG Anthony E., 2000, Guide to Military Operations Other Than War, 
Tactics, Techniques & Procedures for Stability and Support Operations, Stackpole Books, Philadelphia, 
p. 147
439 KFOR News Update by Major Steven R. Shappell, KFOR Spokesman Pristina, 07 November 2000
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On 10 May 2000 the KTC issued a ‘Political Statement on Tolerance’ that called on the 
FRY authorities to allow  the unconditional hand-over to U N M IK  o f all Kosovo 
Albanians and members o f other Kosovo communities held in  Serbian prisons. In what 
was hailed by the SRSG as the most important KTC meeting so far, fo r the firs t time 
both Kosovo Albanian and Serb representatives strongly condemned the crimes and 
violent acts during and after the war on Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, as w ell as 
Kosovo’s m inority communities. Kosovo Serb KTC representative Rada Trajkovic, 
welcomed this firs t confirmation o f the violation o f Serb human rights.440 General 
Ortuno also added his own support.
These enlightened commitments by the leaders o f Kosovo's administration are 
most v ita l for the rebuilding process, I wholeheartedly add my voice, and the 
influence o f every KFOR peacekeeper, to the call fo r an immediate end to the 
destructive cycle o f revenge and violence against fe llow  citizens.441
However the ground level realities were a far cry from  the tolerant attitudes being 
espoused those at the executive level. In  the weeks prior to the statements being made 
attacks were conducted against Kosovo Serb homes in  the mixed village o f Cernica (a 
grenade injured six people in  a shop442) and the Kosovo Serb village o f Gmcar in  the 
Gnjilane. The Kosovo Serb saw the attacks as yet another failure by KFOR to provide 
adequate security and to carry out proper investigations into the attacks. Their 
frustration reached breaking point and demonstrations occurred in  Grncar and Vrbovac 
against KFOR which in  each case led to stone throwing against the troops in which one 
US soldier was injured. KFOR troops guarding a Serbian Orthodox Church were also 
surrounded and attacked. W ith the Kosovo Serb’s patience worn so thin the OSCE 
ominously warned that the situation for minorities would have to be improved soon or 
KFOR would find itse lf becoming a target for more lethal attacks than stone 
throwing.443
440 SEC.FR 254/00, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Weekly Mission Report No. 20/2000, 1 0 - 1 6  May 2000, 
18 May 2000 [Restricted]
441 KFOR News Update by Lt.-Cdr. Philip Anido, KFOR Spokesperson Pristina, 11 May 2000
442 KFOR News Update by Lt.-Cdr. Philip Anido, KFOR Spokesperson Pristina, 10 May 2000
443 SEC.FR 254/00, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Weekly Mission Report No. 20/2000, 1 0 - 1 6  May 2000, 
18 May 2000 [Restricted], KFOR News Update by Lt.-Cdr. Philip Anido, KFOR Spokesperson Pristina, 
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In the short term the situation became worse and the turm oil on the ground was 
reflected at the political level. The firs t anniversary o f the end o f NATO bombing led to 
a surge o f violence against Kosovo Serbs, leaving eight k illed  and eight wounded. The 
SNC suspended their participation as observers in  the IAC  and KTC in  protest, and 
Bishop Artem ije wrote to the President o f the UN Security Council demanding a 
condemnation o f Kosovo Albanian terrorism. He also criticised the UN and NATO and 
requested concrete guarantees for improved security.444 Although NATO Secretary 
General Lord George Robertson declared in  the same period that the International 
Community would not tolerate ethnic violence (a common refrain) his words carried 
even less weight than usual. Attacks on Russian KFOR continued on a daily basis in 
Malisevo m unicipality between 31 May and 6 June 2000.
Overall we can see how KFOR’s statements on terrorist attacks m irror closely the 
values w ith in  the m ilitary ethic. They were non-confrontational, avoiding any 
references that m ight recognise the terrorist problem as one that was widespread, deep 
rooted or representative o f a wider fo llow ing than a few  wrong-minded individuals. 
Instead they sought to emphasise the negative aspects o f terrorist action and by doing so 
divorce the radicals from  their broader base o f support. This approach was a middle 
ground approach, calculated against the outcomes o f more or less vigorous tactics. Had 
KFOR been more critical o f the Kosovo Albanian po litica l structures there would have 
been a greater risk o f confrontation. Had KFOR been less critical terrorist activities 
would have been even more widespread. From this perspective the m ilitary were 
conforming to conservative realist behaviour, calculating the relative risk to the relative 
gain and remaining conscious o f the latent power o f those connected to the radical 
elements. In addition to this, KFOR’s tactics also reflected the deeper philosophies 
w ith in Huntington’s m ilita ry ethic. The primacy o f o fficia ls, institutions and broader 
communities was stressed, while those acting outside o f these groups were criminalised. 
An aspect worth considering here is also the virtue o f obedience, which Huntington 
notes is exalted among the m ilitary, and it could be argued that this attitude would feed 
the desire o f the m ilitary to denigrate those independent o f recognised or o ffic ia l 
structures. However, the weakness o f the m ilitary approach was evident in KFOR’s 
refusal to accept that those perpetrating terrorist attacks and extortion were operating 
w ith a degree o f consent from  their community. Therefore, while the statements may
444 SEC.FR 300/00, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Weekly Mission Report No. 23/2000, 31 May -  6 June
2000, 9 June 2000 [Restricted]
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have had some impact in  divorcing radicals from  the mainstream, the statements o f the 
m ilitary portrayed the problem o f ethnic violence in a fashion that was contrary to 
reality in  a number o f aspects.
Kosovo Serb para lle l structures
Problems w ith parallel structures were not exclusively confined to the Kosovo Albanian 
community, the Kosovo Serb community after the war also had its own authorities, 
albeit far more localised. Nowhere were these stronger than in the divided city o f 
M itrovica. A  city o f 60,000 people w ith in  a m unicipality o f 100,000, M itrovica is 
divided a two by the river Ibar leaving Kosovo Serbs in  charge o f the northern h a lf and 
Kosovo Albanians in  the south. In 2001 the OSCE estimated that northern M itrovica 
held 15,000 Serbs, more than any other enclave in  Kosovo and o f this amount 5000 
were internally displaced persons.445 The way in which KFOR dealt w ith  these 
unofficial authorities conforms to the pattern already established w ith in  this chapter. 
Huntington’s parallel authority model is o f less significance while the horizontal control 
model is correspondingly strengthened. The logic o f the m ilita ry ethic is again useful in 
understanding KFOR’ s behaviour when confronted by a hostile force, and the validity 
o f the conservative realist approach is reinforced.
Problems w ith the town began immediately after the withdrawal o f Serbian m ilitary 
forces and the return o f Kosovo Albanian refugees as the area became polarised along 
ethnic lines. Kosovo Albanian families recently returning from refugee centres in 
Albania and Macedonia now discovered that their homes remained out o f bounds, 
whilst persecuted Kosovo Serbs from outlying regions gathered in one o f the few Serb 
strongholds remaining in  the province. By 21 June 1999 journalists were asking what 
could be done to prevent the division o f the town, to which KFOR replied that the 
‘principle here is to lower tension’ .446 Practically however these developments went 
contrary to KFOR’s intended plans for the town. As NATO had o ffic ia lly  bombed the 
Serbian forces to prevent ethnic violence, to preside over a city divided upon those same
445 Municipal Profile, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, August 2001, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, Compiled by the Department of Démocratisation, Mitrovica: a divided town, BBC News, 24 June
1999
446 KFOR Press Conference by General Sir Mike Jackson, 21 June 1999, Pristina, Kosovo, SEC.FR 
549/99, The OSCE Assessment Team to Kosovo, Activity Report 24 June 1999, 28 June 1999 
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ethnic lines would be considered a failure by the m ilita ry and the international 
community and shatter attempts to create a m ulti-cultural society. O ffic ia lly  a strong 
rejection o f segregation was in  evidence. When Wesley Clark was asked on 24 June 
about the partition o f M itrovica he replied
...there w ill be no partition in M itrovica or any other o f these cities here. 
Paramilitaries are not permitted under the M ilita ry  Technical Agreement w ith 
KFOR and they have either got to stop being paramilitaries or they have got to 
leave. KFOR has the power to enforce the M ilita ry  Technical Agreement and it 
w ill do so.447
However, realities on the ground belied these statements. Whether due to a shortage o f 
manpower or poor decision-making KFOR committed a large part o f its resources to the 
Kosovo Albanian side o f the city and did not have sufficient le ft for the northern half, 
effectively surrendering it up to paramilitary control. Armed Serbs ensured that Kosovo 
Albanians could not cross the main bridge across the Ibar.448 Thereafter the grip o f the 
parallel structures on northern M itrovica rapidly tightened un til it  became a largely no- 
go area for the international community and Kosovo Albanians. It wasn’t long before 
the city, which had been described as tense on a number o f occasions by the OSCE, 
erupted into violence. By late June 1999 respective crowds o f Kosovo Serbs and 
Kosovo Albanians were gathering for protests on both sides o f the river, and by July 
KFOR was firing  warning shots to keep each side apart.449 Instead o f the enforcement 
that NATO had spoken of, KFOR engaged in more discursive tactics. KFOR, the 
OSCE and U N M IK  attempted to broker a freedom o f movement agreement for the city, 
but were unsuccessful.450 By September 1999 the paramilitaries appeared to be firm ly 
entrenched and clashes between Serb and Albanian Kosovars had intensified. The 
maturation o f the parallel structures w ithin the city was revealed by the use o f radio 
communications by both sides to orchestrate crowd activity during clashes and
447 KFOR Press Conference by NATO Secretary General, Mr. Javier Solana, General Wesley Clark and 
General Sir Mike Jackson, 24 June 1999, Pristina, Kosovo
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protests.451 In response to this deterioration KFOR issued a strong statement, 
pinpointing Serbian agitators as the root o f the problem.
Several episodes over the last few days have shown, however, worrying 
indications o f what seem to be organised Serbian attempts to deliberately 
destabilise the security situation in  Kosovo. The disturbances in  M itrovica seem 
to have been carefully orchestrated, and you w ill be aware o f reports o f Serb 
activity in  the northern and eastern areas o f Kosovo. These incidents and reports 
are taken very seriously and w ill be followed up resolutely by a ll KFOR forces. 
I f  threatened, KFOR troops w ill respond robustly and in  accordance w ith the 
Rules o f Engagement using m ilitary force i f  necessary.452
Again, despite the stem wording, KFOR did not make any serious attempts to break the 
parallel structures in  M itrovica. Weapons confiscations and arrests were continued as 
before, but w ithout a concerted effort to push the authority o f the international 
administration across the Ibar, Serbian param ilitary rule would never be seriously 
challenged.
Again we can see how Huntington’s parallel authority model is weakened by the 
presence o f strong non-m ilitary force. KFOR’s freedom o f action and their stated 
readiness to use force was undermined by the vigorous opposition o f the Serb 
community w ith in  north M itrovica. Despite the fact that KFOR was independent o f any 
structures that gave local Serbs authority over it, KFOR could not simply do as they 
pleased. The lim iting  factor to KFOR’s independence was the simple threat o f force 
which Serb paramilitaries, and local Serb civilians, could bring to bear against m ilitary 
personnel. This threat o f force was not so dangerous due to relative firepower, but due 
to its potentially devastating effect to KFOR’s reputation. I f  the international security 
presence had to meet violence w ith  violence, an uncontrolled upward spiral m ight lead 
to an outcome sim ilar to the Bloody Sunday incident in  Northern Ireland. In  a related 
fashion, the accuracy o f Huntington’s horizontal control concept appears to be much 
higher.
451 SEC.FR 744/99, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Weekly Report Nr. 10/99 8-14 September 1999,16 
September 1999
452 KFOR Press Statement by Major Ole Irgens, KFOR Spokesman, 13 September 1999, Pristina, Kosovo
155
The presence o f armed civilians, and unarmed civilians prepared to engage in  or support 
violence, meant that KFOR had a strong block in  opposition to their presence and 
authority. The previous experience, where KFOR expanded into the areas o f expertise 
o f other ^ groups was now reversed, and it  was KFOR’s relative expertise, the provision 
o f security, which was now eroded and confined by an outside c iv ilian  group.
The m ilitary ethic has a dual use in explaining the reversal o f these expectations. On 
one level it  was in  KFOR’s direct interests not to enforce their authority vigorously, due 
to the possibility o f the loss o f life. The power-oriented, pacifist and pessimistic traits 
o f the m ilitary ethic would rule out adventurous or bellicose activities that m ight induce 
greater insecurity than security. On another level, the m ilita ry ethic to which KFOR’s 
actions so often conformed was confronted w ith attitudes that seemed in direct 
opposition to m ilita ry values as identified by Huntington. The Serb community was 
aggressive, disobedient and optim istic, insofar as it was challenging a force far more 
powerful. From a Huntingtonian perspective this would mean that KFOR was facing an 
opponent that was unpredictable, as it was not conforming to values that the m ilitary 
would instinctively understand. Unpredictability would mean lack o f control and 
insecurity, which the m ilita ry would strongly wish to avoid.
To the international community, the Serbian paramilitaries who enforced the parallel 
structures became known as the ‘bridge watcher s’ after their most visible activities. One 
source places their membership at between 150 and 250 personnel and states that they 
were paid by the Serbian M inistry o f the Interior as members o f State Security, a direct 
violation o f Resolution 1244 as General Clark described it. In fact Belgrade continued 
to support the Serbs o f northern M itrovica through the provision o f administrative and 
social services.453 The bridgewatchers, just like Kosovo Albanian radical elements, 
supplemented their funds through organised crime including smuggling and 
prostitution. Funding from  the international community was also alleged to have been 
diverted from  public services to the bridgewatchers, as w ell as direct extortion. One 
local Serb leader, referring to local businesses, was quoted as saying,
453 UNMIK’s Kosovo Albatross, Tackling Division in Mitrovica, International Crisis Group Report No.
131,3 June 2002, p.3
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‘Do you see how many cafés there are on the main street? Daily, they earn DM  500. 
What is it  fo r them to give one days income?’454
W ith the authority for northern M itrovica clearly w ith in  the hands o f the paramilitaries 
and not the international community, the scene was set fo r ongoing clashes between 
Kosovo Serbs, Kosovo Albanians and KFOR. Despite the clumsiness o f the m ilita ry’s 
handling o f the situation in M itrovica in  1999, the unrest resulted in a raft o f measures 
being enacted to strengthen the ab ility o f KFOR and the international community to 
deal w ith paramilitary activity w ith in  the city. The M itrovica strategy, as the package 
became known as, included:
• The ‘safety zone’ along the river was to be expanded and additional ‘ restricted 
access’ areas w ith in  the city to be established.
• Additional checkpoints to be created and further house and premises searches 
undertaken.
• Curfew to be enforced strictly.
• Restrictions and permit requirements on public gatherings.
• Access o f persons and vehicles to M itrovica to be prohibited as necessary.
• Extremist elements to be removed from M itrovica under U N M IK  Regulation No. 
1999/2
• U N M IK  Regulation No. 2000/4 against incitement o f ethnic hatred to be applied.
• Investigation, prosecution and trials o f those suspected o f having committed 
crim inal acts to be expedited, including through immediate appointment o f prosecutors 
and judges.455
KFOR and U N M IK  now appeared to have the necessary tools to combat the 
paramilitaries, and certainly after February KFOR did take a more robust stance w ith 
Kosovo Serb m ilitancy. On 2 March 2000 preparations were made to return a number 
o f Kosovo Albanians to their homes in  the Serbian controlled area o f the city. One 
group o f Kosovo Albanians who crossed the Ibar to inspect their homes in the morning 
and met no opposition. Later on a crowd o f approximately 250 Kosovo Serbs began to 
throw stones at another group that were also visiting. French KFOR contained the
455 SEC.FR 79/00, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Spot Report: Further violence in Mitrovica, 16 February
2000 [Restricted]
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crowd while local leaders assisted in calming the crowd. Despite the altercation several 
Kosovo Albanian families expressed their desire to return to M itrovica, and the KFOR 
and U N M IK  prepared to escort them back.456 On 3 March 2000 40 Kosovo Albanians 
were escorted by KFOR back across the Ibar. Although o ffic ia l KFOR briefing gave 
spartan details o f the day’s occurrences, the incident was to prove something o f a sore 
point between international organisations.457 On returning the convoy o f Kosovo 
Albanians in KFOR armoured personnel carriers faced an aggressive crowd o f Kosovo 
Serbs who attempted to block the vehicles. KFOR used tear gas to disperse the Serb 
crowd and succeeded in  transporting the Albanians through the crowd o f demonstrators.
However, the UNHCR took exception to the actions o f KFOR due to the fact that 
m ilitary had resorted to force to effect the return and also because their organisation 
hadn’t been consulted. Not only did the UNHCR believe that KFOR and U N M IK  had 
acted recklessly in  jeopardising the lives o f the Kosovo Albanians, they also criticised 
the failure to address reciprocal returns 458 The OSCE by comparison supported 
U N M IK  and KFOR in this case as they viewed it as one o f the few examples o f positive 
and firm  intervention that the international community had shown in  the M itrovica 
region in months. The technical basis for the difference o f opinion was whether the 
return was forced or not, and according the OSCE office in  M itrovica the returns were 
voluntary, and therefore couldn’t be designated as forced despite the violence that 
ensued.459 However it  was regrettable that a clash w ith  the param ilitary authorities in  
northern M itrovica had to be spearheaded by the simple desire o f a number o f families, 
who must surely have been terrified inside the m ilitary vehicles, to return home.
Nor did the fate o f the returnees appear to fare any better over the coming months. In 
March 2000 a decision was taken to establish ‘Confidence Zones’ on both sides o f the 
bridges crossing the Ibar river. In reference to the zones KFOR stated that
This w ill improve the overall security environment and reassure the population
o f their safety. It w ill also improve freedom o f movement for those actually
456 KFOR News Update by Lieutenant Commander Philip Anido, KFOR Spokesperson Pristina, 03 
March 2000
437 KFOR News Update by Lieutenant Commander Philip Anido, KFOR Spokesperson Pristina, 04 
March 2000
458 SEC.FR 128/00, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Weekly Report No. 10/2000, 1-7 March 2000, 9 March
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liv ing  or working in  the area. Access to the area w ill be controlled w ith an ID - 
system for those liv ing  or working in  the area.460
However, during the operation KFOR used tear gas and stun grenades to repel a crowd 
o f 300 M itrovica Serbs who threw bottles and stones. Seven people were injured 
including three soldiers.461 By May 2000 the security situation had only slightly 
improved. The OSCE reported that KFOR and U N M IK  were trying to overcome the 
partition o f the city, which was described as ‘almost hermetic’ through the integration 
o f the Confidence Zones. In addition to this the Kosovo Albanians who had returned to 
three high-rise apartment buildings in  the north were now liv ing  in  a ghetto heavily 
guarded by KFOR and barbed w ire.462 Although physical improvements appeared to be 
evident on the surface, real integration o f the city remained as distant a goal as ever.
The relationship between Huntington’s parallel authority and horizontal control models 
is again emphasised w ith  regard to the M itrovica experiences. M ilita ry  independence 
and freedom o f action was curtailed by the robust opposition o f c ivilian groups. The 
actions o f KFOR and U N M IK , although more resolute and focused than before, had still 
not tackled the central problem o f the parallel structures w ith in  M itrovica. Whereas the 
security forces appeared to be somewhat less intim idated by the threat o f a backlash, 
they were by no means engaged in a direct assault upon param ilitary rule. The return o f 
refugees was a largely symbolic act, and while it  was no doubt o f politica l importance 
to the OSCE, KFOR and U NM IK, it was not any indication o f improved circumstances 
w ith in the city. The power o f the bridgewatchers hadn’t been diminished in  any 
perceivable way by July 2000 and this fact was reflected in  the sheer d ifficu lty  involved 
in detaining even one member o f the group.
On the evening o f 17 July U N M IK  police arrested one o f the bridgewatchers in 
connection w ith  an arson attack on a car owned by a Kosovar Albanian. Ten minutes 
after the suspect was transported to the U N M IK  Police station in  northern M itrovica a 
crowd o f 200 people led by O liver Ivanovic, leader o f the Serb National Council in 
M itrovica, gathered close to the station and demanded the release o f the detainee 
pending the hearing o f charges. One U N M IK  Policeman, an Indian, was taken hostage.
460 KFOR News Update by Lt.-Col. Henning Philipp, KFOR Spokesperson Pristina, 16 March 2000
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KFOR sent reinforcements to the area and closed a ll bridges across the Ibar River. 
Three shots were then fired in  north M itrovica and Kosovo Serbs then blocked the 
central square in  the city where they halted and stoned tw o ligh t KFOR vehicles. The 
commander o f the M NB North, General Sublet, then went to negotiate w ith Ivanovic. 
Ivanovic demanded the release o f the bridgewatcher, which the General refused to do 
(whether Ivanovic attempted to use the hostage U N M IK  policeman as a bartering chip 
is unreported). W hile discussions continued between the two, th irty  Kosovar Serbs 
armed w ith  baseball bats approached the area. A  KFOR unit commander ordered tear- 
gas to be used to disperse the crowd and shots were fired into the air. Sometime during 
the evening the policeman who had been taken hostage was returned to the station, led 
personally there by Ivanovic himself. Throughout the night scuffles and protests 
continued leaving at least five people injured. The suspect was eventually brought 
before an international judge the fo llow ing afternoon.463 Protests continued over the 
fo llow ing days, and the OSCE reported a number o f attacks against U N M IK Police. On 
18 July 20 Kosovo Serbs entered the apartment o f two U N M IK  Policemen, threatened 
them and forced them to hand over their pistols and radio. Later 100 Kosovo Serbs 
were reported to be looting an apartment rented by another two U N M IK  policemen and 
in  another incident an U N M IK  police car was ambushed.464 The suspect whose arrest 
originally sparked the unrest was him self released on the evening o f 18 July pending a 
court day fo r tria l.465
Overall the operation had achieved little  past inflam ing the population north o f the Ibar 
and placing the international community presence in  a precarious position that KFOR 
was unw illing to deal w ith. The kidnapping and targeting o f U N M IK  police staff 
clearly displayed the powerlessness o f the civilian  security forces in  northern M itrovica, 
which was now a no-go area. Only w ith  KFOR in  the lead could the international 
community extend its influence across the entire city. The OSCE in particular was 
incensed, and viewed the power o f the bridgewatchers as a direct consequence o f 
inadequate action by the international community. The organisation criticised the 
unwillingness to confront the paramilitaries and in particular stressed the fact that the
463 KFOR News Update by Major Scott A. Slaten, KFOR Spokesman Pristina, 18 July 2000, SEC.FR 
392/00, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Spot Report: Serious Problems in Mitrovica 19 July 2000,20 July
2000 [Restricted], Tension mounts in Kosovska Mitrovica as negotiations fail, B92 News, 18 July 2000, 
N.B. The exact chronology o f events is sometimes difficult to ascertain but when in doubt the author has 
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M itrovica strategy had never been properly implemented. O M IK  now called for a 
forceful establishment o f law and order and a review o f the entire governing system in 
the north o f the c ity  in  order to break the grip o f the Belgrade supported parallel 
structures.466 However, this path was not taken. Although SRSG Kouchner and 
General Ortuno met to discuss ways o f regaining security control in  the north, only 
immediate security concerns were to be addressed. U N M IK  Police and KFOR revised 
jo in t patrolling and enforcement plans to increase the security o f U N M IK  Police, not to 
push across the Ibar in  force.467 By August the M itrovica strategy itse lf was being 
seriously reviewed by KFOR and U NM IK. Although the OSCE was not privy to the 
details it  recommended that a vita l component o f the revamped strategy would be the 
removal o f the bridgewatchers, a move that had recently received endorsement through
« /(¿O
the A irlie  House declaration o f 23 July 2000. The declaration made by Serb and 
Albanian Kosovars representatives including Ibrahim  Rugova, Hashim Thaci, Bishop 
Artem ije Radosavljevic and Father Sava Janjic called for, amongst other items, KFOR 
and U N M IK  to confiscate a ll illegal weapons and to immediately dissolve ‘parallel 
governing and security structures’ .469 This consensus on the ground, included w ith the 
legislative and jud ic ia l tools included w ith in  a new M itrovica strategy, presented a ripe 
opportunity to crack down on the bridgewatchers. Although such a move was 
guaranteed to result in  widespread violence and unrest in  the city, to do so was the 
obligation o f KFOR under the terms o f Resolution 1244, its right under the M ilita ry 
Technical Agreement, and its duty in  accordance w ith  the collective po litica l consensus 
o f both international organisations and politica l leaders w ith in  the province.
U ltim ately however, the situation did not change. Huntington’s parallel authority 
concept, while weakened by param ilitary power, appeared simultaneously strong w ith 
regard to the m ilita ry ’s co-operation w ith o ffic ia l c iv ilian  groups and representatives. 
Although various politica l initiatives were forwarded, each foundered on the same issue, 
the reluctance o f KFOR to cross the Ibar in  force. By 2002 a reference to the 
Bridgewatchers stated that ‘KFOR and U N M IK  have not made any serious effort to
466 SEC.FR 392/00, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Spot Report: Serious Problems in Mitrovica 19 July 2000, 
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crack down on them.’470 The reasons why KFOR refused to do this appear to lie in  part 
w ith the French contingent based in  the city, whose presence and co-operation appeared 
to be problematic from  the very beginning. However, changes were d ifficu lt to effect. 
General Reinhardt had to negotiate for four months to get agreement, in  principle, for 
non-French forces to be brought into the city.471 The logic o f the French contingent by 
contrast appeared to be an extreme accentuation o f the m ilita ry ethic. They claimed, in 
the face o f criticism  about their lack o f action, that there was no m ilita ry solution to the 
situation. They argued that their mandate was to maintain calm while robust measures, 
on the other hand, would simply induce serious instability. In  short, the French were 
prepared to do nothing. Nor did there appear to be anyway to coerce the French into 
complying w ith requests for stronger action. Allegations were even made by senior 
NATO officia ls that French KFOR did not fo llow  orders issued from Brussels.472 This 
phenomenon where nations (it is presumed that the French contingent were acting under 
governmental authority, or at least relying on a lack o f government intervention) refrain 
from certain actions or operations is known as ‘red-carding’ , and is a common feature o f 
m ulti-national, especially UN, m ilitary operations.473 Red carding was often initiated 
by local commanders expressing concerns about a ground level situations, and the fear 
o f widespread French casualties in  M itrovica was a very realistic concern.
Chapter conclusion
Whereas the previous two sections have displayed the m ilita ry as an independent and 
expansionist actor in  conform ity w ith Huntingtons’s parallel authority concept and in 
contravention o f his notion o f horizontal control, this section has described outcomes 
that are entirely the reverse o f previous experiences. The m ilita ry was less independent 
in  its actions w ith  paramilitary groups, and more w illin g  to negotiate and to cooperate, 
as evidenced by the transformation o f the K LA , the accommodation o f politica l leaders 
and the hostage taking in  M itrovica. A t the same time KFOR’s dealings w ith o ffic ia l 
c ivilian groups suggested that the relationship o f independence and expansionism was
470 UNMIK’s Kosovo Albatross, Tackling Division in Mitrovica, International Crisis Group Report No.
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unchanged. One obvious factor which caused the reversal o f outcomes for Huntington’s 
concepts o f c iv ilian  control is the latent or existing threat o f violence. This stands to 
reason when examined through a Huntingtonian perspective, as it  appears logical that 
the profession which is most specialised in  the application o f violence should be 
m indful o f those who also have violent force at their disposal. Regarding c ivil-m ilita ry 
co-operation it  also appears that the threat o f violent force can have an ultimately 
paralysing effect, as witnessed in  M itrovica. It must also be noted that in  this instance 
the French contingent may simply have been exactly the wrong choice for the wrong 
city, insofar as they were less cooperative in general and stationed in an area which was 
more d ifficu lt than average. However, i f  the presence o f an armed threat is a more 
enduring problem, then it  w ill not be solved as easily as other areas o f c iv il-m ilita ry  co­
operation. Previous sections have noted the positive results when a successful division 
o f labour was achieved between various m ilita ry and civ ilian  parties. However, when 
dealing w ith  an armed threat there is no other group that can be substituted instead o f 
the m ilitary, and therefore an interchange o f roles is not possible.
163
C o n c l u s i o n
This dissertation sought to achieve two objectives w ith  regard to our understanding o f 
ground level c iv il-m ilita ry  relations. Firstly, to test the extent to which an established 
theory, in  this case the seminal work o f Samuel Huntington, can be applied in  a 
contemporary context. Secondly, by doing so, to discover whether this theory can be 
applied as, or modified to provide the basis of, a new conceptual approach to ground 
level c iv il-m ilita ry  relations. Huntington’s original thesis was that the creation o f a 
professional officer corps made the m ilitary an autonomous social institution. Once the 
m ilitary became a true profession w ith enduring peculiar characteristics it would clash 
w ith  its c iv ilian  overseers due to its conservative realist outlook and the divergence o f 
its particular expertise from  liberal democratic norms. More specifically, Huntington 
refined the concepts o f parallel authority and horizontal control.
From Chapter Three onwards we have examined how the international m ilitary presence 
reacted in  three different sectors o f responsibility. Chapter Three looked at the 
m ilita ry ’s involvement w ith  humanitarian and infrastructure tasks, concentrating on 
combined c iv il-m ilita ry  efforts to deal w ith  the Kosovo refugee crisis and the m ilita ry ’s 
interactions w ith  c iv ilian  personnel and organisations in  humanitarian and c iv il projects. 
Chapter Four examined KFOR’s co-operation w ith civilians in  the areas o f policing and 
justice, and viewed the way in which the m ilitary improvised and devised their own 
policing service as w ell as the m ilita ry ’s role in, and co-operation w ith, Kosovo’s 
jud icia l system. Chapter Five assessed KFOR’s treatment o f the province’s
paramilitary and radical groups and looked at the impact o f the m ilita ry ’s reactions to 
sectarian and ethnically motivated violence.
Parallel authority stated that the level o f authority refers to the position that the group
occupies in  the hierarchy o f the governmental authority. KFOR would have greatest
power i f  they have m ilita ry sovereignty, less i f  they do not possess authority over other
institutions and vice versa, and the least when they may be subordinate to another
institution. The concept o f horizontal control stated that the scope o f authority refers to
the variety and type o f values w ith  respect to which the group is form ally authorised to
exercise power. Horizontal c ivilian control would have been exercised against the
KFOR to the extent that they would have been confined w ith in  a lim ited scope by the
parallel activities o f c iv ilian  agencies or groups roughly at the same level o f authority.
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Huntington’s realistic and conservative m ilitary mind suggested that the m ilitary would 
seek to be as strong and as secure as possible, would be constantly m indful o f threats.
Regarding his respective concepts o f parallel authority and horizontal control, each did 
enjoy va lid ity (the former much more so than the latter) w ith in  particular circumstances, 
however they also appeared to be mutually exclusive. When examining the interactions 
between the m ilita ry and other actors, m ilitary independence did not occur w ith strong 
horizontal control, and vice versa, although the m ilita ry could act independently o f one 
actor and be simultaneously controlled by another. Huntington’s m ilitary ethic also 
appeared to be a useful interpretation o f m ilitary preferences, but was less valuable 
when applied to experiences where the m ilitary was involved in  less traditional tasks.
The m ilita ry ’s strongest assertions o f independence could be seen in  their interaction 
w ith sectors that were strategically important to them or in  those where authority was to 
be shared or divided w ith  civ ilian  entities whose interests clashed w ith those o f the 
m ilitary. An example o f the former would include critica l infrastructure, such as the 
broadcast and transport systems, while the latter included the jud ic ia l system, civilian 
police and civ ilian  organisations. However, w ith more aggressive groups the m ilitary 
was much less independent in  its actions and more w illin g  to negotiate and to cooperate, 
as displayed by their dealings w ith the K LA  and K L A  associated politica l leaders.
However aspects o f c iv il-m ilita ry  co-operation on security matters showed that KFOR 
could also be a relatively cooperative partner, and in  the case o f the election operations 
the m ilitary was a key contributor. Therefore a contemporary use o f Huntington’s 
parallel authority concept needs to incorporate the idea that the m ilitary can reconcile 
itse lf to civ ilian  needs even when the civilian entities in  question are not in  direct 
control over it. Based upon the conclusions o f this case study it  would appear that the 
m ilitary have the potential to be an independent actor, rather than being an independent 
actor in a ll cases. When c iv il-m ilita ry  co-operation has been successful it  also appears 
that the main factor o f success was not the broad presence o f civ ilian  entities, as 
suggested by Huntington’s horizontal control concept, but a number o f other factors. 
D ivision o f labour and the respective resources and recognition given to both civilian 
and m ilitary parties appear to be important factors in positive mutual accommodation. 
Where one party has the mandate but not the resources to engage w ith a particular 
problem, it stands to reason that they may sacrifice some o f their control to a second
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party in  order to avail o f that party’s greater resources. The Kosovo crisis was littered 
w ith interactions between c iv il and m ilitary groups where c iv ilian  groups were given 
the mandate to resolve refugee and reconstruction issues only to find  themselves 
dependent o f the m ilita ry ’s resource base.
Horizontal control does not appear to be significantly strengthened by a diversity o f 
purely c iv ilian  entities, nor does it appear to be by itse lf a strong factor in  enforcing 
c ivilian  control. We find that the notion o f horizontal control is not successful in 
explaining outcomes in  humanitarian assistance, refugee camp construction, provision 
o f health care and many other social programs and projects. In  jud ic ia l and policing 
matters KFOR could disregard the relevant authorities and install mechanisms that 
reflected the m ilita ry ’s preferences over those o f its c iv ilian  counterparts. In  addition to 
this, where the m ilita ry was publicly confronted on such matters by c iv ilian  groups it 
did not capitulate, but instead employed more subtle methods o f persuasion, recalling 
Janowitz’ s earlier assessment (1959:493). According to him , m ilita ry authority had 
responded to technological changes, or more accurately the in flu x  o f c iv ilian  personnel 
caused by technological changes, by transforming from  an organisation based on 
authority to one employing more and more techniques o f manipulation (Janowitz, 
1959:493). So in this regard, although horizontal control was a factor, it  was not 
particularly strong or effective. Only where civilian  groups were linked to more hostile 
elements, thereby having a greater leverage, was horizontal control a stronger factor in 
the c iv il-m ilita ry  relationship.
The enduring quality o f Huntington’s ‘ The Soldier and the State’ lies in  its focus on the 
division o f power between elite groups and its attending m ilita ry ethic, which offers a 
guide to the possible preferences o f professional officers. By examining both, it is 
feasible not just to isolate what freedom o f action the m ilita ry enjoy in  civ il-m ilita ry 
relations, but what courses o f action m ight be most amenable to the m ilita ry as a group. 
In the same way that we consider the driving goal o f a commercial company w ith in the 
market place to be profit, we can assume by Huntington’s work that the objective o f the 
professional soldier is security. However, just as the commercial company may have 
many ways to secure p ro fit in  long- or short-term strategies that may or may not work, 
so too can the m ilitary be confronted w ith many different possibilities to achieve 
security. By accentuating the values w ith in  the m ilitary ethic we can also assume that 
the m ilitary as a conservative realist group does not just wish parity o f power w ith its
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perceived enemies, it  wishes to be actively stronger. The practical outcome o f this 
attitude is that the m ilitary would resist such courses o f action that m ight weaken their 
relative strength. As displayed in  this study this attitude can translate into a reluctance 
to divert resources or surrender control o f critical infrastructure to non-m ilitary groups 
or tasks.
There are also qualifying factors for the m ilitary ethic. Although it can identify 
preferences that can be associated w ith the m ilitary in  general, that appears to be the 
lim it o f its u tility . Soldiers are not robots, and the m ilita ry ethic is not the program by 
which they operate. As previously stated, there w ill often be many options that may 
deliver higher security to those the m ilitary wishes to defend, not least themselves. 
Another aspect worth considering is that the m ilita ry operates a rig id  bureaucratic 
hierarchy where decisions w ill often come down to, in  general, a single man. In a 
standard western m ilita ry formation the actions of, fo r example, three men may be 
controlled by one corporal, nine men by one sergeant, th irty  men by one lieutenant, and 
so forth. The potential fo r deviation from the values inherent w ith in  the m ilitary ethic is 
therefore high, especially w ith  the importance o f a soldier’ s unquestioning obedience to 
the decisions o f superior officers. Therefore, while the m ilita ry ethic gives a strong 
cultural background to the preferences o f m ilitary personnel, i f  one officer were to make 
decisions that ran counter to the principles o f the m ilita ry ethic it  would sim ilarly affect 
the actions o f a ll his subordinates who are carrying out his orders. Another aspect 
which m ight lead to deviation from the m ilitary ethic as defined by Huntington is the 
possible in flux o f new values. Further examinations o f modem m ilita ry curricula may 
assist in  contemporising Huntington’s m ilitary ethic i f  broad based conclusions could be 
reached, for example the extent o f an in flux o f human rights values into western 
m ilitaries. Further studies along the lines o f those recently conducted by Franke 
(1997:33-57) and Stiehm (2001:290-291), incorporating reference to key values defined 
by Huntington, would be useful in  this regard.
On the division o f power between groups in theatre, Huntington’s concepts o f parallel 
authority and horizontal c iv ilian  control worked w ell in  many respects and point 
towards a further possible framework for understanding c iv il-m ilita ry  co-operation. 
However, the study also pointed towards other possible avenues to examine the 
structures o f authority. Regarding mandates and bodies an institutional approach could 
concentrate on the functioning o f different governing structures and develop
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explanations for the outcomes o f c iv il-m ilita ry  interaction. The bodies developed by 
NATO and the Albanian government to coordinate aid during the refugee crisis were 
examples o f ad hoc mechanisms that did not function effic iently due to their unwieldy 
characteristics. The design o f these structures was less due to po litica l motivations and 
more to a lack o f experience by the parties involved. The regime theory approach, as 
advocated by Bland (1999:7-26) should account fo r not just the structures, but also the 
incentives to comply w ith  and respect mandates, disciplinary and legal provisions. 
Certain aspects that would be o f interest to such an approach would be the conformity 
o f m ilitary actions w ith  the parameters laid down in  the mandate, such as KFOR’s 
observance o f UNSCR 1244. It stands to reason that where m ilita ry goals are not 
specified to any great degree or developed in  conform ity w ith  m ilita ry thinking, it w ill 
be correspondingly more d ifficu lt for the m ilitary to comply. This could happen either 
because the m ilitary may not be strategically positioned, trained or qualified to carry out 
their role, or because the terms o f reference for the operation are too general to act as a 
strong regime. Deviation is even more like ly  when m ilita ry forces are operating away 
from the normal institutions o f c iv ilian  oversight. The weakness o f Huntington’s 
horizontal control concept in  relation to media, legal and human rights groups in 
Kosovo shows how other institutions that would normally provide further restraining 
forces can be ignored and sidelined. According to Bland (1999:7-26) when the regime 
and the instruments o f the regime are weak, the compliance w ith  that regime w ill be 
poor, and this was certainly the case in Kosovo. To rectify such a situation, the regime 
must be one where parties have legitimate expectations o f the outcome o f dealings w ith 
one another, and have recourse to punitive measures when these expectations are not 
met. W ith in Kosovo, there were no penalties that could be levelled against KFOR by 
those w ith  a grievance against it.
However one benefit o f focusing upon authority and relative power is that it can 
account fo r relations w ith  groups who have significant unofficia l power, especially 
when the region in  question is going through a transition period. W ith reference to the 
behaviour o f param ilitary elements in  Kosovo it appears that naked force can override 
many, i f  not all, relevant structures when those who w ish to use force are sufficiently 
numerous, w illin g  and operating w ith  tacit consent from their communities. 
Furthermore, since the m ilitary are professionally inclined to pursue power and security 
it  seems logical to further examine those factors that are o f direct impact to the m ilitary, 
especially when the scenario at the ground level may be often one that requires the
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application o f violent force. Although other approaches can make valuable 
contributions, the application o f Huntington’s concepts to this study produced useful 
insights into a broad range o f activities, and not those confined to organisational or 
institutional interaction.
The less relevant concepts drawn from Huntington’s ‘The Soldier and the State’ were 
the consideration o f po litica l ideals between elite groups and the focus upon relative 
expertise. Consideration o f elite politica l ideals was dismissed at the beginning o f the 
study as unsuitable fo r a multinational force. However, the question o f expertise, which 
was tested through the horizontal control concept, was also deemed a less useful 
approach. Through this study it was discovered that relative expertise was not a 
compartmentalising factor on m ilitary activities due to authority and resource factors. 
Huntington’s remarks on expertise would serve w ell ceteris paribus, when for example 
the m ilitary occupy one department w ith in  a government o f surrounding departments, 
where each department has its mandate and responsibilities clearly defined by sector 
(health, agriculture, transport et cetera). In theatre however, the m ilitary may often be 
the most technically and organizationally advanced, favoured w ith in  the deployment 
mandate and largest in  physical size, and therefore constitute a very powerful group in 
both ab ility and authority. W ith such advantages it  is no surprise that they w ill seek to 
advance their own interests at the expense o f other groups, even i f  this means 
encroaching upon their expertise. In  other cases additional responsibilities w ill be thrust 
upon the m ilita ry due to the inab ility  o f other groups to cater fo r their own sectors. 
Healthcare in  Kosovo is one obvious example.
Another aspect worth considering in  relation to expertise is the m ilita ry ’s proactive 
nature. Although the m ilitary ethic does describe the m ilita ry as pessimistic, a 
characteristic that evidence was found to support (the alternation between static guards 
and mobile patrols is a good example), the m ilitary can also adapt and develop its 
operational procedure to better assist in  its mission. This characteristic o f adaptation is 
often not associated w ith  the m ilita ry due to its rig id  structure and its social 
conservatism. However, on an operational level the m ilita ry cannot be regarded as a 
group that is necessarily resistant to change, even i f  it  means duplication o f existing 
expertise. In fact it  can be concluded from  this study that the m ilita ry ’s willingness to 
adapt is a further extension o f pessimism, insofar as the m ilita ry want to be prepared for 
a ll contingencies. The description o f the m ilitary as a self-contained entity was never so
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appropriate as when referring to the m ilitary in  theatre. Therefore, w ith  respect to the 
results o f this study, relative expertise was much less relevant in  c iv il-m ilita ry relations 
and co-operation than the m ilita ry ’s penchant fo r control.
Regarding the question o f a new conceptual approach to c iv il-m ilita ry  relations w ithin a 
ground level context, the results o f this study show promise in  m odifying Huntington’s 
work for this type o f application. As previously stated, isolating the factors which cause 
the m ilitary to oscillate from  being a pliant partner at one point, to an independent and 
expansionist actor at another point, appears to be the most important task in  explaining 
the problems associated w ith the application o f Huntington’s theory to c iv il-m ilita ry  co­
operation. Although it  is a failure o f Huntington’s theory that his parallel authority and 
horizontal control models did not successfully co-exist, the value o f the approach is that 
the success or failure o f either model appears to be intrinsically linked. Huntington 
originally posited that the m ilitary became isolated from  civilian society w ith the 
creation o f the professional officer corps and the development o f m ilitary expertise. He 
refined this position to identify relative authority, outlook and expertise (in  addition to a 
number o f other points) as significant factors in  the determination o f c iv il-m ilita ry 
relations. Huntington’s original approach works in  an established setting, the m ilitary 
w ithin the parent state for example, as the variables are minimised and the relationship 
is well determined. In a multi-national ground level setting neither the variables nor the 
relationship are predetermined and therefore the relative significance o f each factor is 
altered. The success o f Huntington’s work is that he correctly identified factors that are 
relevant to the c iv il-m ilita ry  relationship, even i f  he did not foresee how these factors 
might separately gain more or less weight w ith in  d iffering c iv il-m ilita ry  environments. 
The Soldier and the State identified one equation o f c iv il-m ilita ry  relations, but more 
permutations o f the equation are s till possible and in  fact necessary w ith in  a 
contemporary setting.
The results o f this thesis show that Huntington’s approach can be verified w ith in  the 
context o f a ground level mission, and the methodology o f this study can be replicated 
for other experiences. I f  the same intrinsic lin k  between parallel authority and 
horizontal control is again demonstrated then we can accept the relevant factors that 
Huntington identified and the formal relationship between them. We can then begin to 
establish one coherent model capable o f explaining c iv il-m ilita ry  relations and 
interaction at the ground level by isolating those elements that give more weight to
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authority, expertise, or outlook w ith in the c iv il-m ilita ry  relationship. One apparent 
factor which has caused the reversal o f outcomes for Huntington’s concepts o f civilian 
control in  Kosovo was the latent or existing threat o f violence. From an ideological and 
practical level the specific incorporation o f the relative threat w ith in  a Huntingtonian 
approach is suitable. A  conservative realist profession, specialised in  the application o f 
violence, should be above all m indful o f those who also have violent force at their 
disposal.
In conclusion this study suggests that Samuel Huntington’s 1957 work can be modified 
to evaluate c iv il-m ilita ry  relations in  a ground level environment. According to the 
data, when m ilita ry independence from c iv ilian  parties is high, horizontal c ivilian 
control is correspondingly low. The reverse was also true. Horizontal civ ilian  control 
can also be strong, usually where there is a significant threat behind it, and when this 
occurred m ilita ry independence was correspondingly low. Overall this suggests that co­
existence in  the fie ld  w ill be d ifficu lt fo r m ilita ry and c iv ilian  parties when their 
working methodologies are so different. Whereas there is obviously shared 
responsibility, both m ilita ry and civilian parties working in  unison towards a common 
goal, it  does not mean that differences are forgotten and working methodologies 
compromised. Each party tried to remain true to its working ethic as far as possible. 
For the m ilitary, as defined by Huntington’s m ilitary ethic and supported by many 
examples in  Kosovo, this prim arily means recognising the presence and possible 
consequences o f violent action. Various civilian  groups by contrast, although 
occasionally countenancing aggressive confrontation, were more like ly  to be m indful o f 
legal or egalitarian concepts. Co-operation was successful when the needs were 
complimentary and responsibility could be divided into subsections, but friction 
occurred when responsibility was jo in tly  taken. In the latter cases the m ilita ry ’s wishes 
usually prevailed. When points o f contention arose it  was KFOR that ‘ called the shots’ 
and enforced its decisions upon the civilian  parties. Only when the m ilitary was 
threatened w ith  violence and c iv il disobedience from Kosovar radicals did it chose a 
less authoritarian approach.
C iv il-m ilita ry relations literature to date on this subject area has largely been policy 
oriented and has not employed a theoretical approach, and it has been therefore devoid 
o f a more fundamental understanding o f the forces that underpin the relationship 
between soldiers and their c iv ilian  counterparts in  ground level operations. This study
171
has successfully shown how elements o f the c iv il-m ilita ry  relationship, already 
identified and verified by previous work, may be m odified and reapplied to a 
contemporary conflict setting. In  doing so it provides a greater understanding o f the 
synergies possible between soldiers and civilians by building upon an accepted 
theoretical approach and linking it  to a modem day operation. Huntington’s work has 
been taken from  the original soldier/state context and brought ‘ into the fie ld ’ where it 
has successfully accounted for the interactions between both spheres. Given the huge 
in flux o f c iv ilian  personnel into conflict regions over the last one and a ha lf decades, 
and elevation o f c iv il-m ilita ry  co-operation concepts to the doctrinal level, it  is a tim ely 
transition.
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A p p e n d ic e s
A. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 
R E S O L U T I O N  1 2 4 4  (1 9 9 9 )
A d o p t e d  b y  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  a t  i t s  4 0 1 1 t h  m e e t i n g ,  o n  1 0  J u n e  
1 9 9 9
The Security Council, B earing  in  m ind  the purposes and princip les o f  the Charter o f  the 
U nited  N ations, and the p rim ary  responsibility  o f  the Security  Council for the 
m aintenance o f  international peace and security,
R ecalling  its resolutions 1160 (1998) o f  31 M arch  1998, 1199 (1998) o f  23 Septem ber 
1998 ,1203 (1998) o f  24 O ctober 1998 and 1239 (1999) o f  14 M ay 1999,
R egretting tha t there has no t been  full com pliance w ith the  requirem ents o f  these 
resolutions,
D eterm ined to  resolve the  grave hum anitarian  situation in  K osovo, Federal R epublic  o f  
Y ugoslavia, and to  provide for the safe and free return  o f  a ll refugees and displaced 
persons to  their hom es,
C ondem ning all acts o f  v io lence against the K osovo population  as w ell as all terrorist 
acts by any party,
R ecalling the statem ent m ade by  the Secretary-G eneral on  9 A pril 1999, expressing 
concern at the hum anitarian  tragedy tak ing  place in  K osovo,
R eaffirm ing the righ t o f  all refugees and displaced persons to  return  to  their hom es in
safety,
R ecalling the ju risd ic tion  and the m andate o f  the In ternational Tribunal for the Form er 
Y ugoslavia,
W elcom ing the general princip les on a  political so lution to  the K osovo crisis adopted on 
6 M ay 1999 and w elcom ing  also the acceptance by  the Federal R epublic o f  Y ugoslavia 
o f  the principles and the Federal Republic o f  Y ugoslavia 's agreem ent to that paper,
Reaffirm ing the com m itm ent o f  all M em ber States to the  sovereignty and territorial 
integrity o f  the  Federal R epublic  o f  Y ugoslavia and the o ther States o f  the region, as set 
out in the H elsinki F inal A ct,
R eaffirm ing the call in  prev ious resolutions for substantial autonom y and m eaningful 
self-adm inistration for K osovo,
D eterm ining tha t the situation  in  the reg ion  continues to  constitute a threat to 
international peace and security ,
D eterm ined to  ensure the safety and security  o f  in ternational personnel and the 
im plem entation by all concerned  o f  their responsibilities under the present resolution, 
and acting for these purposes under C hapter V II o f  the C harter o f  the U nited N ations,
1. D ecides that a  po litical so lution to  the K osovo crisis shall be based on the general 
principles in  annex 1 and as further elaborated  in  the p rincip les and other required
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elements in  annex 2;
2. W elcom es the acceptance by  the Federal R epublic  o f  Y ugoslav ia  o f  the  principles 
and other required  elem ents referred  to in  paragraph  1 above, and  dem ands the full 
cooperation o f  the Federal R epublic o f  Y ugoslavia in  th e ir rap id  im plem entation;
3. D em ands in  particu lar that the Federal R epublic  o f  Y ugoslav ia  pu t an  im m ediate and 
verifiable end to violence and repression in  K osovo, and beg in  and com plete verifiable 
phased w ithdraw al from  K osovo o f  all m ilitary , po lice and  param ilita ry  forces 
according to  a  rapid tim etable, w ith  w hich the deploym ent o f  the international security 
p resence in  K osovo w ill be synchronized;
4. Confirm s tha t after the w ithdraw al an agreed  num ber o f  Y ugoslav and  Serb m ilitary 
and police personnel w ill be perm itted  to  return  to K osovo to  perfo rm  the  functions in 
accordance w ith  annex 2;
5. D ecides on  the  deploym ent in  K osovo, under U nited  N ations auspices, o f  
international civil and security presences, w ith  appropriate equipm ent and personnel as 
required, and w elcom es the agreem ent o f  the  Federal R epublic  o f  Y ugoslav ia to  such 
presences;
6. Requests the  Secretary-G eneral to appoint, in  consultation w ith  the Security Council, 
a Special R epresentative to  control the im plem entation o f  the in ternational civil 
p resence, and further requests the Secretary-G eneral to  instruct h is Special 
R epresentative to  coordinate closely w ith the international security  presence to  ensure 
that bo th  presences operate tow ards the sam e goals and in  a m utually  supportive 
m anner;
7. A uthorizes M em ber States and relevant international organizations to  establish  the 
international security  presence in  K osovo as set out in  po in t 4 o f  annex 2 w ith  all 
necessary m eans to  fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph  9 below ;
8. A ffirm s the need  for the rapid  early  deploym ent o f  effective international civil and 
security presences to K osovo, and dem ands that the parties cooperate fu lly  in  their 
deploym ent;
9. D ecides tha t the responsibilities o f  the international security  p resence to  be deployed 
and acting in  K osovo w ill include:
(a) D eterring renew ed hostilities, m aintain ing and w here necessary  enforcing a 
ceasefire, and ensuring the w ithdraw al and  preventing the  return  into K osovo o f  Federal 
and R epublic m ilitary, police and param ilitary  forces, excep t as prov ided  in  point 6 o f
cxcix
(b) D em ilitarizing the K osovo L iberation A rm y (K LA ) and o ther arm ed K osovo 
A lbanian groups as required  in  paragraph  15 below ;
(c) Establishing a  secure environm ent in  w hich  refugees and d isp laced  persons can 
return  hom e in  safety, the international civil presence can  operate, a  transitional 
adm inistration can be established, and hum anitarian  aid can be delivered;
(d) E nsuring public  safety and order un til the international civil presence can take 
responsibility  fo r th is task;
(e) Supervising dem ining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take 
over responsibility  fo r this task;
(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely  w ith  the  w ork  o f  the 
international civil presence;
(g) C onducting border m onitoring duties as required;
(h) E nsuring  the  pro tec tion  and freedom  o f  m ovem ent o f  itself, the international civil 
p resence, and o ther international organizations;
annex 2;
10. A uthorizes the  Secretary-G eneral, w ith  the  assistance o f  relevan t international 
organizations, to establish  an international civil p resence in  K osovo in  o rder to provide 
an in terim  adm inistration for K osovo under w hich  the peop le  o f  K osovo can enjoy 
substantial autonom y w ith in  the Federal R epublic  o f  Y ugoslavia, and w hich  w ill 
provide transitional adm inistration w hile establishing and overseeing the  developm ent 
o f  provisional dem ocratic  self-governing institu tions to  ensure conditions for a peaceful 
and norm al life for all inhabitants o f  K osovo;
11. D ecides that the m ain  responsibilities o f  the international civil presence w ill include:
(a) Prom oting the  establishm ent, pending a final settlem ent, o f  substantial autonom y 
and self-governm ent in  K osovo, taking full account o f  annex  2 and o f  the Ram bouillet 
accords (S /1999/648);
(b) Perform ing basic civ ilian  adm inistrative functions w here and as long as required;
(c) O rganizing and overseeing the developm ent o f  p rovisional institu tions for 
dem ocratic and autonom ous self-governm ent pending  a  po litical settlem ent, including 
the holding o f  elections;
(d) Transferring, as these institu tions are established, its adm inistrative responsibilities 
w hile overseeing and supporting the consolidation  o f  K osovo 's local provisional 
institutions and other peace-build ing  activities;
(e) Facilitating a  political process designed to  determ ine K osovo 's fu ture status, taking 
into account the R am bouillet accords (S /1999/648);
(f) In  a  final stage, overseeing the transfer o f  authority  from  K osovo 's provisional 
institu tions to  institu tions established under a  political settlem ent;
(g) Supporting the reconstruction o f  key infrastructure and  o ther econom ic 
reconstruction;
(h) Supporting, in  coordination w ith  international hum anitarian  organizations, 
hum anitarian  and disaster re lie f  aid;
(i) M aintain ing civil law  and order, including establishing local police forces and 
m eanw hile th rough the deploym ent o f  international police personnel to  serve in 
K osovo;
(j) Protecting and prom oting hum an  rights;
(k) A ssuring the safe and unim peded return  o f  all refugees and d isplaced persons to 
their hom es in  K osovo;
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12. Em phasizes the need  for coordinated hum anitarian  re l ie f  operations, and for the 
Federal Republic o f  Y ugoslavia to  allow  unim peded access to  K osovo by  hum anitarian 
aid organizations and to  cooperate w ith  such organizations so as to  ensure the  fast and 
effective delivery o f  international aid;
13. Encourages all M em ber States and international organizations to  contribute to 
econom ic and social reconstruction as w ell as to  the  safe re tu rn  o f  refugees and 
displaced persons, and em phasizes in  th is contex t the  im portance o f  convening an 
international donors' conference, particularly  fo r the  purposes set ou t in  paragraph 11
(g) above, at the earliest possib le date;
14. D em ands full cooperation  by all concerned, including  the  international security 
presence, w ith  the In ternational Tribunal for the  Form er Y ugoslavia;
15. D em ands that the K L A  and other arm ed K osovo A lban ian  groups end im m ediately 
all offensive actions and com ply w ith  the requirem ents fo r dem ilitarization  as laid dow n 
by the head o f  the international security presence in  consu lta tion  w ith  the  Special 
R epresentative o f  the  Secretary-G eneral;
16. D ecides that the p rohib itions im posed by paragraph  8 o f  reso lu tion  1160 (1998) 
shall no t apply to  arm s and related  m atériel for the use o f  the  international civil and 
security presences;
17. W elcom es the w ork in  hand in  the E uropean U nion  and o ther in ternational 
organizations to develop a com prehensive approach to  the  econom ic developm ent and 
stabilization o f  the region affected  by  the K osovo crisis, including the im plem entation 
o f  a  Stability Pact for South E astern  E urope w ith  b road  in ternational participation in 
order to further the prom otion o f  dem ocracy, econom ic prosperity , stability  and regional 
cooperation;
18. D em ands that all States in  the  reg ion  cooperate fu lly  in  the  im plem entation  o f  all 
aspects o f  this resolution;
19. D ecides that the international civil and security  p resences are established for an 
initial period o f  12 m onths, to  continue thereafter unless th e  Security  Council decides 
otherw ise;
20. Requests the Secretary-G eneral to  report to the  C ouncil at regular in tervals on the 
im plem entation o f  th is resolution, including reports from  the leaderships o f  the
international civil and security  presences, the first reports to  be subm itted  w ith in  30 
days o f  the  adoption o f  th is resolution;
21. D ecides to  rem ain  actively seized o f  the m atter.
B. Communication from KFOR
KFOR MAIN
P I O  O F F I C E  
Film City 
Pristina
12 April 2 0 0 2  
D e a r  Mr D oyle
P le a s e  find th e  p a ra g ra p h  b e lo w  re fe re n c e  th e  q u e s tio n  y o u  a s k e d  on  th e  C o d e  
of C o n d u c t in K o so v o
I will h a v e  left by  th e  tim e  y o u  re c e iv e  th is  b u t p le a s e  fe e l f re e  to  c o n ta c t  th e  
P IO  office  a t  p io @ m a in .k fo r .n a to .in t if you  n e e d  a n y  th in g  e ls e .  My re p la c e m e n t  
is a  British S a ilo r  by  th e  n a m e  o f VWVTR Gillian O R R . T h e r e  a r e  tw o  p e o p le  in 
th is  office s o  I a m  s u re  you  will n o t h a v e  a  p ro b lem  rece iv in g  a n  a n s w e r . Y ou 
will r e c e iv e  a n  a n s w e r  re g a rd in g  th e  S O F A  a s  s o o n  a s  w e  k n o w  th e  s itu a tio n .
KFOR includes personnel from many different nations. Each of these 
nations brings its own unique national legal and military discipline 
policies to the operation. Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) to the KFOR 
mission retain exclusive jurisdiction over their forces throughout 
deployment in the KFOR theatre of operations. Discipline is an entirely 
National Matter. COMKFOR has requested that Commanders and Senior 
National Representatives of TCNs, publish national policies which reflects 
the guidance and is enforceable through their national disciplinary 
channels.
R e g a rd s
LW W TR M ich e le  C a rty  
P IO  A dm in
C. Correspondence with UNMIK POLICE
(Em ails in  order o f  latest first)
----- O riginal M e ss a g e ------
From: "U N M IK  PO L-PR ESS" <pol-press@ un.org>
To: <derm ot.doyle5@ m ail.dcu.ie>
Sent: Thursday, June 2 7 ,2 0 0 2  3:02 PM
Subject: Re: D ate  o f  M O U  betw een K F O R  and U N M IK
Hello,
I don 't know  o f  any  instances w hen a M O U  w as violated. H ow ever, I expect 
that any conflicts w ould  be resolved at the  Police  C om m issioner-C O M K FO R  
or SR SG -C O M K FO R  level. The objective o f  a  M O U  is to  get the  agreed 
positions in  w riting  to  reduce the potential for conflict. A  M O U  isn 't like a 
treaty or legal contract. There is a p resum ption  o f  a  desire to cooperate on 
both  sides.
B est regards,
Barry F letcher
"Derm ot D oyle" < derm ot.doyle5@ m ail.dcu.ie  on 06/27/2002 03:26:38 PM
To: "U N M IK  PO L-PR ESS" <pol-press@ un.org
cc:
bcc:
Subject: Re: D ate o f  M O U  betw een K F O R  and U N M IK  
Hi Barry,
Sorry to bug  you  again  but I have ju s t tw o m ore questions on  the M OU s.
W hat happens i f  e ither party  (K FO R  or U N C IV PO L) doesn 't respect the 
principles laid  out in  an M O U , is there any recourse for th e  o ther party?
I f  for any reason  it is found by  one party  to be im practical or
otherw ise, w ould  the SR SG  and  C O M K FO R  negotiate  a  new  one, o r w ould  it be
referred upw ards to the  Security  Council or resolved th rough  diplom atic channels?
Thanks,
D erm ot D oyle 
+353 1 700 5069
----- O riginal M e ssa g e -------
From : "U N M IK  PO L-PR ESS" <pol-press@ un.org
To: < derm ot.doyle5@ m ail.dcu.ie
Sent: Friday, June 07, 2002 3:58 PM
Subject: Re: D ate o f  M O U  betw een K FO R  and U N M IK
H ello,
There are seperate M O U s betw een U N M IK  and K F O R  regard ing  "prim acy" for 
each R egion  (5 R egions). T hey  are all sim ilar w ith  the fo llow ing  outline:
1. G eneral - T ransfers Investigative and Tactical P rim acy from  K F O R  to  U N M IK  
Police effective on  the appropriate date. N ote  that K F O R  retains overall O perational 
prim acy th roughout K osovo in  accordance w ith  the "all necessary  m eans" provisions o f 
1244, The situation continues to  evolve tow ard  a situation  m ore like the relationship 
betw een the B ritish  police and m ilitary  in  N orthern  Ire land  today.
2. Status o f  Forces - C onfirm s the im m unity o f  K FO R  personnel from  
civil crim inal prosecution. N ote  that U N M IK  Police are covered  by  the 
standard diplom atic im m unity  that U N  personnel have around  the world.
3. C ooperation - E stablishes a  Jo in t O perations Center and  describes general principles 
for jo in t operations and jo in t use  o f  facilities (such as de ten tion  centers and com bination 
U N M IK  Police/K FO R  stations).
- D efines responsibilities o f  the  respective organizations w ith  regard  to certain  issues, 
such as guarding "patrim onial sites".
- Establishes obligations for com m unication, such as advising  each  other o f  
p lanned/ongoing operations and operating policies
- C onfirm s U N M IK  Police  as the  relevant authority fo r pub lic  o rder and crim e 
investigations except in  "cases o f  special K FO R  interest". In  those cases, the two 
organizations "will com m only  agree on  the w ay ahead and  the  po in t o f  transfer o f  
authority".
I hope the above helps.
B est regards,
B arry  F letcher
"D erm ot D oyle" < derm ot.doyle5@ m ail.dcu.ie  on 06/07/2002 12:33:52 PM  
To: "U N M IK  PO L-PR ESS" <pol-press@ un.org
cciv
cc:
bcc:
Subject: Re: D ate o f  M O U  betw een K FO R  and U N M IK  
Hi Barry,
H ere's the  rem inder you  asked m e for regard ing  the  M O U 's. 
Thanks,
D erm ot D oyle
----- O riginal M e ssa g e ------
From : "U N M IK  PO L-PR ESS" <pol-press@ un.org
To: <derm ot.doyle5@ m ail.dcu.ie
Sent: Tuesday, June 0 4 ,2 0 0 2  4:59 PM
Subject: Re: D ate o f  M O U  betw een K FO R  and U N M IK
Hi,
I will check to  see how  m uch info can  be released  . It w ill take a 
few  days. R em ind m e i f  I don 't get back to  you  by  F riday  AM .
B arry Fletcher
"Derm ot Doyle" < derm ot.doyle5@ m ail.dcu.ie on  06/04/2002 04:21:40 PM
To: "U N M IK  PO L-PR ESS" <pol-press@ un.org
cc:
bcc:
Subject: D ate o f  M O U  betw een K FO R  and U N M IK  
Hello again Barry,
A bout the  M O U  betw een  K FO R  and U N M IK , can  you  te ll i f  it w as the  one signed by 
General C abigiosu and B ernard  K ouchner on 21 N ovem ber 2000? Is there  m ore than  
one m em orandum  for d ifferent operations, or are all o f  the  details contained w ith in  one? 
W ould it be also possib le  to  know  the b road  areas detailed  in  the m em orandum , or m ust 
it stay strictly confidential?
Thanks 
D erm ot D oyle 
+353 1 700 5069
----- O riginal M e ssa g e ------
From: "U N M IK  PO L-PR ESS" <pol-press@ un.org
To: <derm ot.doyle5@ m ail.dcu.ie
Sent: W ednesday, M ay 2 9 ,2 0 0 2  4:04 PM
Subject: Re: T ransfer o f  pow ers from  K F O R  to U N M IK  Police
H ello ,
ccv
It has been  a  very busy  day for us and I m ay have been  on  the phone. The m obile phone 
system  is also often overloaded and several tries are needed  to  get th rough  (M y m obile 
phone is +377-44-233-092).
Q uestions 1 & 2 w ould  be best discussed on the phone. R egard ing  # 3, there 
are M em orandum s o f  U nderstanding betw een U N M IK  and  K FO R  that define the 
d ivisions o f  responsibilities. How ever, they are no t pub lic  docum ents and are not 
available fo r inspection (sorry).
B est regards,
B arry F letcher
"D erm ot Doyle" < derm ot.doyle5@ m ail.dcu.ie on  05/29/2002 03:17:42 PM
To: "U N M IK  PO L-PR ESS" <pol-press@ un.org
cc:
bcc:
Subject: Re: T ransfer o f  pow ers from  K F O R  to U N M IK  Police 
D ear M r Fletcher,
Thanks for your speedy reply. I tried to  call you  a  m om ent ago but I couldn 't get 
through. I have som e m ore specific questions for you, bu t i f  you  th ink  they  w ould  be 
better discussed on the  phone, please send m e a  good tim e  o f  the  day to  catch  you  at.
Thanks again,
D erm ot D oyle
1. In jo in t operations, such as arrest w arran t operations, are U N M IK  police the  final 
authority  on operational procedure? A re their regulations in  p lace tha t give U N M IK  
police final au thority  in  th is type o f  po lice operation?
2. I f  K F O R  is responsible for overall security, and U N M IK  Police are responsible for 
crim e fighting, local security  etc., can  th is lead to  friction betw een  the tw o 
organisations? I f  a d ispute on authority  does arise, w ho decides w hich  organisation has 
prim acy?
3. W hat regulations o r rules are in  p lace to  determ ine the d iv ision  o f  responsibility  
betw een m ilitary  and police forces? W ould it be possib le fo r m e to receive a copy o f  
these regulations?
ccvi
D. Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by 
the UCK
U n d e r ta k in g  o f  d e m ilita r isa tio n  a n d  tra n s fo rm a tio n  b y  th e  U C K  
S igned  20 J u n e  1999
This U ndertaking provides for a ceasefire by the U CK , their d isengagem ent from  the 
zones o f  conflict, subsequent dem ilitarisation and rein tegration  into civ il society. In 
accordance w ith  the term s o f  U N S C R  1244 and taking account o f  the obligations agreed 
to at R am bouillet and the public  com m itm ents m ady by  the K osovar A lbanian 
R am bouillet delegation.
The U C K  undertake to  renounce the use o f  force to  com ply  w ith  the directions o f  the 
C om m ander o f  the international security  force in  K osovo (C O M K FO R ), and where 
applicable the bead  o f  the in terim  civil adm inistration fo r K osovo, and to  resolve 
peacefully  any questions relating to  the im plem entation o f  th is undertaking.
The U C K  agree tha t the International Security Presence (K FO R ) and the  international 
civil presence w ill continue to  deploy and operate w ithout h indrance w ith in  K osovo and 
that K F O R  has the authority  to take all necessary  action to  estab lish  and m aintain a 
secure env ironm ent for all c itizens o f  K osovo and o therw ise carry  out its m ission.
The U C K  agrees to  com ply w ith  all o f  the  obligations o f  th is U ndertaking and to ensure 
that w ith  im m ediate effect all U C K  forces in K osovo and in  neighbouring countries will 
observe the prov isions o f  th is U ndertaking, w ill refrain  from  all hostile or provocative 
acts, hostile  in ten t and freeze m ilitary  m ovem ent in either d irection  across International 
borders o r the boundary  betw een K osovo and other parts o f  the  FR Y , or any other 
actions inconsisten t w ith  the  spirit o f  U N SC R  1244. The U C K  in K osovo agree to 
com m it them selves publicly  to  dem ilitarise in  accordance w ith  paragraphs 22 and 23, 
refrain  from  activ ities w hich  jeopard ise  the safety o f  in ternational governm ental and 
non-governm ental personnel including K FO R , and to  facilitate  the deploym ent and 
operation o f  K FO R .
ccv ii
For purposes o f  th is U ndertaking, the follow ing expressions shall have the m eanings as 
described below  :
The U C K  includes all personnel and organisations w ith in  K osovo, currently  under U C K  
control, w ith  a  m ilitary  or param ilitary  capability and any  o ther groups or individuals so 
designated by  C om m ander K F O R  (CO M K FO R )
« FR Y  Forces » includes all o f  the FR Y  and R epublic o f  Serb ia  personnel and 
organisations w ith  a m ilitary  capability. This includes reg u la r arm y and naval forces, 
arm ed civilian  groups, associated  param ilitary groups, a ir forces, national guards, border 
police, arm y reserves, m ilitary  police, intelligence serv ices, M inistry  o f  Internal Affairs, 
local, special, rio t and anti-terrorist police, and any o ther groups o r individuals so 
designated by  C om m ander K F O R  (CO M K FO R).
The G round Safety Z one (G SZ) is defined as a  5-k ilom etre zone tha t extends beyond 
the K osovo province border into the rest o f  FR Y  territory . It includes the terrain  w ithin 
tha t 5-kilom etre zone.
Prohibited  w eapons are any w eapon 12.7m m  or larger, any  an ti-tank  or anti-aircraft
w eapons, grenades, m ines o r explosives, autom atic and long  barrelled  w eapons.
The purpose o f  th is U ndertak ing  are as follow s :
To establish  a  durable cessation o f  hostilities.
To provide for the support and  authorisation o f  the K F O R  and  in  particu lar to  authorise 
the K FO R  to take such  actions as are required, including the  use o f  necessary force in 
accordance w ith  K FO R 's ru les o f  engagem ent, to  ensure com pliance w ith  this 
U ndertaking and pro tection  o f  the K FO R , and to contribute to  a secure environm ent for 
the international civil im plem entation presence, and o ther in ternational organisations, 
agencies, and non-governm ental organisations and the civ il populace.
The actions o f  the U C K  shall be in  accordance w ith  th is U ndertak ing . « The K FO R  » 
com m ander in  consultation, w here appropriate, w ith  the in terim  civil adm inistrator will 
be the final au thority  regard ing  the interpretation o f  this U ndertak ing  and the security 
aspects o f  the peace  settlem ent it supports. H is determ inations w ill be b inding on all 
parties and persons.
C essa tion  o f  H o stilities
W ith im m ediate effect on signature the U C K  agrees to com ply  w ith  this U ndertaking 
and w ith  the directions o f  CO M K FO R . A ny  forces w h ich  fall to  com ply w ith  this 
U ndertaking or w ith  the  d irections o f  C O M K FO R  w ill be  liable to  m ilitary  action as 
deem ed appropriate by  C O M K FO R.
W ith im m ediate effect on signature o f  th is U ndertaking all hostile  acts by the U C K  will 
cease. The U C K  C h ie f o f  G eneral S ta ff undertakes to  issue  c lear and precise 
instructions to  all un its  and personnel under his com m and, to ensure contact w ith  the 
FR Y  force is avoided and to  com ply fully w ith  the arrangem ents fo r bringing this 
U ndertaking into effect. H e w ill m ake announcem ents im m ediately  fo llow ing final 
signature o f  th is U ndertak ing , w hich w ill be broadcast regu larly  th rough  all appropriate 
channels to  assist in  ensuring tha t instructions to  m ain tain  th is  U ndertaking reach all the 
forces under h is com m and and are understood by  the pub lic  in  general.
The U C K  undertakes and agrees in  particu lar :
ccv iii
To cease the firing  o f  all w eapons and use o f  explosive devices.
N ot to  place any m ines, barriers or checkpoints, nor m ain ta in  any observation  posts or 
protective obstacles.
The destruction o f  buildings, facilities or structures is no t perm itted . It shall no t engage 
in  any m ilitary, security , or train ing related  activities, including ground or air defence 
operations, in  or over K osovo or GSZ, w ithout the p rio r express approval o f  
CO M K FO R.
N o t to attack, detain  or intim idate any civilians in  K osovo, n o r shall they attack, 
confiscate or v io late the property  o f  civilians in  K osovo.
The U C K  agrees no t to  conduct any reprisals, counter-attacks, or any unilateral actions 
in  response to  v io lations o f  the U N SC R  1244 and other ex tan t agreem ents relating to 
Kosovo. This in  no w ay  denies the righ t o f  self-defence.
The U C K  agrees no t to interfere w ith  those FR Y  personnel th a t retu rn  to  K osovo to 
conduct specific tasks as authorised and directed  by  C O M K FO R ,
Except as approved by  CO M K FO R, the U C K  agrees th a t its personel in  K osovo will 
no t carry w eapons o f  any type :
W ithin 2 kilom etres o f  V J and M U P assem bly areas ;
W ithin 2 kilom etres o f  the m ain  roads and the tow ns upon  them  listed  at A ppendix A  ; 
W ithin 2 k ilom etres o f  external borders o f  K osovo ;
In any o ther areas designated by  C O M K FO R
W ithin 4 days o f  signature o f  th is U ndertak ing  :
The U C K  w ill close all fighting positions, entrenchm ents, and checkpoints on roads, 
and m ark their m inefields and booby traps.
The U C K  C h ief o f  G eneral S ta ff shall report in w riting com pletion  o f  the  above 
requirem ent to  C O M K FO R  and continue to provide w eekly  detailed  w ritten  status 
reports un til dem ilitarisation, as detailed in  the fo llow ing paragraphs, is com plete.
C ro ss -B o rd e r  ac tiv ity
W ith im m ediate effect the  U C K  w ill cease the m ovem ent o f  arm ed bodies into 
neighbouring countries. A ll m ovem ent o f  arm ed bodies into K osovo w ill be subject to 
the prior approval o f  C O M K FO R.
M o n ito r in g  th e  C essa tio n  o f  H ostilities
The authority  fo r dealing  w ith  breaches o f  th is U ndertak ing  rests w ith  CO M K FO R . He 
w ill m onitor and m ain tain  and i f  necessary  enfore the cessation  o f  hostilities.
The U C K  agrees to  co-operate fu lly  w ith  K FO R  and the in terim  civil adm inistration for 
K osovo. The c h ie f  o f  the G eneral S ta ff o f  the U C K  w ill ensure that p rom pt and 
appropriate action  is taken  to deal w ith  any breaches o f  th is U ndertak ing  by  his forces 
as directed by  C O M K FO R .
Elem ents o f  K F O R  w ill be assigned to  m ain tain  contact w ith  the  U C K  and will be 
deployed to its com m and structure and bases.
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K FO R  w ill establish  appropriate control at designated  crossing  po in ts into A lbania and 
the FYROM .
J o in t  Im p le m e n ta tio n  C om m ission  (JIC )
A  JIC  w ill be estab lished  in  Pristina w ithin 4 days o f  the  signatu re  o f  th is Undertaking. 
The JIC  w ill be chaired  by  CO M K FO R  and w ill com prise  the  sen ior com m anders o f  
K FO R  and the U C K , and a  representative from  the in terim  civil adm inistration for 
Kosovo.
The JIC  w ill m eet as often  as required by C O M K FO R  th roughou t the im plem entation o f 
this U ndertaking. It m ay  be called w ithout prio r no tice and  represen tation  by the U C K  is 
expected at a level appropriate w ith the rank o f  the K F O R  chairm an. Its functions will 
include :
E nsuring com pliance w ith  agreed arrangem ents for the  security  and activities o f  all 
fo rc e s ;
The investigation o f  actual or threatened breaches o f  h is U ndertak ing  ;
Such other tasks as m ay  be assigned to it by C O M K FO R  in  the interests o f  m aintaining 
the cessation o f  hostilities.
D em ilita risa tio n  a n d  tra n s fo rm a tio n
The U C K  w ill fo llow  the  procedures established by C O M K F O R  for the phased 
dem ilitarisation, transform ation  and m onitoring o f  U C K  forces in  K osovo and for 
further regulation o f  their activities. They w ill no t tra in  o r organise parades w ithout the 
authorithy o f  C O M K FO R .
The U C K  agrees to  the follow ing tim etable w hich w ill com m ence from  the signature o f  
this U ndertaking :
W ithin 7 days, the U C K  shall establish secure w eapons storage sites, w hich  shall be 
registered w ith  and verified  by the K F O R ;
W ithin 7 days the U C K  w ill clear their m inefields and booby  traps, vacate their fighting 
positions and transfer to  assem bly areas as agreed w ith  C O M K F O R  at the JIC.
Thereafter only personnel authorised by C O M K FO R  and  senior O fficers o f  the U C K  
w ith their close pro tection  personnel not exceeding 3, carry ing  side arm s only, w ill be 
allow ed outside the assem bly areas.
A fter 7 days autom atic sm all arm s w eapons no t stored in  the  reg istered  w eapons storage 
sites can only be held  inside the authorised assem bly areas.
A fter 29 days, the  reten tion  o f  any non  autom atic long barrelled  w eapons shall be 
subject to  authorisation by CO M K FO R.
W ithin 30 days, subject to  arrangem ents by  C O M K FO R , i f  necessary , all U C K  
personnel, w ho are no t o f  local origin, w hether or no t they  are  legally  w ith in  K osovo, 
including individual advisors, freedom  fighters, trainers, vo lunteers, and personnel from  
neighbouring and other States, shall be w ithdraw n from  K osovo.
A rrangem ents fo r control o f  w eapons are as follow s :
W ithin 30 days the  U C K  shall store in  the reg istered  w eapons storage sites all 
prohibited w eapons w ith  the exception o f  autom atic sm all arm s. 30 per cent o f  their
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to tal holdings o f  au tom atic sm all arm s w eapons w ill also  be stored in  these sites at this 
stage. A m m unition  for the  rem aining w eapons should  be w ithdraw n and stored at an 
approved site au thorised  by  C O M K FO R  separate from  the  assem bly areas at the sam e 
tim e.
A t 30 days it shall be  illegal for U C K  personnel to  possess proh ib ited  w eapons, w ith  the 
exception o f  autom atic sm all arm s w ithin assem bly areas, and unauthorised long 
barrelled w eapons. Such  w eapons shall be subject to  confiscation  by  the  KFOR.
W ithin  60 days a  further 30 per cent o f  autom atic sm all arm s, g iving a  total o f  60 per 
cent o f  the U C K  hold ings, w ill be stored in  the reg istered  w eapons storage sites.
W ithin  90 days all autom atic sm all arm s w eapons w ill be stored  in  the registered 
w eapons storage sites. Thereafter their possession by  U C K  personnel w ill be  prohibited  
and such w eapons w ill be subject to  confiscation by  K FO R .
From  30 days until 90 days the w eapons storage sites w ill be under jo in t control o f  the 
U C K  and K F O R  under procedures approved by  C O M K FO R  at the JIC . A fter 90 days 
K FO R  w ill assum e full control o f  these sites.
W ith in  90 days all U C K  forces w ill have com pleted the  processes for their 
dem ilitarisation and are to  cease w earing either m ilitary  uniform s or insignia o f  the 
UCK.
W ith in  90 days the C h ie f  o f  G eneral S ta ff U C K  shall confirm  com pliance w ith  the 
above restrictions in  w riting  to  CO M KFO R.
The provisions o f  th is U ndertaking enter into force w ith  im m ediate effect o f  its 
signature by  the K osovar A lbanian  representative(s).
The U C K  intends to com ply  w ith  the term s o f  the  U nited  N ations Security Council 
R esolution 1244, and in  th is context that the international com m unity  should take due 
and full account o f  the  contribution o f  the U C K  during th e  K osovo crisis and 
accordingly  give due consideration  to :
R ecognition that, w hile  the  U C K  and its structures are in  the  process o f  transform ation, 
it is com m itted  to  p ropose individual current m em bers to  participate  in  the 
adm inistration and po lice  forces o f  K osovo, enjoying special consideration in  v iew  o f  
the expertise they  have developped.
The form ation o f  an A rm y in K osovo on  the lines o f  the  U S N ational G uard in  due 
course as part o f  a po litical process designed to determ ine K osovo 's future status, taking 
into account the  R am bouille t Accord.
This U ndertak ing  is p rov ided  in  E nglish  and A lbanian  and i f  there is any doubt as to the 
m eaning o f  the tex t the  E nglish  version has precedence.
A p p e n d ix  A:
R o ad s
Pec - L apusnik  - P ristina  
Border- D jakovica  - K lina
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B order - P rizren  - Suva R eka - P ristina
D jakovica - O rahovac - L apusn ik  - Pristina
Pec-D jakovica - P rizren  - U rosevac - B order
B order - U rosevac - P ristina  - Podujevo - B order
Pristina - K osovska M itrovica - B order
K osovska M itrov ica - (R akos) - Pec
Pec - B order w ith  M ontenegro (through Rozaj)
P ristina  - L isica  - B order w ith  Serbia
P ristina  - G njilane - U rosevac
G rijlane - V elik i Tm ovac - B order w ith  Serbia
Prizren - D oganovic
